1 The Role of Pope Honorius III in the Fifth Crusade1 Thomas W. Smith In the historiography on the Fifth Crusade, the idea that the expedition represented the epitome of a ‘papal crusade’ still looms large. Thomas Van Cleve wrote that in planning the Fifth Crusade, Pope Innocent III took ‘every precaution to insure that the plans did not miscarry through falling into the hands of others than the chosen agents of the church ... the Fifth Crusade was to be above all else a papal crusade’.2 Helmut Roscher, writing contemporaneously with Van Cleve, argued the exact opposite. He forcefully made the case that Innocent did not attempt to keep the Fifth Crusade under exclusively papal direction, stating that ‘the idea that Innocent wanted to exclude the kings from the crusade no longer holds up’.3 Nonetheless it has endured. Hans Mayer maintained that Innocent III had deliberately sought to exclude the kings of Europe from the crusade and that he fought ‘to make the crusade an ecclesiastical and specifically a papal enterprise.’4 Mayer concluded his account of the Fifth Crusade by asserting that it was ‘the Church’s final attempt to turn the crusade into an enterprise directed and led by her alone.’5 James Powell was influenced by the view of Roscher and cautiously sided with him over the topic of papal crusade leadership, making the astute point that, because of the sporadic departure of crusaders, ‘the role left for the pope was that of a coordinator and at times a clearinghouse for information, rather than a director of operations.’6 Elsewhere in Powell’s work there are nevertheless indicators that he considered Pope Honorius III to have had ‘control over the conduct of the war’, at least for a time.7 Innocent III’s supposed desire for total control over the Fifth Crusade stemmed from an apparently broader aim for papal control of the crusade movement, and Donald Queller and Thomas Madden have argued that Innocent also meant the Fourth Crusade ‘to be wholly under papal control.’8 Christopher Tyerman suggested that the notion of the pope as willing director of the Fifth Crusade is flawed, but did not drive the point home.9 While 1 I wish to thank Bernard Hamilton and Barbara Bombi for kindly commenting on this paper. Thomas C. Van Cleve, ‘The Fifth Crusade’, in HC, vol. 2, p. 378. 3 Helmut Roscher, Papst Innocenz III. und die Kreuzzüge (Göttingen, 1969), p. 154: ‘Die These, Innocenz habe die Könige vom Kreuzzug fernhalten wollen, ist nicht länger zu halten.’ 4 Hans Eberhard Mayer, The Crusades, 2nd edn, trans. John Gillingham (Oxford, 1988), pp. 216– 17, 218. 5 Ibid., p. 227. 6 Anatomy, pp. 111, 108. 7 Ibid., p. 172. 8 Donald E. Queller and Thomas F. Madden, The Fourth Crusade: The Conquest of Constantinople, 2nd edn (Philadelphia, 1997), p. 1. 9 Christopher Tyerman, God’s War: A New History of the Crusades (London, 2006), p. 606. 2 2 Pierre-Vincent Claverie does not subscribe to the idea that the papacy purposely attempted to exclude the kings of Europe from the leadership of the crusade, he writes that Honorius ‘entrusted the direction of the crusade’ to the legate Pelagius, Cardinal-Bishop of Albano, ‘who had already defended the interests of the Holy See in the East’.10 The problem is that insufficient distinction has been made between the decisions of Innocent III who planned the crusade and Honorius III who presided over its execution. Honorius’s role during the Fifth Crusade still requires unravelling. His undeniably important efforts in supporting the crusade by taxing the clergy, recruiting reinforcements, and communicating with the crusade’s legate have been confused with the direction of the military campaign itself. In this chapter I shall analyse the dispositio clauses of Honorius’s letters to the crusade army (these sections contained the pope’s decisions and orders) to determine whether Honorius sought to direct the crusade from the curia. 11 This is something which has not previously been done. Honorius left the responsibility for leading and directing the Fifth Crusade up to the leadership council drawn from the crusade army – a loose amalgamation of the most powerful crusaders with the army at any point, among whom at different times were King John of Jerusalem, King Andrew II of Hungary, Duke Leopold VI of Austria, Duke Louis of Bavaria, and also the papal legate a latere, Pelagius.12 The Fifth Crusade had no single undisputed leader and was characterized by relatively short periods of service. Most crusaders only campaigned for about a year rather than committing themselves to fight until the end, as had been the case on previous crusades.13 Pelagius was undoubtedly influential in the direction of the Fifth Crusade, but a distinction must be made between the roles of the legate and the pope. The focus of this chapter is to assess the level of control that the pope exerted over the crusade from the curia, rather than the legate on the ground. Honorius’s registers (Vatican City, Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Registra Vaticana 9–13) prove that the pope was in close contact with the crusade. Between 1217 and 1221 he is recorded to have sent fifteen letters regarding the Pierre-Vincent Claverie, Honorius III et l’Orient (1216–1227): Étude et publication de sources inédites des Archives vaticanes (ASV) (Leiden, 2013), p. 46: ‘Honorius confia la direction de la croisade durant l’été au cardinal Pélage d’Albano, qui avait déjà défendu les intérêts du SaintSiège en Orient.’ 