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{{Short description|Planned World War II military operation}}
{{About|a World War II military operation|the 2012 Somali National Army and AMISOM offensive|Battle of Kismayo (2012)|the 2007 Operation that was part of Operation Marne Torch|Operation Sledgehammer (2007)}}
'''Operation Sledgehammer''' was a World War IIan [[Allies of World War II|Allied]] plan for a cross-[[English Channel|Channel]] invasion of Europe during [[World War II]], as the first step in helping to reduce pressure on the Soviet [[Red Army]] by establishing a [[Western Front (World War II)|Second Front]],. It was to be executed in 1942 and developedacted as a contingency alternative to [[Operation Roundup (1942)|Operation Roundup]], the original Allied plan for the invasion of Europe in 1943. Allied forces were to seize the French Atlantic ports of either [[Brest, France|Brest]] or [[Cherbourg-Octeville|Cherbourg]] and areas of the [[Cotentin Peninsula]] during the early autumn of 1942, and amass troops for a breakout in the spring of 1943.
 
The operation was eagerly pressed for by both the United States military and the Soviet Union, but rejected by the British, who feltconcluded a landing in France was premature, and hence impractical. <ref name=Husen1999/><ref name=Mackenzie2014/> This perception was reinforced by the failure of the smaller [[Dieppe Raid]] in August 1942. As a result, Sledgehammer was never carried out, and instead the British proposal for an invasion of [[French North Africa]] took place in November 1942 under the code name [[Operation Torch]].
 
==History==
=== Background ===
After the United States entered World War II, the U.S. [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]] pressed for an invasion of mainland Europe via the English Channel "as soon as possible", i.e. the early part of 1942. The British were, however, reluctant, as it was felt that other places had a higher priority, the time was not right and insufficient men and landing craft were available. British officials pressed for action in North Africa which would allow relatively inexperienced American forces to gain experience in a less risky theatre while gradually building up overwhelming force before engaging Germany head on.<ref name=Husen1999>{{cite book|last1=Husen|first1=editor, David T. Zabecki ; assistant editors, Carl O. Schuster, Paul J. Rose, William H. Van|title=World War II in Europe : an encyclopedia|date=1999|publisher=Garland Pub.|isbn=9780824070298|page=1270|url=https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=gYDN-UfehEEC&pg=PA1270&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiNp_GU4vXLAhUBWxQKHd9CDkQQ6AEIPTAG#v=onepage&q&f=false}}</ref><ref name=Mackenzie2014>{{cite book|last1=Mackenzie|first1=S.P.|title=The Second World War in Europe: Second Edition|date=2014|publisher=Routledge|isbn=1317864719|pages=54–55|url=https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=GsUFBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA55&&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwicw4jk4PXLAhVBlhQKHepMDJUQ6AEINzAF#v=onepage&q&f=false}}</ref>
After the United States entered World War II in December 1941, the U.S. [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]] pressed for an invasion of [[mainland Europe]] via the English Channel "as soon as possible". In March 1942, in a letter to British Prime Minister [[Winston Churchill]], U.S. President [[Franklin Roosevelt]] wrote:
 
{{quoteQuote|I am becoming more and more interested in the establishment of a new front this summer on the European continent, certainly for air and raids. From the point of view of shipping and supplies it is infinitely easier for us to participate in because of a maximum distance of about three thousand miles. And even though losses will doubtless be great, such losses will be compensated by at least equal German losses and by compelling the Germans to divert large forces of all kinds from the Russian front.|Roosevelt to Churchill, 9 March 1942}}
The U.S. tended to regard this reluctance as an example of British caution but since at the time they lacked the resources to carry out such an operation themselves, the result was stalemate, along with increased pressure on the British, which began in March 1942 with a letter from [[President of the United States|President]] [[Franklin D. Roosevelt|Roosevelt]] to [[Winston Churchill]]:
 
On 8 April, General [[George Marshall|General George Marshall]] and [[Harry Hopkins]] arrived in Britain to press the case for two possible American plans for a landing in Occupied France, Operation Roundup and Operation Sledgehammer.
{{quote|I am becoming more and more interested in the establishment of a new front this summer on the European continent, certainly for air and raids. From the point of view of shipping and supplies it is infinitely easier for us to participate in because of a maximum distance of about three thousand miles. And even though losses will doubtless be great, such losses will be compensated by at least equal German losses and by compelling the Germans to divert large forces of all kinds from the Russian front.|Roosevelt to Churchill, 9 March 1942}}
 
===Operation SledgehammerRoundup plan===
On 8 April, [[George Marshall|General George Marshall]] and [[Harry Hopkins]] arrived in Britain to press the case for two possible American plans for a landing in Occupied France, Operation Roundup and Operation Sledgehammer.
[[Operation Roundup (1942)|Roundup]] was tothe beoriginal executedAllied byplan 48for Alliedthe divisions, 18invasion of whichcontinental would be BritishEurope. It was to be mounted before April 1943 and executed by 48 divisions, 18 of which would be British.
 
