Reynaldo Ileto, Foreword to Elizabeth Angsioco (editor), Talang Buhay ng Supremo And. Bonifacio sa Kabite [Supremo Andres Bonifacio in Cavite], manuscript by Heneral Emilio Aguinaldo. Published in 2020 by the National Historical Commission of the Philippines. [final version for copyediting] The image that the public has of Emilio Aguinaldo today is largely shaped by the 2015 movie, Heneral Luna. The film attempts to portray Antonio Luna as the greatest general ever produced by the Philippine Revolution, whose murder in 1899 is regarded as the beginning of the end of effective Filipino resistance to the Americans. Ironically, the villain in the story ends up being, not the American invader, but Aguinaldo himself, through the insinuation that he is ultimately responsible for the gruesome murder of his most accomplished commander. This negative portrayal is clinched by the movie s flashback to an earlier event in which Aguinaldo is implicated in the execution of the Katipunan leader, Andres Bonifacio. A movie that arguably is the best production to date about the Filipino-American War, ends up with the disturbing suggestion that the real war
was, and continues to be, within Filipino society itself. Luna represents the selfless patriot, the ilustrado who sacrifices his career and ultimately his life in the defense of the motherland, while Aguinaldo is the prototype of the provincial politician who maintains his hold on power through personal loyalties and the elimination of rivals. The sinister portrayal of Aguinaldo and the construction of a heroic--if arrogant and impulsive--Luna is based largely on a book by Vivencio Jose, which draws heavily on the writings of Luna. Jose s work was published in 1971, when Aguinaldo s reputation was at an all-time low owing to the upsurge in Bonifacio-inspired student radicalism and perhaps also because then-President Marcos was trying to identify himself with the president of the Malolos Republic. Heneral Luna would have become a lasting masterpiece had Aguinaldo been treated more fairly by tapping the works of even just one other scholar, Teodoro Agoncillo, whose books about Bonifacio, Aguinaldo, and Luna were published in 1956 and 1960. Agoncillo s research benefitted immensely from the direct access he had to General Aguinaldo from the mid-1940s onward. In fact, Aguinaldo may have started 1 to write his memoirs in 1946 in response to Agoncillo s prodding. The bulk of his memoirs finally saw print in 1964 under the title, Mga Gunita ng Himagsikan. They supplement, in Aguinaldo s own writing, Agoncillo s majestic reconstruction of the events of 189697. The present publication is a shorter compendium of Aguinaldo s memoirs, obviously related to the 1964 book, yet intended by Aguinaldo to be a self-standing work that focuses on Bonifacio s sojourn in Cavite. Much of what Aguinaldo writes about concerns the battles between the Filipino and Spanish forces in Cavite from the time Bonifacio arrived to take over the command of one of the two politico-military zones into which Cavite was divided. His account of the war casts light into his abilities as a military commander, a dimension of his career that is obscured in the portrayal of Luna as, in the words of Gen. James Franklin Bell, the only General the Filipino Army had.
It also helps to clarify the circumstances leading to the execution of Bonifacio. The Talang Buhay begins with an account of Andres Bonifacio s entry into Cavite. A revolutionary government had already been organized in that province some three months prior. The arrival of the Katipunan Supremo would change the internal political landscape because although he was the acknowledged founder of the Katipunan secret society in Manila, which Aguinaldo had joined, he was nevertheless a native of Tondo, Manila, and therefore an outsider
whose connection with Cavite was through his wife s family. As Aguinaldo and Bonifacio met and exchanged the latest news about the progress or otherwise of the rebellion, sounds of gunfire could be heard in the distance. We must not forget that the political tensions between Aguinaldo, Bonifacio and their respective parties were played out in a war zone, never too far from where Spanish and mainly Caviteño rebel forces were engaged in combat. The information provided by Aguinaldo reveals that underlying the political tensions sparked by Bonifacio s move to Cavite was a shift in the revolutionary movement s center of gravity. While it all began with the Bonifacio-led uprising in Manila and its environs, the Spanish counterattacks and reprisals had dislodged Bonifacio from his Manila base. Bonifacio confided to 2 Aguinaldo that his military orders were no longer being obeyed by his Katipunan subordinates after the defeats at Balintawak and other places. Bonifacio, in fact, expressed his gratitude to Aguinaldo for the uprising in Cavite that prevented further Katipunan defeats. The suppression of the Katipunan in the Manila area triggered