11 On dispositio clauses, see: Reginald L. Poole, Lectures on the History of the Papal Chancery down to the time of Innocent III (Cambridge, 1915), pp. 43–4; Thomas Frenz, Papsturkunden des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit, 2nd edn (Stuttgart, 2000), p. 12. 12 Anatomy, p. 114; Guy Perry, John of Brienne: King of Jerusalem, Emperor of Constantinople, c.1175– 1237 (Cambridge, 2013), pp. 97–8. 13 Anatomy, p. 116. 10 3 expedition to the army and its leaders.14 It appears that we possess the majority of the pope’s correspondence with the crusaders in the registers, despite the selective registration of letters that was practised at Honorius’s curia.15 The papacy often chose to register letters that were in the curia’s interest, such as those that concerned crusades and other political affairs, but this was by no means a mandatory procedure.16 Many of Honorius’s crusade letters can be matched with corresponding missives from recipients – especially Emperor Frederick II – through which references to the existence of a few lost papal crusade letters can be discovered and the tenor of their contents approximated.17 References to now-lost documents in the narratio clause of papal letters (which outlined the events leading up to their issue) are another means by which lost correspondence can be identified.18 Despite the prospect that we may be missing other papal letters to the crusade army of which no such traces remain, the number, content, and topical range of those recorded in Honorius’s registers represent more than enough evidence from which to draw firm conclusions on the nature of the pope’s control over the Fifth Crusade. The first letters despatched by Honorius regarding the course of the crusade were issued as a pair on 24 July 1217. They are both concerned with the proposed meeting of the main crusade contingents from Europe on Cyprus, planned for 8 September 1217. Honorius despatched one to a number of Italian 14 The fifteen letters examined in this paper are those sent to the army and the legate on the subject of the crusade: Pressutti, vol 1, nos. 673, 1580, 1581, 1824, 2195, 2338, 2514, 2517, 2574, 2575, 2610, 2800, 2866, 2940, 3478. Honorius also sent ten letters to Pelagius concerning his other duties as legate in the Near East: ibid., nos. 1298, 1394, 1433, 1524, 1527, 1528, 1540, 2876, 3495, 3500. Similarly, one other letter was also despatched to King John of Jerusalem regarding his claim to the Armenian throne: ibid., no. 2320. These extra letters, however, do not directly impinge upon the question of Honorius’s control over the Fifth Crusade and therefore are not examined in this paper, although they do prove that Honorius was in very close contact with the crusade army and especially his legate. 15 For registration practice at Honorius’s curia, see Jane E. Sayers, Papal Government and England during the Pontificate of Honorius III (1216–1227) (Cambridge, 1984), pp. 71–5. 16 There was no unequivocal pattern for the registration of curial letters, although letters of importance – such as those regarding the crusade – were often included: Paulus Rabikauskas, Diplomatica pontificia, 6th edn (Rome, 1998), p. 82. Harry Bresslau warned that although the papacy’s important outgoing political letters were frequently registered, this was not always the rule, and therefore the registers do not represent a complete record of papal political correspondence: Harry Bresslau, Handbuch der Urkundenlehre für Deutschland und Italien, 3rd edn (3 vols, Berlin, 1958), vol. 1, p. 121. 17 For example, see below, p. ##, for the lost papal letter to the emperor-elect Frederick, issued around late November 1218. 18 For example, see below, p. ##, for the crusader report despatched to the curia immediately after arrival of the legate Pelagius in Egypt in autumn 1218. On narratio clauses in papal letters, see: Poole, Lectures, pp. 43–4; Frenz, Papsturkunden, p. 12. 