===Operation RoundupSledgehammer plan===
Sledgehammer was a plan to capture the French seaports of either Brest or Cherbourg during the early autumn of 1942 in the event thatif Germany or the Soviet Union was at the brink of collapse.<ref>{{cite book|url= http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/sp1943-44/introduction.htm |title=Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare 1943-19441943–1944|chapter= Introduction: The Basis of Strategy|publisher=Center of Military History United States Army|date=1990|accessdateaccess-date=April 9, 2016 |last= Matloff |first= Maurice}}</ref> Sledgehammer was to be carried out mainly by British troops as the Americans could only supply two or three trained divisions in time.<ref>{{Cite book|url= https://books.google.co.ukcom/books?id=hF8SDgAAQBAJ&lpg=PT223&ots=9iREOGAt2x&pg=PT223#v=onepage&q&f=false|title=The Marshall Story: A Biography of General George C. Marshall|last= Payne |first=Robert|date=2017-02-07|publisher=Pickle Partners Publishing|year= |isbn=9781787203990|location=|pages=|language=en978-1-78720-399-0 |quote=Sledgehammer was to be a largely British operation}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|url= https://books.google.co.ukcom/books?id=WQoWBAAAQBAJ&lpg=PA258&ots=SJfb3DWett&pg=PA258#v=onepage&q&f=false |title=The Impact of the First World War on U.S. Policymakers: American Strategic and Foreign Policy Formulation, 1938–1942|last= Carew |first=Michael G.|date=2014-07-18|publisher=Lexington Books|year=|isbn=9780739190500|location=|pages=|language=en 978-0-73919050-0 |quote=Sledgehammer, which of necessity would be a largely British operation, given the lack of trained American forces in 1942.}}</ref> Churchill responded that it was "more difficult, less attractive, less immediately helpful or ultimately fruitful than Roundup". After capturing Cherbourg and areas on the Cotentin peninsulaPeninsula, the beachhead was to be defended and held through the winter of 1942 and into 1943, while troops were massed for a breakout operation to take place in spring 1943. ThisThe plan became popular and received the codenamecode name Sledgehammer. Hopkins added additional political weight to the proposed plan by opining that if U.S.US public opinion had anything to do with it, the U.S. war effort would be directed instead against Japan if an invasion of mainland Europe was not mounted soon.
[[Operation Roundup (1942)|Roundup]] was to be executed by 48 Allied divisions, 18 of which would be British. It was to be mounted before April 1943.
 
However, the elements required for such an operation were lacking, i.e.: air superiority, amphibious warfare equipment, sufficient forces and adequate supply. DespiteIn allspite of this, the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered Sledgehammer to be feasible.
===Operation Sledgehammer===
Sledgehammer was a plan to capture the French seaports of either Brest or Cherbourg during the early autumn of 1942 in the event that Germany or the Soviet Union was at the brink of collapse.<ref>{{cite book|url=http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/sp1943-44/introduction.htm|title=Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare 1943-1944|chapter=Introduction: The Basis of Strategy|publisher=Center of Military History United States Army|date=1990|accessdate=April 9, 2016|last=Matloff|first= Maurice}}</ref> Sledgehammer was to be carried out mainly by British troops as the Americans could only supply two or three trained divisions in time.<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=hF8SDgAAQBAJ&lpg=PT223&ots=9iREOGAt2x&pg=PT223#v=onepage&q&f=false|title=The Marshall Story: A Biography of General George C. Marshall|last=Payne|first=Robert|date=2017-02-07|publisher=Pickle Partners Publishing|year=|isbn=9781787203990|location=|pages=|language=en|quote=}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=WQoWBAAAQBAJ&lpg=PA258&ots=SJfb3DWett&pg=PA258#v=onepage&q&f=false|title=The Impact of the First World War on U.S. Policymakers: American Strategic and Foreign Policy Formulation, 1938–1942|last=Carew|first=Michael G.|date=2014-07-18|publisher=Lexington Books|year=|isbn=9780739190500|location=|pages=|language=en|quote=Sledgehammer, which of necessity would be a largely British operation, given the lack of trained American forces in 1942.}}</ref> Churchill responded that it was "more difficult, less attractive, less immediately helpful or ultimately fruitful than Roundup". After capturing Cherbourg and areas on the Cotentin peninsula, the beachhead was to be defended and held through the winter of 1942 and into 1943, while troops were massed for a breakout operation to take place in spring 1943. This plan became popular and received the codename Sledgehammer. Hopkins added additional political weight to the proposed plan by opining that if U.S. public opinion had anything to do with it, the U.S. war effort would be directed instead against Japan if an invasion of mainland Europe was not mounted soon.
 
