Operation Sledgehammer: Difference between revisions

The operation was eagerly pressed for by both the United States military and the Soviet Union, but rejected by the British, who concluded a landing in France was premature, and hence impractical.<ref name="Husen1999">{{cite book|last1=Husen|first1=editor, David T. Zabecki ; assistant editors, Carl O. Schuster, Paul J. Rose, William H. Van|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=gYDN-UfehEEC&pg=PA1270|title=World War II in Europe : an encyclopedia|date=1999|publisher=Garland Pub.|isbn=9780824070298|page=1270}}</ref><ref name="Mackenzie2014">{{cite book|last1=Mackenzie|first1=S.P.|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=GsUFBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA55|title=The Second World War in Europe: Second Edition|date=2014|publisher=Routledge|isbn=978-1317864714|pages=54–55}}</ref> As a result, Sledgehammer was never carried out, and instead the British proposal for an invasion of [[French North Africa]] took place in November 1942 under the code name [[Operation Torch]].

On 8 April, General [[George Marshall]] and [[Harry Hopkins]] arrived in BritaBritain to press the case for two possible American plans for a landing in Occupied France, Operation Roundup and Operation Sledgehammer.

Sledgehammer was a plan to capture the French seaports of either Brest or Cherbourg during the early autumn of 1942 if Germany or the Soviet Union was at the brink of collapse.<ref>{{cite book|url= http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/sp1943-44/introduction.htm |title=Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare 1943-19441943–1944|chapter= Introduction: The Basis of Strategy|publisher=Center of Military History United States Army|date=1990|access-date=April 9, 2016 |last= Matloff |first= Maurice}}</ref> Sledgehammer was to be carried out mainly by British troops as the Americans could only supply two or three trained divisions in time.<ref>{{Cite book|url= https://books.google.com/books?id=hF8SDgAAQBAJ&pg=PT223|title=The Marshall Story: A Biography of General George C. Marshall|last= Payne |first=Robert|date=2017-02-07|publisher=Pickle Partners Publishing |isbn=9781787203990|language=en978-1-78720-399-0 |quote=Sledgehammer was to be a largely British operation}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|url= https://books.google.com/books?id=WQoWBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA258 |title=The Impact of the First World War on U.S. Policymakers: American Strategic and Foreign Policy Formulation, 1938–1942|last= Carew |first=Michael G.|date=2014-07-18|publisher=Lexington Books|isbn=9780739190500|language=en 978-0-73919050-0 |quote=Sledgehammer, which of necessity would be a largely British operation, given the lack of trained American forces in 1942.}}</ref> Churchill responded that it was "more difficult, less attractive, less immediately helpful or ultimately fruitful than Roundup". After capturing Cherbourg and areas on the Cotentin Peninsula, the beachhead was to be defended and held through the winter of 1942 and into 1943 while troops were massed for a breakout operation to take place in spring 1943. The plan became popular and received the code name Sledgehammer. Hopkins added additional political weight to the proposed plan by opining that if US public opinion had anything to do with it, the war effort would be directed instead against Japan if an invasion of mainland Europe was not mounted soon.

If Sledgehammer had been carried out, the British could have landed only six divisions at most, but the Germans had 25-3025–30 divisions in Western Europe. Assuming that it could be established in the first place, a beachhead on the Cotentin peninsula would be blocked off and attacked by land, sea and air. Cherbourg, the only suitable port, would no doubt be mined, and aircraft and artillery would be expected to attack the town in strength while the German armored forces were brought to bear.

British officials pressed for action in North Africa, which would allow relatively-inexperienced American forces to gain experience in a less risky theatre and the gradual buildup of overwhelming force before Germany was engaged head on.<ref name="Husen1999">{{cite book|editor-first1=David T. |editor-last1=Zabecki |others=Assistant editors: Carl O. Schuster, Paul J. Rose, William H. Van Husen |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=gYDN-UfehEEC&pg=PA1270|title=World War II in Europe : an encyclopedia|date=1999|publisher=Garland Pub.|isbn=9780824070298|page=1270}}</ref><ref name="Mackenzie2014">{{cite book|last1=Mackenzie|first1=S.P.|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=GsUFBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA55|title=The Second World War in Europe: Second Edition|date=2014|publisher=Routledge|isbn=978-1317864714|pages=54–55}}</ref> At the [[Second Washington Conference]] in June 1942, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill decided to postpone the cross-[[English Channel]] invasion until 1943 and make the first priority the [[North African campaign|opening a second front in North Africa]]. At the Second Claridge Conference in London, July 20 – 2620–26, Churchill and Roosevelt aid Harry Hopkins agreed to substitute [[Operation Torch]], the invasion of [[French North Africa]], for US reinforcement of the [[Western Desert campaign]].<ref name=":0">{{cite book|url= https://books.google.com/books?id=VRiYAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA135|title=Routledge Handbook of US Military and Diplomatic History|date= 2013 |publisher=Taylor and& Francis|isbn=9781135071028978-1-13507102-8 |location = Hoboken |page=135}}</ref>

Senior U.S. commanders expressed strong opposition to the landings and after the western Allied [[Combined Chiefs of Staff]] (CCS) met in London on 30 July, General Marshall and Admiral [[Ernest King]] declined to approve the plan. Marshall and other U.S. generals continued to advocate Operation Sledgehammer, which the British rejected.<ref name="Husen1999"/><ref name="Mackenzie2014"/> After Prime Minister Churchill pressed for a landing in French North Africa in 1942, Marshall suggested instead to President Roosevelt that the U.S. abandon the [[Germany first]] strategy and take the offensive in the Pacific. Roosevelt said it would do nothing to help Russia.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Ward|first1=Geoffrey C.|chapter-url = https://books.google.com/books?id=V73CAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA402|title=The Roosevelts: An Intimate History|last2=Burns|first2=Ken|date=2014|publisher=Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group|isbn=978-03853530690-38535306-9|pagespage =402|chapter= The Common Cause: 1939-19441939–1944}}</ref> With Marshall unable to persuade the British to change their minds,<ref name= ":0" /> President Roosevelt gave a direct order that Torch was to have precedence over other operations and was to take place at the earliest possible date, one of only two direct orders he gave to military commanders during the war.{{Reference needed |date=June 2024}} Torch met the British objective of securing victory in North Africa and the American objective to engage in the fight against Nazi Germany on a limited scale.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Willmott |first=H.P. |url=https://archive.org/details/june194400will |title=June, 1944 |publisher=Blandford Press |year=1984 |isbn=0-7137-1446-8|location=Poole, Dorset}}</ref>{{Page needed |date=June 2024}}

In the interim, a large-scale Canadian-led [[Dieppe Raid |raid on the French coast]] was planned to take some of the pressure off the Soviet Union.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Normandy Landings, Operations Overlord and Neptune|url= http://www.naval-history.net/WW2CampaignsNormandy.htm |access-date= 2020-11-27|website=www.naval-history.net Naval History}}</ref>

In November 1942 Eisenhower, now a [[Lieutenant general (United States)|lieutenant general]], told Churchill that no major operation on the Continent could be carried out before 1944.<ref name= "morison">[[Samuel Eliot Morison]], ''The Invasion of France and Germany'', {{ISBN|0-316-58311-1}}, pp 7-177–17</ref>

==ReferencesNotes==