4 clergy informing them that Andrew II, Leopold VI, and all the other crusaders were going to meet on Cyprus – presumably to decide on strategy – and ordered the clergy to preach the crusade.19 A slight variation of this letter was addressed to King John of Jerusalem, the patriarch of Jerusalem, and the Templars and the Hospitallers in the kingdom of Jerusalem.20 This letter informed the recipients of the planned meeting, and invited them to attend or send messages to Cyprus so that the crusaders might have their counsel. Although the meeting on Cyprus does not seem to have actually occurred (probably on account of coordination problems), it seems likely that it was conceived to allow the Western crusaders to muster and strategize before arriving in John’s territory, presumably in an effort to prevent the king from assuming overall leadership of the crusade. Honorius’s attempt to exclude John from a potentially decisive strategy meeting may represent a papal effort to manipulate the leadership and course of the crusade, but in an indirect manner.21 These letters were a papal sleight of hand rather than an emphatic expression of authority, however, and probably derived more from the wishes of Andrew II himself than from the pope. Indeed, since Andrew had already written to John regarding the Cyprus muster (which Honorius referred to in his own letter to John), the pope was following the king of Hungary’s lead.22 Andrew and Honorius had exchanged a number of letters in 1217 in the run-up to the king’s crusade, and it is possible that Andrew may have expressed a desire to exclude John during this dialogue.23 After the initial skirmishing of the Fifth Crusade in the Holy Land during the autumn of 1217, the master of the Knights Templar in the Holy Land, William of Chartres, composed and sent the first despatch from the crusade to Honorius, 19 Vatican City, Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Registra Vaticana 9, fol. 138r; Pressutti, vol. 1, no. 672; Bullarium Cyprium, ed. Christopher Schabel, Charles Perrat, and Jean Richard, 3 vols (Nicosia, 2010–12), vol. 1, no. c-3, pp. 183–5. 20 Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 138r: ‘ut secundum tue discretionis consilium in negotio Christi ordinate procedant, sicut idem rex tue celsitudini per suas litteras dicitur intimare, serenitatem rem rogamus et monemus attentes quatinus sicut causam Christi zelaris, eis illuc per te vel sollempnes nuntios occurrere non omittas impensurus eisdem, prout tua noscitur specialiter interesse consilium et auxilium oportunum.’; Pressutti, vol. 1, no. 673; Bullarium Cyprium, vol. 1, no. c-4, pp. 185–6. 21 For a more detailed discussion of this, as well as Honorius’s relations with John of Brienne and Frederick II, see: Thomas W. Smith, ‘Between Two Kings: Pope Honorius III and the Seizure of the Kingdom of Jerusalem by Frederick II in 1225’, Journal of Medieval History, 41 (2015), pp. 41–59. 22 Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 138r: ‘sicut idem rex tue celsitudini per suas litteras dicitur intimare’; Pressutti, vol. 1, no. 673; Bullarium Cyprium, vol. 1, no. c-4, p. 185. 23 Pressutti, vol. 1, nos. 291, 330, 371. For a more detailed analysis of the Cyprus meeting in particular, and Honorius’s relations with John as king of Jerusalem in general, see: Smith, ‘Between Two Kings’, esp. pp. 48–9. 5 which was received at the curia towards the end of November.24 The report recounted the early activities of the crusaders, the state of their provisions, and their plan to besiege the Egyptian city of Damietta. There is no recorded response to William, but on 24 November Honorius did send letters to the archbishops of Oristano (Sardinia) and Reims which included a copy of William’s report, and celebrated the successful launch of the crusade, demonstrating one of the curia’s key functions of transferring information between the Near East and the West and vice versa.25 It is unlikely that Honorius would have sent this letter to Oristano and Reims alone. Rather it is extremely plausible to suggest that the letter was sent to most, if not all, of the prelates of the West, and that the copies to Oristano and Reims were the only ones to survive. In August 1218 the curia received its second despatch from the crusade, now laying siege to Damietta. On 15 June the crusaders had written to the pope informing him of events and requesting reinforcements from Europe.26 The receipt of this despatch at the curia led to a two-stage response. Honorius’s first action was to reply to the crusaders directly on 13 August, notifying them that the curia was continuing to raise support in Europe and was sending crusaders on to Damietta via the Italian port cities.27 Honorius’s role as a sponsor of the crusade is further emphasized in the letter’s dispositio which only carried the order to stand firm and unified in vigorously carrying out the siege, whilst reassuring them that the curia was working tirelessly to support them.28 The second part of the pope’s response to the crusader despatch was to issue another letter at around the same time to the French contingent assembling at Genoa, which included Count Hervé of Nevers, Count Hugh of La Marche, and William of Chartres’ report has been dated to the end of October 1217: Pierre-Vincent Claverie, L’Ordre du Temple en Terre Sainte et à Chypre au XIIIe siècle, 3 vols (Nicosia, 2005), vol. 3, no. 499, pp. 432–3. 