The Book The Role of Foreign fleets in the decomposition of the naval forces of Byzantium, is concerning on an important issue of decline of Byzantine marine in the twelfth century and the beginning of the thirteenth. The period from...
moreThe Book The Role of Foreign fleets in the decomposition of the naval forces of Byzantium, is concerning on an important issue of decline of Byzantine marine in the twelfth century and the beginning of the thirteenth. The period from 1118 to 1204 was an extremely difficult time for the Byzantine navy and for people involved in shipping in Byzantium. There has been a breakdown of this key element of the armed forces on an unprecedented scale that surpasses all previous threats. The Emperors reigning at that time, as well as their administration were not prepared for the consequences, for what can bring such a process to maritime safety, and above all to the existence of the Empire. We can, therefore, pose a number of questions: Why did the ruling classes of Byzantium were not aware of this state of affairs? Do they have a chance to stop this process? What was the economic role of foreign fleets operating in the Byzantine Empire? What was the reason for the success of the opponents of the empire? Finally, how the naval forces of the Empire were presented against the background of their fleets? So far, no one gave a clear answer to all these questions. To fill this gap and answer to all these questions, we wrote this book.
Due to the fact that we deal with three main causative enemies-Normans, the Italian urban communes and Crusaders, we have to rely on sources originating not only from the environment associated with the Byzantine Empire, but in fact, with almost the whole of medieval Western Europe. We adopted
a problematic system, in order to analyze the source material and its transparency to the readers. This will allow us to track the one hand, an increase in the importance of maritime powers with whom competed Empire, on the other hand measures the Byzantines themselves, which had been an equally important impact on the distribution of naval forces. Therefore, the work will begin with the presentation of the development of the Byzantine fleet between 1118 and 1204, and later the Norman fleet, which in the first half of the twelfth century, grows into the biggest military naval power in the Mediterranean. Their fleet was capable not only to endanger the Byzantine Empire, but also Arabs and cities of northern Italy. The Normans as the main opponent on the sea of the Byzantium in this period deserved such special and wider treatment, because their growing power shades the weakened navy of the Empire.
The Book consists of four chapters. The first chapter is devoted to showing
a internal problems that touch the Byzantine naval forces in the considered period. The first section showed the phenomenon of alienation of these newcomers and their fleets to the common Byzantines. In the second subchapter, we will presented the crisis of the institutions associated with the Navy of the Byzantine Empire. In the third subchapter we fund, the issue of new ships and the development of boatbuilding, with which we are dealing in western and northern Europe during this period, and the effects of which directly and indirectly felt on the Byzantine Empire. The technological changes in boatbuilding were an expression of progress, as well as the ability to use the achievements of others. This was particularly evident in the English fleet, to which in this subchapter we devote
a lot of space, presenting several types of ships and boats, used by English during the Third Crusade mainly against the Byzantines in Cyprus.
The second chapter is presented to the activities of the Normans, and in particular their fleets against the Byzantine Empire during the years 1113-1194. The rapid development of the Norman fleet, which took place during the reign of Roger II, is opposed with passivity of the Byzantines during the reign of John II Comnenus, and the first years of the reign of his son, Manuel. Next we have showed the war which underwent Roger with Byzantium at sea in the late forties of the twelfth century, in which the fleet of Normans played a decisive role. The outbreak of war was associated with the transition of the Second Crusades, during which the Empire was forced to fight hard and rough sea battles with the Normans, who took the opportunity to show the weakness of the regime from Constantinople. The Byzantine counterattack facing south Italy, will be discussed here also. The whole chapter is closed with a showing of the relationship at the sea between the Normans and Byzantines, in the the reign of the last Comnenian and Angelos emperors, when the newcomers from the Apennine Peninsula used the internal crisis in the Empire to hit at Thessalonica. They joined in the struggle for Cyprus, as well as they stood at the gates of Constantinople.
The third chapter consists of two distinct sections, covering the maritime relations between Byzantium and the north-italian urban communes: Venice, Pisa and Genoa. In the first of them it is showed a perverse attitude and role of Venice in the history of the Byzantine navy and trade in the twelfth century (excluding its share in the Fourth Crusade, which merged the interests of the Crusaders with the objectives of the Republic of St. Mark). We have showed, how this relationships have evolved from mutual cooperation and respect, to the open hostility and hatred, which exploded with a huge power in the last decades of the XII century. We have highlight the errors committed by emperors to Venetian naval forces, along with the economic arguments, which gave more power into the hands of the representatives of the Republic of St. Mark. The second and final section is devoted to the showing a fleet and people operations from the two cities, Pisa and Genoa in the years 1118-1201. We have
tried there to answer whether the newcomers from Italy, were actually an ideal alternative as maritime ally of the Byzantine Empire, especially in the western Mediterranean. We will see whether especially Genoese ships and the inhabitants of their metropolis, could become a substitute for the Byzantine fleet. Here pictured is also a process in which newcomers from Pisa and Genoa, used the Venetians model to try to get as many at the expense of Constantinople, and when the power of central Byzantine government over the seas will become illusory, they went to pirate activities, which was not stopped by poor Byzantine navy.
The fourth chapter of this work is used to show the relationship of Byzantine Navy with Crusaders in the years 1144-1204. We have started from the Second Crusade, its partial analyzes and draw lessons from its mistakes, especially in the context of maritime transport. Also we went to pirate activities of Crusaders, which were targeted in the closest to them Byzantine island – Cyprus. We also discuss there the growing importance of fleets of visitor from Northern Europe, whose activity in the Mediterranean, began to change power relations on this waters. In the next section we focus our attention on a only one common Byzantine-Latin military naval operation. This action was an attack on Egypt, made by fleet of basileus Manuel Comnenus, who supported the Crusaders in this country. We showed also to what extent, this largest Byzantine navy offensive operation in the twelfth century, accelerated decay, especially of the imperial fleet, which was previously the backbone of the naval forces of the Empire. The third section shows the history of the Third Crusade, with a huge emphasis on the English fleet of king Richard the Lionheart. We pictured here the trail’s of naval forces of the King of England, who conquered island Cyprus, which rebelled earlier from the power of emperors of Constantinople. The loss of this province and the inability to recover it, is a further evidence of degradation of the Byzantine fleet. Chapter closes the history of maritime activities during Fourth Crusade. The Venice together with the Crusaders, made an act that could not be done before by anyone. They captured twice Constantinople from the sea. Could there be a better proof of the complete decomposition of the Byzantine fleet, since it was not able to stop modern fleet of the Republic at the gates of the capital of the Empire?
The fate of the Byzantine fleet itself is a kind of background for the activities of other navies that changed the face of the Medieval Mediterranean world. The work is closed with two annexes. The first will deal with the actions of the Byzantines on inland waters (mainly the Danube),in the reign of John Comnenus and his son Manuel. Little or no activity on the seaworthy rivers, is very strong evidence of decomposition of naval forces of Empire, which for such action has been established. In this annex will try to prove it. The second annex will address issue of the Prosopography of the Byzantine commanders of this period.