If Sledgehammer had been carried out, the British could have landed only six divisions at most, whereasbut the Germans had 25-3025–30 divisions in Western Europe. Assuming that it could be established in the first place, a beachhead on the ContinentalCotentin peninsula would be blocked off and attacked by land, sea and air. Cherbourg, the only suitable port, would no doubt be mined, whileand aircraft and artillery would be expected to attack the town in strength, while the German armouredarmored forces were brought to bear.
However, the elements required for such an operation were lacking, i.e. air superiority, amphibious warfare equipment, sufficient forces and adequate supply. Despite all this, the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered Sledgehammer feasible.
 
The pressure to mount Sledgehammer increased further when Soviet Foreign Minister [[Vyacheslav Molotov]] arrived in the UKBritain to press for a Second Front. After trying and failing to persuade Churchill, Molotov travelled on to Washington where he enjoyed a better reception and received more support for his requests. He then returned to London and was convinced that a Secondsecond Frontfront in 1942 was an actualactually part of Anglo-American policy.
If Sledgehammer had been carried out, the British could have landed only six divisions at most, whereas the Germans had 25-30 divisions in Western Europe. Assuming it could be established in the first place, a beachhead on the Continental peninsula would be blocked off and attacked by land, sea and air. Cherbourg, the only suitable port would no doubt be mined, while aircraft and artillery would be expected to attack the town in strength, while German armoured forces were brought to bear.
 
===Course of events===
The pressure to mount Sledgehammer increased further when Soviet Foreign Minister [[Vyacheslav Molotov]] arrived in the UK to press for a Second Front. After trying and failing to persuade Churchill, Molotov travelled on to Washington where he enjoyed a better reception and received more support for his requests. He then returned to London convinced that a Second Front in 1942 was an actual part of Anglo-American policy.
{{Further|List of Allied World War II conferences}}
 
British officials pressed for action in North Africa, which would allow relatively-inexperienced American forces to gain experience in a less risky theatre and the gradual buildup of overwhelming force before Germany was engaged head on.<ref name="Husen1999">{{cite book|editor-first1=David T. |editor-last1=Zabecki |others=Assistant editors: Carl O. Schuster, Paul J. Rose, William H. Van Husen |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=gYDN-UfehEEC&pg=PA1270|title=World War II in Europe : an encyclopedia|date=1999|publisher=Garland Pub.|isbn=9780824070298|page=1270}}</ref><ref name="Mackenzie2014">{{cite book|last1=Mackenzie|first1=S.P.|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=GsUFBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA55|title=The Second World War in Europe: Second Edition|date=2014|publisher=Routledge|isbn=978-1317864714|pages=54–55}}</ref> At the [[Second Washington Conference]] in June 1942, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill decided to postpone the cross-[[English Channel]] invasion until 1943 and make the first priority the [[North African campaign|opening a second front in North Africa]]. At the Second Claridge Conference in London, July 20–26, Churchill and Roosevelt aid Harry Hopkins agreed to substitute [[Operation Torch]], the invasion of [[French North Africa]], for US reinforcement of the [[Western Desert campaign]].<ref name=":0">{{cite book|url= https://books.google.com/books?id=VRiYAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA135|title=Routledge Handbook of US Military and Diplomatic History|date= 2013 |publisher=Taylor & Francis|isbn=978-1-13507102-8 |location = Hoboken |page=135}}</ref>
===British proposal===
Churchill pressed for a landing in North Africa in 1942. U.S. Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall suggested instead to Roosevelt that the U.S. abandon the [[Europe first|Germany-first]] strategy and take the offensive in the Pacific. Roosevelt "disapproved" the proposal saying it would do nothing to help Russia.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Ward|first1=Geoffrey C.|last2=Burns|first2=Ken|title=The Roosevelts: An Intimate History|date=2014|publisher=Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group|isbn=0385353065|url=https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=V73CAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&pg=SA6-PA69-IA6#v=onepage&q&f=false|chapter=The Common Cause: 1939-1944}}</ref> With Roosevelt's support, and Marshall unable to persuade the British to change their minds, in July 1942 [[Operation Torch]], the invasion of French North Africa, was scheduled for later that year.<ref>{{cite book|title=Routledge Handbook of US Military and Diplomatic History|date=2013|publisher=Taylor and Francis|location=Hoboken|isbn=9781135071028|page=135|url=https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=VRiYAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA135&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwip0Jbc4vXLAhXIuBoKHXC4DYgQ6AEIQzAH#v=onepage&q&f=false}}</ref>
 