a movement of people southward to Cavite. As Aguinaldo puts it, at the time Bonifacio and his men moved to Cavite, many men and women, not necessarily Katipuneros, had entered Cavite to join the rebels there. Among them was the mayor of Pateros, a certain Santiago, who came over with his men. The coming of Bonifacio was an occasion for the Magdiwang and Magdalo factions in Cavite to joyfully get together and enjoy the momentary unity of the opposing factions. Aguinaldo, however, could not stay long in the festivities. He had to take leave to join the fight at Zapote. Both factions experienced a brief period of unity upon Bonifacio s arrival. After all, he was the recognized supremo of the Katipunan, which had sparked the revolution. However, early in the Talang Buhay, Aguinaldo writes that Bonifacio then proceeded to organize his own army, separate from Aguinaldo s. The Magdiwang government changed in character; the Supremo was crowned Haring Bayan (Sovereign Monarch), a title he attached to his signature, and his associates were awarded titles of Virrey (Viceroy) and Ministros. The Talang Buhay reiterates Aguinaldo s insistence, in his various writings, that conflict between the two wings of the Katipunan in Cavite was inevitable because the Magdiwang was Maka-Hari (monarchist), while the Magdalo was Republikano. The monarchist impulse makes sense if we put ourselves in the context of that historical period. In 1841, Apolinario de la Cruz (or Hermano Pule of the ill-fated Cofradia de San Jose) was crowned king of the Tagalogs
by his followers, steeped as they were in the world of awit and korido. Bonifacio himself was a fan of this literary genre, his favorite being the awit of the Spanish king Bernardo Carpio, who had long been localized by the Tagalogs. Telesforo Canseco writes that while some Caviteños lamented the execution of Spanish friars, just as many prayed for the triumph of the insurrection
and, during Holy Week, the 3 coadjutor led public prayers for the triumph of the king of the Tagalogs.
Was this a reference to Haring Bayan Bonifacio? The other side
to insinuations about Bonifacio s monarchical ambitions was the latter s scornful dismissal of Aguinaldo s sympathies toward certain Spanish friars. If Bonifacio was makahari,
the counteraccusation was that Aguinaldo was makaprayle.
The gravity of the mudslinging is evident in the Talang Buhay. On the one hand are Aguinaldo s sarcastic references to the Haring Bayan
and on the other is the story of how Bonifacio circulated a forged document purporting to reveal a conspiracy (sabwatan) between Aguinaldo and the Jesuit padre Pio Pi to hand over the rebels guns to the Spaniards at Naik. While Aguinaldo clearly believed that the time had come to put an end to the Spanish clergy s domination of society, he did not view the friars as a class but rather judged them on the basis of their work in their parishes. He narrates how he pleaded with Bonifacio to spare the lives of two of three Spanish friars who had been taken into custody by the Magdalo but entrusted to the Magdiwang. His reasoning was that the two were truly good men (talagang mabait). Bonifacio scornfully rejected the pleas. The Talang Buhay portrays Bonifacio as categorically anti-friar. As far as he was concerned, the frailes were all false priests who pretended to be holy men while inflicting untold cruelties on the people. He had vowed (naipanumpa) to execute all the Spanish friars who fell into his hands  in revenge, perhaps, for what they had done to Gomburza and Rizal. Furthermore, the Katipunan rebellion was perceived by many as a time of role inversion, when the former friar-lords would become servants of the indios. As Katipunan supremo, Bonifacio expected deference from the subjugated foreign clerics. On one occasion, upon hearing that a Spanish Jesuit had tried to arrange a truce by establishing contact with Aguinaldo, Bonifacio was outraged that the Spanish priest hadn t approached him first. Aguinaldo s more nuanced attitude toward the friars reflected his previous experience as town mayor. This is a crucial difference between both leaders. Bonifacio had been a petty clerk in Tondo, Manila, radicalized by the writings of the Propaganda. Thrust into the rural environment of Cavite, he was in alien country, where mayors ruled. He addressed his Katipunan counterpart there as Capitán  obviously not in reference to Aguinaldo s military rank 4 but to his reputation as capitán municipal, or mayor, of Cavite Viejo. Traditionally, the mayor (variously called gobernadorcillo, capitán municipal or presidente) worked closely with the Spanish padre cura in running a pueblo. A common perception was that the mayor was merely a puppet
of the Spanish friar. In day to day municipal affairs, however, both needed each other. The friar was a representative of the colonial power, true, but he could also be manipulated or even controlled by the mayor, who had his own sources of power. While the guardia civil, if available, could be called upon to support a friar s actions, the mayor had at his disposal an armed police force, called cuadrilleros. Magdiwang remained peaceful while Magdalo was at war
