Diego Azevedo Leite

Uma das grandes teorias atualmente populares no campo da ciência cognitiva é a Teoria Mecanicista da Cognição Humana (TMCH), que tem sido elaborada por diversos autores influentes nestas duas primeiras décadas do século XXI. Alguns dos seus proponentes mais conhecidos argumentam que ela promove uma nova revolução no campo, que ela é capaz de integrá-lo teoricamente e que ela é capaz de integrá-lo à neurociência. No entanto, um exame minucioso da proposta mostra que ela apresenta inúmeros problemas significativos.

The neo-mechanistic theory of human cognition is currently one of the most accepted major theories in fields, such as cognitive science and cognitive neuroscience. This proposal offers an account of human cognitive computation, and it has been considered by its proponents as revolutionary and capable of integrating research concerning human cognition with new evidence provided by fields of biology and neuroscience. However, some complex cognitive capacities still present a challenge for explanations constructed by using this theoretical structure. In this chapter, I make a presentation of some of the central tenets of this framework and show in what dimensions it helps our understanding of human cognition concerning aspects of capacities, such as visual perception and memory consolidation. My central goal, however, is to show that to understand and explain some particular human cognitive capacities, such as self-consciousness and some conscious informal reasoning and decision making, the framework shows substantial limitations. I conclude the chapter by suggesting that to fully understand human cognition we will need much more than what the neo-mechanistic framework is actually able to provide.

One of the central aims of the neo-mechanistic framework for the neural and cognitive sciences is to construct a pluralistic integration of scientific explanations, allowing for a weak explanatory autonomy of higher-level sciences, such as cognitive science. This integration involves understanding human cognition as information processing occurring in multi-level human neuro-cognitive mechanisms, explained by multi-level neuro-cognitive models. Strong explanatory neuro-cognitive reduction, however, poses a significant challenge to this pluralist ambition and the weak autonomy of cognitive science derived therefrom. Based on research in current molecular and cellular neuroscience, the framework holds that the best strategy for integrating human neuro-cognitive theories is through direct reductive explanations based on molecular and cellular neural processes. It is my aim to investigate whether the neo-mechanistic framework can meet the challenge. I argue that leading neo-mechanists offer some significant replies; however, they are not able yet to completely remove strong explanatory reductionism from their own framework.

Michael Gazzaniga, a prominent cognitive neuroscientist, has argued against reductionist accounts of cognition. Instead, Gazzaniga defends a form of non-reductive physicalism: epistemological neuro-cognitive non-reductionism and ontological monist physicalism. His position is motivated by the theses that: (1) cognitive phenomena can be realized by multiple neural systems; (2) many outcomes of these systems are unpredictable; and (3) multi-level explanations are required. Epistemological neuro-cognitive non-reductionism is presented as the most appropriate stance to account for the way in which phenomena should be explained in cognitive neuroscience. In this paper, I argue, however, that a recent form of (ontological and epistemological) neuro-cognitive reductionism, namely neo-mechanistic reduc-tionism accounts for the arguments presented by Gazzaniga. Thus, the theory offers a more consistent and well-articulated view of the relationship between cognitive and neural phenomena that is specifically compatible with the explanatory strategies and aims of contemporary cognitive neuroscience.

Apesar de a relação entre a psicologia empírica e a antropologia pragmática ser amplamente reconhecida na literatura especializada, não há consenso entre os pesquisadores a respeito da natureza exata dessa relação. O presente trabalho tem o objetivo de investigar este tema no pensamento crítico de Kant durante a década de 1780, de forma a contribuir para um maior esclarecimento sobre este ponto. Especificamente, buscamos compreender a afirmação de Kant, feita na Crítica da Razão Pura (1781), a respeito da inserção da psicologia empírica em uma antropologia pormenorizada. Nossa análise sugere que na década de 1780 é mantida a ligação entre a psicologia empírica e o ponto de vista teórico do conhecimento do homem. Essa ligação explica a afirmação de Kant. Ela significa que a psicologia empírica deve ser considerada antropologia escolástica (teórica) e deve ser mais bem desenvolvida de modo a constituir um campo de investigação autônomo. Além disso, mostramos que há também uma forte ligação entre os conhecimentos teóricos da psicologia empírica e a antropologia do ponto de vista pragmático.

Although the relationship between empirical psychology and pragmatic anthropology is widely recognized in the specialized literature, there is no consensus over the precise nature of this relationship. The present work aims to investigate this topic in Kant’s critical period during the 1780s, in order to contribute to a further clarification of this point. More specifically, we seek to understand Kant’s statement in the Critique of Pure Reason (1781) regarding the inclusion of empirical psychology in a detailed anthropology. Our analysis suggests that in the 1780s the link between empirical psychology and the theoretical point of view of man's knowledge is maintained. This explains Kant’s statement. It means that empirical psychology should be considered scholastic (theoretical) anthropology and should be further developed to constitute an autonomous research field. In addition, we show that there is also a strong link between theoretical knowledge of empirical psychology and anthropology considered from the pragmatic point of view.

A relação entre a psicologia empírica e o projeto de uma antropologia pragmática no pensamento de Kant tem sido frequentemente discutida na literatura secundária. No entanto, não há consenso entre os intérpretes de Kant sobre o sentido exato desta relação. O objetivo do presente trabalho é contribuir para um maior esclarecimento a respeito deste tema, investigando a relação entre psicologia empírica e antropologia no pensamento kantiano nas décadas de 1760 e 1770. Nossa análise sugere que até a primeira metade da década de 1770 Kant utiliza os termos ‘psicologia empírica’ e ‘antropologia’ de forma quase idêntica, e que somente a partir da segunda metade desta mesma década ele introduz uma distinção mais clara e fundamental entre ambas as disciplinas.

The relationship between empirical psychology and the project of a pragmatic anthropology in Kant’s thought has been frequently discussed in the secondary literature. However, there is no consensus among Kant’s interpreters on the exact nature of this relationship. The aim of this paper is to contribute to a better understanding of this topic, by analyzing the relationship between empirical psychology and anthropology in Kant’s thought in the decades of 1760 and 1770. Our analysis suggests that until the first part of the 1770s, Kant uses the terms ‘empirical psychology’ and ‘anthropology’ almost identically, and that only in the second half of that decade he introduces a more clear and fundamental distinction between both disciplines.

This book presents a theoretical critical appraisal of the Mechanistic Theory of Human Cognition (MTHC), which is one of the most popular major theories in the contemporary field of cognitive science. It analyses and evaluates whether MTHC provides a unifying account of human cognition and its explanation. The book presents a systematic investigation of the internal and external consistency of the theory, as well as a systematic comparison with other contemporary major theories in the field. In this sense, it provides a fresh look at more recent major theoretical debates in this area of scientific research and a rigorous analysis of one of its most central major theories. Rigorous theoretical work is integrated with objective consideration of relevant empirical evidence, making the discussions robust and clear. As a result, the book shows that MTHC provides a significant theoretical contribution for the field of cognitive science. The content is useful for those interested in theoretical and empirical issues concerning major theories in the contemporary field of cognitive science.