25 Reg. Vat. 9, fols 177r–78r; Pressutti, vol. 1, no. 885. The in eundem modum copy sent to Reims is not recorded in the register, but is printed in RHGF, vol. 19, p. 639. The archbishop of Oristano in Sardinia (Alboren’ in the papal register) proved troublesome to identify, and I gratefully acknowledge help from Anne Duggan and Jan Vandeburie which set me on the right path. For the identification of Oristano with the Latin title Arboren’, see: Numerus et tituli cardinalium, archiepiscoporum, & episcoporum Christianorum, [editor unknown] (Paris, 1545), p. 24. 26 The crusader report is preserved as a copy in Honorius’s letter to the crusaders at Genoa: Reg. Vat. 10, fols 9v–10r; Pressutti, vol. 1, no. 1581. 27 Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 10; Pressutti, vol. 1, no. 1580; Bullarium Cyprium, vol. 1, no. c-22, pp. 207– 09. 28 Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 10: ‘Interim igitur vos sicut fideles servi et strenui milites Ihesu Christi firmi et constantes estote, ac quod pernecessarium est unanimes et concordes quasi vir unius uno numero serviatis Domino Deo vestro, et quicquid oculos divine maiestatis offendit, quantum humana permittit fragilitas evitetis, ita ut supernum auxilium quod nostris et aliorum fidelium precibus vobis impetrare satagimus, debeatis merito expectare.’; Pressutti, vol. 1, no. 1580; Bullarium Cyprium, vol. 1, no. c-22, pp. 208–09. 24 6 now also Robert of Courçon.29 This letter actually contains very few of the pope’s own words, and is really only a brief papal exhortation flanking a copy of the crusaders’ report of 15 June at both ends. The dispositio ordered those massing at Genoa to hurry to Egypt, because, as the crusaders stated, Damietta and the whole of Egypt might be delivered over to the Christians.30 The copying of the crusader despatch into the pope’s own letter to the French contingent is evidence of papal coordination rather than direction: Honorius supported the crusaders by rallying the knightly classes of Europe, but did not reply with his own orders for how the crusade should continue. Another crusader report – no longer extant – appears to have arrived at the curia in November 1218. A papal letter issued in response on 27 November, addressed to the archbishop of Sens, the crusaders in his diocese, and the archbishops of England and France, refers to such a report being received, and specifically names the legate Pelagius as being one of the authors, thus making it distinct from the 15 June report.31 It therefore seems almost certain that on his arrival in Egypt in the autumn passage of 1218, Pelagius, with the crusade leadership, took the opportunity to write a despatch on their dire financial situation at the time, and then sent it back to the curia on one of the crusader ships turning around and heading for home. The papal letter of 27 November recounts that the crusaders had urgently petitioned for men and money to pay for siege machines and galleys, and notified Reg. Vat. 10, fols 9v–10r; Pressutti, vol. 1, no. 1581. This letter is dated using the ‘Datum ut supra’ formula in the register. The letter registered immediately before it is dated 27 August, whereas the reply to the crusade army registered immediately after it is dated 13 August. If one places one’s trust in the dating formula, then the date of this letter to the French contingent must be 27 August; it is possible, though, that this is a case of scribal error. 30 Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 10r: ‘Monemus igitur universitatem vestram, rogamus et exhortamur in Domino, per apostolica vobis scripta precipiendo mandantes quatinus attendentes discriminamus in quo positus est exercitus Christianus nisi succursum habuerit festinatum, provideatis et disponatis ac irrefragabiliter ordinetis quod tam vos quam alii crucesignati qui ad portum Ianuensem conveniunt versus Damiatam in nomine Domini sabaoth dirigatis celeriter iter vestrum, quia sicut et littere ipse innuunt et nuntii qui attulerunt eas expressissime dicunt, certa spes est quod si vos et alii crucesignati applicueritis ad civitatem iamdictam, et illa et tota Egyptus ab eo cuius est terra et plenitudo eius dabitur in manus populi Christiani.’; Pressutti, vol. 1, no. 1581. 31 Pelagius did not arrive until autumn 1218 and so was too late to help compose the 15 June report, whose authors were named as the patriarch of Jerusalem, King John, the archbishop of Nicosia, Jacques de Vitry, bishop of Acre, the bishop of Bethlehem, the duke of Austria, the masters of the Hospital, Temple and Teutonic Orders, and all the barons, clergy, and people besieging Damietta: Reg. Vat. 10, fols 9v–10r; Pressutti, vol. 1, no. 1581. The later and now-lost second report which Honorius refers to in his letter of 27 November 1218 was sent by the patriarch of Jerusalem, Pelagius, bishop of Albano apostolice sedis legatus, King John, the masters of the Hospital, Temple and Teutonic Orders, the duke of Austria, the foremost among the Roman contingent, and the other prelates and magnates besieging Damietta: Reg. Vat. 10, fols 30v–31v; Pressutti, vol. 1, no. 1716. 