-this is a constant refrain in the Talang Buhay. The events at Tejeros leading to the irrevocable split between Aguinaldo and Bonifacio need to be placed in a wartime context. The territory controlled by Aguinaldo s forces (Magdalo) was being besieged by reinforced Spanish infantry and ranger battalions. Polavieja had even prepared an iron cage for the capture alive of the renegade capitán municipál
Aguinaldo. In contrast, Magdiwang territory, under Bonifacio s control, remained relatively free of hostilities. Desperately needing support from the idle Magdiwang forces, Aguinaldo, with appropriate deference, approached the Haring Bayan to seek his help. But Bonifacio wouldn t allow his men to come to the aid of the Magdalo, arguing that his forces needed to remain intact in anticipation of the inevitable Spanish attack. Besides, if or when the Magdalo men were overwhelmed by the enemy, they could simply pull back and join the ranks of the Magdiwang. To Aguinaldo, the Supremo s insistence on keeping the forces separate was a grave mistake. The Magdiwang and Magdalo should instead have worked together to repel the enemy. The wisdom of Aguinaldo s alternative strategy is evident and reinforces the consensus among scholars that Aguinaldo was simply the better military commander than Bonifacio. This might be attributed to some innate martial talents, but the simple fact is that his stint as town mayor and commandant of a police force (cuadrilleros) would have taught him some basic lessons about fighting battles in the rugged terrain of Cavite. Bonifacio had never led an armed group prior to the Katipunan revolt. 5 The Talang Buhay adds a cultural dimension to the story: Reminiscent of awit and komedya plot lines, Aguinaldo humbly approaches Bonifacio, practically begging for help, but is rebuffed by the Haring Bayan, who fails to empathize with his besieged compatriots in the front lines. Filled with grief, the Capitán Henerál departs from the scene with his tail between his legs. The scene is practically replicated when Aguinaldo is faced with an impending Spanish offensive on Silang. He pulls his wits together and again approaches the Haring Bayan pleading for a contribution (abuloy) of Magdiwang reinforcements towards Silang s defense. Again this is denied. The Talang Buhay gives us a glimpse of the leadership qualities that pushed Aguinaldo to the top of the military command in Cavite. When, for example, he received news of Silang s fall, he rushed to the frontlines to reorganize General Belarmino s scattered forces and mount a counterattack. Restoring order and discipline to an army in disarray depended very much on an officer s ability to boost morale through his rousing speeches and displays of personal courage. The popular perception is that Bonifacio and Luna possessed such talents. True, but the historical record points to Aguinaldo as the most accomplished of them all, which explains why he ultimately became the commanding general of the Republican army. Aguinaldo mentions an occasion wherein he gathered together his men and spoke to them in such a way that, the following morning, they possessed a maningning na damdamin  meaning to say, they were all fired up and ready to engage the enemy. On another occasion, he admits to having been terrified upon seeing a horde of Spanish rangers advancing towards the Filipino defense lines, but he managed to conceal his fright as he crawled along the trenches to rally the troops and make them fight as one body. Aguinaldo s account of his role in the battles at Cavite may be faulted for being self-serving, but his ability to rally the troops and engage in effective trench warfare is corroborated elsewhere. Aguinaldo s reputation as an effective military leader would have spread far and wide. This would explain not only his ability to hold the Magdalo forces together, but also the respect he held even among the Magdiwang officers and their troops. The Talang Buhay narrates how, in response to Aguinaldo s appeal for reinforcements, more and more Magdiwang officers were 6 switching over to his command despite the fact that the Supremo had repeatedly refused to render assistance. Fundamental changes in the military command structures were taking place even before the political break at the Tejeros assembly. Artemio Ricarte, a Magdiwang general, without Bonifacio s authorization was able to join forces with Aguinaldo in an offensive against the Spaniards. Major Julian Montalan, Major Gregorio Jocson, Major Andres Villanueva, and several others, all from Magdiwang, also without authorization from Bonifacio brought their men over to Aguinaldo s camp. No less than Colonel Juan Cailles of the Army of Haring Bayan, Supremo Andres Bonifacio at Magdiwang, transferred to my command.