Senior U.S. commanders expressed strong opposition to the landings and after the western Allied [[Combined Chiefs of Staff]] (CCS) met in London on 30 July, General Marshall and Admiral [[Ernest King]] declined to approve the plan. Marshall and other U.S. generals continued to advocate Operation Sledgehammer, which the British rejected.<ref name="Husen1999"/><ref name="Mackenzie2014"/> After Prime Minister Churchill pressed for a landing in French North Africa in 1942, Marshall suggested instead to President Roosevelt that the U.S. abandon the [[Germany first]] strategy and take the offensive in the Pacific. Roosevelt said it would do nothing to help Russia.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Ward|first1=Geoffrey C.|chapter-url = https://books.google.com/books?id=V73CAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA402|title=The Roosevelts: An Intimate History|last2=Burns|first2=Ken|date=2014|publisher=Knopf Doubleday |isbn=978-0-38535306-9|page =402|chapter= The Common Cause: 1939–1944}}</ref> With Marshall unable to persuade the British to change their minds,<ref name= ":0" /> President Roosevelt gave a direct order that Torch was to have precedence over other operations and was to take place at the earliest possible date, one of only two direct orders he gave to military commanders during the war.{{Reference needed |date=June 2024}} Torch met the British objective of securing victory in North Africa and the American objective to engage in the fight against Nazi Germany on a limited scale.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Willmott |first=H.P. |url=https://archive.org/details/june194400will |title=June, 1944 |publisher=Blandford Press |year=1984 |isbn=0-7137-1446-8}}</ref>{{Page needed |date=June 2024}}
==References==
{{reflist}}
 
In the interim, a large-scale Canadian-led [[Dieppe Raid |raid on the French coast]] was planned to take some of the pressure off the Soviet Union.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Normandy Landings, Operations Overlord and Neptune|url= http://www.naval-history.net/WW2CampaignsNormandy.htm |access-date= 2020-11-27|website= Naval History}}</ref>
== Further reading ==
 
In November 1942 Eisenhower, now a [[Lieutenant general (United States)|lieutenant general]], told Churchill that no major operation on the Continent could be carried out before 1944.<ref name= "morison">[[Samuel Eliot Morison]], ''The Invasion of France and Germany'', {{ISBN|0-316-58311-1}}, pp 7–17</ref>
 
== See also ==
* [[Diplomatic history of World War II]]
* [[Operation Bolero]]
 
==Notes==
 
{{Reflist|30em}}
 
==References==
 
* {{cite book |last=Matloff |first=Maurice |title=Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943–1944 |series=[[United States Army in World War II]] – The War Department |location=Washington, D.C. |publisher=Office of the Chief of Military History |year=1959 |url=https://history.army.mil/html/books/001/1-4/CMH_Pub_1-4.pdf |access-date=1 June 2017 |oclc=670082949 }}
* {{Cite book | last = Neillands | first = Robin | authorlink = | coauthors = | title = The Dieppe Raid | publisher = Indiana University Press | year = 2005 | location = | pages = | url = | doi = | id = | isbn = 978-0-253-34781-7}}
* {{cite book |last=Stoler |first=Mark A. |title=The Politics of the Second Front: American Military Planning and Diplomacy in Coalition Warfare, 1941-1943 |series =Contributions in Military History |id=No. 12 |publisher=Greenwood Press |location=Westport, Connecticut |year=1977 |isbn=0-8371-9438-5 |oclc=3003289 }}
* {{cite book |last=Stoler |first=Mark A. |title=Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and US Strategy in World War II |publisher=UNC Press Books |location= Chapel Hill, North Carolina |year=2003 |isbn=978-0-8078-5507-2 |oclc=315731885 }}
* {{cite thesis |last=Strange |first=Joseph L. |title=Cross-Channel Attack, 1942: The British Rejection of Operation Sledgehammer and the Cherbourg Alternative |publisher=University of Maryland |degree=PhD |year=1984 |url=https://www.proquest.com/docview/303317233 |access-date=8 June 2024 |id={{ProQuest|303317233}} |via=ProQuest }}
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[[Category:Battles and operations of World War II]]