29 7 the recipients that the curia was hurrying to send aid to the East. In the dispositio Honorius ordered that crusaders from the territories of the recipients should depart in the March or May passages at the latest.32 After organising the requested transfer of funds to Egypt, Honorius wrote to Pelagius and the masters of the Hospitallers and Templars on 23 January 1219 informing them to expect receipt of five thousand marks, of which the master of each Order was to receive exactly half.33 In the dispositio Honorius gave no specific instructions for the distribution of funds, instead leaving it up to the recipients.34 The crusader report also appears to have prompted the curia to move to engage the emperor-elect Frederick as one of the reinforcements requested from Egypt, and highlights the pope’s role as the chief supporter, sponsor, and advocate of the crusade. Although we possess no record of the text of Honorius’s attempt to engage Frederick in the Fifth Crusade, it is clear that a papal letter was issued. Frederick sent a letter to Honorius on 12 January 1219 which reveals that the emperor-elect was replying to a recent (now lost) papal letter he had received that set out the state of the Holy Land.35 It is plausible to suggest that this lost letter must have been sent at around the same time as the 27 November letter to the archbishops of England and France on the same theme. Honorius may have urged Frederick to leave by the feast of John the Baptist (24 June 1219) in the lost papal letter, because in his reply Frederick bound himself to this deadline. Despite Frederick’s promise to crusade imminently, he repeatedly delayed his departure and regularly missed deadlines throughout the Fifth Crusade because of his domestic affairs.36 After failing to meet his 24 June 1219 deadline, a second Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 31r: ‘Monemus igitur universitatem vestram et obsecramus per aspersionem sanguinis Ihesu Christi, qui pro vobis tradidit semetipsum, quatinus ponentes ante oculos vestre mentis quantum gaudium quantaque exultatio erit iustis in Domino, si ceptum negotium finem ipso dante habuerit exoptatum, et apud vos recogitantes e contra, quantam confusionem quantumque memorem contrarium afferret toti populo Christiano, prefato exercitui succurratis, sicut res expostulat festinanter providentes quod vos filii crucesignati proximo Martio vel saltem Madio transfretetis’; Pressutti, vol. 1, no. 1716. 33 Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 50r; Pressutti, vol. 1, no. 1824. 34 Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 50r: ‘Quocirca devotionem tuam de qua plenam in Domino fiduciam obtinemus, monemus et hortamur attente, per apostolica tibi scripta mandantes quatinus provideas diligenter, ut pretaxata pecunia ita utiliter expendatur, quod nos nostro proposito nullatenus defraudemur, quin potius gaudentes exinde quod intendamus adimpletum ad subveniendum Terre predicte magis ac magis iugiter accendamur.’; Pressutti, vol. 1, no. 1824. 35 H-B, vol. 1, pp. 584–6. Frederick’s letter was also copied into Honorius’s register: Reg. Vat. 10, fols 57r–58r. 36 Rudolf Hiestand, ‘Friedrich II. und der Kreuzzug’, in Friedrich II.: Tagung des Deutschen Historischen Instituts in Rom im Gedenkjahr 1994, ed. Arnold Esch and Norbert Kamp (Tübingen, 32 8 deadline of 29 September 1219 was set.37 On 7 September, with this new deadline rapidly approaching and Frederick being no closer to departing, Honorius replied to a letter of Pelagius.38 The papal letter was mostly concerned with the matter of sending funds from the collection of the twentieth tax to the crusade army, but at the end Honorius included a note stating that Frederick was angling for the imperial crown before setting out. The purpose of the letter was again to relay information to the crusade army, and the dispositio merely ordered that Pelagius should try to hold the army together (‘as another Joshua’) until Frederick’s arrival.39 When Damietta finally fell to the crusaders on 5 November 1219, the crusade leadership wrote to the pope on 11 November to update him and to beg for reinforcements and funds.40 The crusaders asked the pope to compel Frederick and other crusaders to come. The next day, a group of nobles including Simon de Joinville wrote a separate letter to Honorius in support of King John’s claim to Damietta, and asked that the city be made over to the kingdom of Jerusalem, using the justification that it would make peace among the crusaders.41 These despatches from the crusaders did not reach the curia until February 1220. On 24 February Honorius issued a response to the letter of 11 November (there is no registered reply to the nobles’ letter of 12 November).42 Honorius congratulated the army on its success and picked out Pelagius for special praise. Presumably prompted by the letter supporting John’s claim to Damietta, Honorius voiced his concern of dissension permeating the army and in the dispositio ordered that the crusaders show Pelagius due devotion and respect to prevent 1996), p. 135; David Abulafia, Frederick II: A Medieval Emperor (London, 1988), pp. 128–9; Wolfgang Stürner, Friedrich II., 1194–1250 (2 vols, Darmstadt, 1992–2000), vol. 2, p. 87. 