(Go: >> BACK << -|- >> HOME <<)

Justiciability: Difference between revisions

Content deleted Content added
Line 17:
For a dispute to rise to the level of a case or controversy, it must first have a party seeking to enforce its rights before a court in a manner prescribed by law; that is, under the ordinary processes established by law and custom. Implicitly, this requires that the dispute be one of a nature commonly viewed as capable of having a court act upon it in specific and conclusive manner. For a court to act upon a case, however, the dispute must concern a definite and concrete matter. For it to even be a dispute, it requires the parties have adverse legal interests. From these characteristics may be distilled factors determining the justiciability of a case or controversy before a federal court:
 
# As an initial question in every case before any federal court, the dispute must fall within the [[subject-matter jurisdiction]] of the federal courts as set out in Article III, §&nbsp;2.
# Federal courts may not issue [[advisory opinions]]. That is, a dispute before a federal court must involve an real question of fact or law, and must be neither hypothetical, abstract, speculative, nor academic. Disputes wherein a party seeks [[Declaratory judgment|declaratory relief]] do not qualify as advisory opinions because the dispute itself is over where the precise boundaries of each party's rights and obligations are to be drawn and the court's decision resolves that dispute in a manner binding upon each party.
# The dispute must involve an [[actual controversy]] between the parties before the court;<ref>''[http://supreme.justia.com/us/219/346/case.html Muskrat v. United States]'', {{ussc|219|346|1911}}</ref> that is, the parties must be seeking a different legal outcome. This rule prevents federal courts from hearing a collusive suit or [[friendly suit]].
# With respect to the timetiming of the dispute, the question must be neither [[ripeness|unripe]] nor [[mootness|moot]].<ref>''[http://supreme.justia.com/us/367/497/case.html Poe v. Ullman]'', {{ussc|367|497|1961}}; ''[http://supreme.justia.com/us/416/312/case.html DeFunis v. Odegaard]'', {{ussc|416|312|1974}}</ref>
#* A dispute is [[ripeness|unripe]] when either no concrete injury exists, or where no concrete injury is imminently pending. An example where a dispute may be unripe would be one in which every alternative to judicial resolution has not yet been [[Exhaustion of remedies|exhausted]].
#* A dispute is [[mootness|moot]] when one of the parties has lost its stake in the outcome. This can occur where the cause of the injury has ceased or the injury has been removed. However, to prevent legal gamesmanship, several exceptions to the mootness doctrine exist.
Line 31 ⟶ 32:
::Examples of political questions include such issues as whether the nation is "at war" with another country, or whether the [[U.S. Senate]] has properly "tried" an [[impeachment|impeached]] federal officer.
 
Where a dispute cannot clear itself of all of the above factors, a federal court is considered as constitutionally barred from hearing it. Even if a case does clear all of the above factors, it still may be constitutionally barred if the parties themselves lack [[standing (law)|standing]].
 
==== Prudential rules ====
While certain disputes may clear all of the constitutional factors of justiciability and standing which otherwise would bar it from being heard in federal court, the courts themselves have created other rules which may serve to divest a dispute of its justiciable nature. The concepts undergirding the constitutional factors for justiciability and standing generally serve to support the court-created prudential rules.
 
Federal courts typically use the following rules to dismiss disputes as nonjusticiable:
# The general rule against federal or state taxpayer standing. However, this rule has exceptions rooted in the [[First Amendment to the United States Constitution|First Amendment]].
# The rule against [[third-party standing]] or third-party claims.
# The rule against generalized grievances.
# The zone of interest test.
 
However, other prudential rules exist which might save a dispute from the prudential rules above:
# Representational standing. The form of standing allows for organizations and associations to represent their members, agents to represent their principals, states to represent their citizens, assignees to prosecute their assigned claims, and finally, in the context of First Amendment overbreadth challenges, the pursuit of claims involving the rights of potentially chilled third parties.
# Federal and state legislative standing. This rule allows legislators standing to litigate claims defending their institution's powers and prerogatives.
# Adverse intervenor standing.<ref>''See'' [[United States v. Windsor]], {{ussc|570|744|2013}}, ''but see'' [[Hollingsworth v. Perry]], {{ussc|570|693|2013}}.</ref> This rule allows an adverse third party to intervene in litigation where the initial adverse parties have come to a tentative agreement that would thereafter result in a friendly suit, provided the adverse intervenor will suffer some concrete harm were the outcome to comport with the agreement reached by the initial parties.
 
As with judge-made rules in general, Congress has power to expand, limit, or prohibit prudential justiciability rules by law.
 
=== State courts ===