Why did they do so? Aguinaldo states that they joined forces with him out of their wholehearted desire to provide the assistance (pag-abuloy) that I desperately needed.
The Talang Buhay reveals an Aguinaldo continually preoccupied with the defense of Cavite against the attacks by Polavieja s reinforced divisions. Aguinaldo believed that the only way to hold the line against the better-armed Spaniards was to consolidate the resources of the province and pursue a holistic strategy instead of one hobbled by the factional divide between Magdiwang and Magdalo. After all, he notes, the early victories of the Katipunan in Cavite, which so impressed Bonifacio, had been made possible through the massive support of townspeople who did not belong to the Katipunan. Bonifacio insisted upon preserving the primacy of the Katipunan, of which he was supremo. Aguinaldo, imbued with the pragmatism of an ex-mayor and military commander, saw the virtue of total mobilization, bypassing secret-society rituals and indoctrination. He voices his sentiments in the Talang Buhay through the following interjection by Edilberto Evangelista at the Tejeros assembly: Your honor, let us not assume that the Revolution has to do only with the Katipunan. The fact of the matter is that [the Revolution] now reflects the sentiment of the people at large. Take me, for example--even though I was not with the Katipunan and still lived in Europe, I truly felt the urge to join the armed struggle.
General Evangelista, an engineer who supervised the construction of trenches in Cavite, was clearly one of Aguinaldo s favorite officers. He perished in the battle of Zapote, hit on the 7 forehead.
Evangelista is just one of the prominent casualties of war memorialized in the Talang Buhay. No greater loss there was, however, than that of Aguinaldo s elder brother at the battle of Pasong Santol. Indeed, Aguinaldo writes, the enemy had to pass over the lifeless body of my brother, Gen. Crispulo Aguinaldo before they could claim the territory.
So intense must have been his grief for he then undertook a risky mission to reach the site where, he was told, Crispulo had been spotted alive, crawling, and drenched in blood. Crispulo Aguinaldo assumed the command of the front lines as a replacement for his younger brother, Emilio, who had finally relented to appeals that he return to Tejeros to take up his office as elected president. If Crispulo hadn´t taken his place, Emilio would have been the one shot dead. And who was responsible for this? The Talang Buhay tells us that prior to the tragic debacle at Pasong Santol, Bonifacio and Ricarte had blocked Magdiwang contingents that were going to the aid of the Magdalo. The death of Crispulo Aguinaldo, and even that of Edilberto Evangelista before him, could have been avoided had Bonifacio not been so single-minded about refusing to send abuloy to the beleaguered Magdalo defenders. I will leave it to the reader to discover what new insights the Talang Buhay provides concerning the events at Tejeros and the death of Bonifacio. My introductory comments are intended mainly to flag some key issues that might be missed, the most crucial being the wartime context of the political crisis. A preoccupation with political rivalry and social difference has overly focused our attention on the complicity of Aguinaldo in the deaths of Andres and Procopio Bonifacio. The Talang Buhay, however, forces us to examine events from the military angle in which Bonifacio becomes complicit in the deaths of Edilberto Evangelista and Crispulo Aguinaldo. This is not a question of good versus evil, but of the grave consequences of the decisions that leaders make in the fog of war. Only by returning to first-hand sources such as this manuscript discovered by Elizabeth Angsioco and now being shared with the public, can we begin to effectively reassess a century s worth of writings on Aguinaldo that have tended to picture him in a negative light. By no means does the Talang Buhay present us with a definitive account of the Aguinaldo-Bonifacio controversy. It is, after all, Aguinaldo s rendering of events that he had lived 8 through and, like any historical document, it has its biases and blind spots. But after reading through the Talang Buhay, in both Aguinaldo s Tagalog and the English translation provided here, none but the most close-minded or partisan reader will continue to accept unquestioningly the Manichean portrayal of the main protagonists in Heneral Luna. 9