37 Reg. Vat. 10, fols 96v–97r; Pressutti, vol. 1, no. 2071. 38 Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 128; Pressutti, vol. 1, no. 2195. 39 Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 128v: ‘Noveris autem multitudinem signatorum ad Terre Sancte festinare succursum ad quem etiam karissimus in Christo filius noster Fredericus illustris Sicile in Romanorum Imperatorem electus speratur recepta Imperii corona in proximo accessurus, quare sicut alter Iosue populum Domini corrobora et conforta sustinens et sustinere docens difficilia quoque animis indefessis, ut opus Dei quod laudabiliter incepisti, ipso auctore valeas feliciter consumare.’; Pressutti, vol. 1, no. 2195. 40 A copy of the crusaders’ letter is preserved in the Chronicon Tolosani canonici Faventini, in Cronache dei secoli XIII e XIV, Documenti di Storia Italiana 6 (Florence, 1876), pp. 704–06. Anatomy, p. 164. 41 Chronicon Tolosani, pp. 706–07. Guy Perry has also drawn attention to a previously unknown third letter written at this time by John of Brienne to the emperor-elect, Frederick. It is closely connected to the barons’ letter of 12 November: Perry, John of Brienne, pp. 103–09. The letter is edited in ibid., pp. 198– 200. See also the paper in the present volume: Guy Perry, ‘From King John of Jerusalem to the Emperor-Elect Frederick II: A Neglected Letter from the Fifth Crusade’, pp. ##. 42 Reg. Vat. 10, fols 161v–62v; Pressutti, vol. 1, no. 2338. 9 this.43 Had the pope wished, this turning-point in the campaign would have been a good opportunity to send any strategic directions to the army, but again, Honorius merely supported the army and bolstered the position of his legate rather than attempting to control the campaign.44 The pope was striving to maintain the cohesion of the crusade host until Frederick could arrive to assume overall command. The main role of Pelagius – at least as perceived at the curia – was to bind the army together until this time. In this sense the expedition was far from a ‘papal crusade’. As the crusade wore on, the emperor-elect Frederick continued to defer his crusade departure. In two documents issued on 24 July 1220, Honorius informed Pelagius to expect receipt of funds from the twentieth, sent a comprehensive account of its collection and distribution between 1218 and 1220, and also updated the legate on Frederick’s situation.45 Honorius announced that Frederick would not be able to arrive in Rome for his imperial coronation before the feast of St Michael (29 September 1220), after which he would finally depart on crusade. The dispositio simply ordered Pelagius to continue striving to maintain the integrity of the crusade host in the meantime.46 These documents supplemented another two letters that had been issued to Pelagius on 1 July, notifying the legate that funds were being transferred through the Paris houses of the Hospitallers and Templars.47 Honorius played a crucial role in the crusade by transferring relevant information to keep the army abreast of European affairs that had a bearing on its strategic direction. Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 162v: ‘Ideoque universitatem vestram rogamus attentius et hortamur per apostolica vobis scripta precipiendo mandantes quatinus eidem in predictis omnibus devote ac humiliter more solito intendatis.’; Pressutti, vol. 1, no. 2338. 44 Much has been made of the award of temporal power to Pelagius in this letter, but Powell has argued convincingly that the term temporalia merely reinforced Pelagius’s original appointment mandate and referred to Pelagius’s power to divide new territorial conquests, rather than representing the appointment of the legate as the crusade’s military leader. Anatomy, p. 180; James M. Powell, ‘Honorius III and the Leadership of the Crusade’, Catholic Historical Review, 63 (1977), pp. 530–1. See also Joseph P. Donovan, Pelagius and the Fifth Crusade (Philadelphia, 1950), p. 70; Van Cleve, ‘Fifth Crusade’, pp. 420–1. 45 Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 1; Pressutti, vol. 1, no. 2574; Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 1v; Pressutti, vol. 1, no. 2575. 46 Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 1v: ‘Porro licet exhortatione non indigeas aliena qui stabilitus fidei firmamento, spei erectus virtute, caritatis fervore succensus, et totius divine armature a dextris, et a sinistris protectione munitus faciente Domino tecum signum in bonum nosti confortare manus dissolutas et genua debilia roborare, ne tamen aliquid de contingentibus omittere videamur, fraternitatem tuam monemus et hortamur in Domino quatinus in ipso confidens qui dat virtutes, et premia elargitur semper ad fortia studeas mittere manus tuas, ut de virtute proficiens in virtutem bravium accipias destinatum.’; Pressutti, vol. 1, no. 2574. 47 Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 193v; Pressutti, vol. 1, no. 2514. Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 195; Pressutti, vol. 1, no. 2517. 43 10 Around Easter 1220, King John left the crusade army to travel back to the kingdom of Jerusalem. When news of his departure reached the curia, Honorius attempted to exert control over John and issued a letter addressed to him on 11 August 1220.48 The letter complained of the damage that John’s absence was doing to the crusade, and Honorius counselled the king to return to it. The dispositio ordered John not to attack Christian Armenia under threat of anathema.49 John did not return until 7 July 1221 – just in time for the crusade’s doomed march into the Egyptian interior. Historians have given a number of explanations for his return, but the fact that it took eleven months from the issue of the papal letter for John to return to the crusade army implies that he was not only motivated to return by the pope’s strictest orders, as Mayer and Van Cleve have propounded.50 Honorius’s attempt to exert control over a prominent crusade leader was thus only partially successful, and reveals the pope trying to restore the existing status quo rather than imposing a new direction on the crusade. After crowning Frederick emperor on 22 November 1220, Honorius wrote to Pelagius on 30 November, informing him of developments at the curia.51 As it stood, Frederick was planning to leave in August, and Duke Louis of Bavaria would lead a vanguard force in March. Honorius told his legate that in urging the duke on, the curia had promised him two thousand marks from Pelagius’s funds, and in the dispositio ordered the legate to set this money aside unless Louis delayed, in which case Pelagius was authorized to use the money to support the crusade by another means.52 Honorius then wrote to Pelagius again on 15 December, restating Frederick’s expected departure date, and ordering in the 48 Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 7r; Pressutti, vol. 1, no. 2610. Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 7r: ‘Licet igitur confidamus quod tu hec prudenter attendens evitabis aliquid attemptare per quod perire ac evacuari posset totus labor quem hactenus pro Terra Sancta subiit populus Christianus, ex habundanti tamen sub obtentu gratie divine ac nostre et sub anathematis pena tibi auctoritate presentium districtissime inhibemus, ne hoc tempore aliquatenus arma moveas contra ipsos Armenos aut quos libet alios Christianos, sed studeas ut tota Christianitas ultramarina in unitate consistat, et venerabili fratre nostro Pelagio Albanensi episcopo aspostolice sedis legato qui strenuitatem tuam frequenter suis nobis litteris commendavit, sicut persone nostre reverenter intendens, studeas quod commune populi Christiani negotium desideratum largiente Domino consequatur effectum, postmodum tuis specialibus commodis operam decentius utiliusque daturus.’; Pressutti, vol. 1, no. 2610; Claverie, Honorius III, no. 49, p. 359. 50 Steven Runciman, A History of the Crusades: The Kingdom of Acre and the Later Crusades (Cambridge, 1954), p. 167; Linda Goldsmith, ‘John of Brienne (d. 1237)’, in The Crusades: An Encyclopedia, ed. Alan V. Murray (4 vols, Santa Barbara, 2006), vol. 2, p. 691; Van Cleve, ‘Fifth Crusade’, p. 424; Mayer, Crusades, p. 226. 51 Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 37v; Pressutti, vol. 1, no. 2800. 52 Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 37v: ‘Ideoque fraternitati tue presentium auctoritate mandamus quatinus si dux ipse moram in exercitu Christiano fecerit congruentem, dictam pecuniam sibi de hiis que tibi Dominus per misericordiam suam et per nostrum studium ministrabit, per diversos terminos tribuas cum ea providentia et cautela, quod in iamdicte Terre subsidium convertatur.’; Pressutti, vol. 1, no. 2800. 49 11 dispositio that the legate rally the crusaders to stand firm until the emperor’s arrival.53 Even after achieving his diplomatic goal of imperial coronation, Frederick still did not leave on crusade, and Honorius sent another letter to Pelagius on 2 January 1221 commenting on the uncertain nature of Frederick’s participation.54 As a result, Honorius suggested in the dispositio that Pelagius might probe the matter of a temporary truce with the Muslims to see if a deal could be struck that would be to the glory of God and Christendom, and then report back to the curia.55 Aside from the letter pressuring King John to rejoin the army, Honorius’s order to seek a truce is the only real example of Honorius explicitly seeking to direct the course of the crusade. Yet this order was not couched in unequivocal terms, and only instructed Pelagius in the subjunctive that he might provide for a truce (‘provideat’) – the decision to conclude a temporary peace was thus left to the legate’s judgement. On 20 June 1221, Honorius issued his last letter to the leadership before the Fifth Crusade foundered.56 This letter to Pelagius, the Military orders, and the archbishop of Bordeaux concerned Frederick’s delays and the advancement of the crusade. The narratio reveals that Pelagius had written back to the pope about the terms of a potential peace treaty, which Honorius and the legate agreed were unsatisfactory.57 The dispositio therefore ordered the recipients to proceed carefully in the meantime until Frederick’s arrival.58 Although Honorius did Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 49r: ‘Confortare ergo in Domino et in eius servitio Christiani exercitus corda confirma, desideratum succursum favente Domino magnifice habiturus.’; Pressutti, vol. 1, no. 2866. 54 Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 61v; Pressutti, vol. 1, no. 2940. 55 Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 61v: ‘Quid autem ipse et ante coronationem suam et in die ipsius coronationis promiserit quamque sollemptniter promissionem suam in omnium astantium audientia publicaverit, et quos et quales, et quantos sollicitaverimus ad subsidium Terre Sancte per alias litteras iam ad te credimus provenisse, verum quia futura frequenter dubio suspenduntur eventu circumspectio tua provideat si medio tempore possit haberi tractatus qui ad gloriam Dei et Christianitatis cedat honorem, et quod occurrerit nobis ante quam stabilias aliquid cito et caute rescribas, ut facta collatione de illis, que per te nobis fuerint intimata, et hiis que tunc parata viderimus ad succcursum dirigatur prudentius negotium Ihesu Christi, et provideatur salubrius subsidio Terre Sancte.’; Pressutti, vol. 1, no. 2940. 56 Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 146; Pressutti, vol. 1, no. 3478; Claverie, Honorius III, no. 54, pp. 366–8. 57 Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 146r: ‘Porro benigne receptis litteris tuis et consideratis que olim a parte altera sunt oblata, et que ab eadem noviter offeruntur, pactio in litteris ipsis expressa, cum iam dudum conditionem habere potuerimus eque bonam sicut te quasi statim quod Egyptum applicuisti accepimus referente, grata nobis non potuerit existere vel accepta.’; Pressutti, vol. 1, no. 3478; Claverie, Honorius III, no. 54, p. 366. For analysis of the grounds for rejecting the two peace treaties offered during the Fifth Crusade, see Perry, John of Brienne, pp. 96–7. 58 Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 146v: ‘Cum autem nos in sinu circumspectionis tue caput intrepidi reclinemus, per apostolica tibi scripta mandamus quatinus predicta diligenter attendens et circumstantias consideramus universas, habito magnorum et prudentum virorum de exercitu quos videris expedire 53 12 intervene in the direction of the crusade at this juncture, the important conclusion to make is that the pope was content to be guided by his legate’s judgement rather than dictating a course of action. Having examined the dispositio clauses of all Honorius’s extant letters to the army of the Fifth Crusade we can conclude that despite being in close contact with the army leadership, the pope’s role was indeed that of a coordinator and supporter rather than a director. Most of the letters carried information on Frederick’s preparedness and the collection of the twentieth rather than papal orders for the expedition’s direction. There is no evidence in the registers that Honorius sought overall command of the crusade, which would have been impractical anyway given his reliance on information from the army and the time delay between issue and receipt of correspondence, which was measured in months and was heavily dependent on the sailing seasons that dictated Mediterranean crossings.59 Only three letters from the entire crusade were orders that sought to influence the campaign’s direction. The three letters concerned the muster on Cyprus, King John’s intentions in Armenia, and the question of a temporary truce.60 Even the import of these documents must be considered with the caveats explored above in mind. Honorius appears to have been satisfied to allow the crusade’s leadership – among whom the legate Pelagius could be counted – to control the campaign, and did not direct, or attempt to direct, the Fifth Crusade himself from the papal curia in Italy. consilio sive super hoc seu super aliis cum ea que te decet et tantum negotium maturitate procedas prout ad gloriam Dei et Christianitatis salutem cognoveris procedendum.’; Pressutti, vol. 1, no. 3478; Claverie, Honorius III, no. 54, pp. 366–8. 59 The average passage from the West to the Holy Land took around four to six weeks, and most journeys were made during the two seasonal passages - the first lasting from late March until early April, and the second from late September until early October - in order to avoid the more dangerous winter sailing conditions. Sailing back to the West from the Near East against the prevailing winds took about twice as long as the journey made with the winds. See John H. Pryor, Geography, Technology, and War: Studies in the Maritime History of the Mediterranean, 6491571 (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 3, 117, 87, 36. 60 Pressutti, vol. 1, nos. 673, 2610, 2940.