As Bulgaria's new parliament convenes this week, Boiko Borissov – a flamboyant, populist wrestler-cum-politician with anti-Turkish, anti-Gypsy tendencies – is poised to become the next prime minister of south-east Europe's second-largest country.
Coming just weeks after the European parliamentary elections, the Bulgarian national elections provided the first test of an incumbent central European government since the onset of the global recession. If Bulgaria's experiences are any indication, the combination of rising unemployment, falling social spending and scepticism over the government's ability to address the economic crisis may present a windfall to parties on the edges of the political mainstream.
Borissov's party, Citizens for the European Development of Bulgaria (GERB), soundly defeated the socialist-led incumbent government, with 39.7% of the vote. A less numerous but perhaps more vocal turnout was registered by the hyper-nationalist Ataka party, whose leaders campaigned on pledges to withdraw from Nato, expel American troops from the country, reverse post-communist privatisation and impose "severe sanctions" on anyone "defaming Bulgaria". With 9.4% of the vote, the party did about as well as in the last national election (2005), and gained about 3% more support than the centre-right Blue Coalition.
While some observers have dismissed the idea of a coalition between Ataka and GERB out of hand, previous Bulgarian governments have included far stranger political bedfellows. The outgoing government consisted of reformed communists, neo-monarchists and a pro-Turkey political movement. Either way, Ataka's staying power at the ballot box should raise red flags for policymakers in the EU and the US, particularly as the full impact of the global economic crisis continues to take hold in central Europe.
In some, though not all, states in Europe's former-communist east, extremist parties are performing better than usual in national and EU-level elections. In Hungary, the far-right Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik) came in third in the June European elections with 15% of the vote. The paramilitary Hungarian Guard, a close affiliate of Jobbik which has adopted the dress and imagery of the country's fascist-era Arrow Cross militia, is also growing stronger. In neighbouring Slovakia, the EU's Commission Against Racism and Intolerance continues to raise the alarm over the "rise in racist political discourse" that has characterised that country's politics since the Slovak National party joined the ruling government in 2006.
The heightened appeal of toxic political parties is not unique to east/central Europe. In the Netherlands, Geert Wilders' Dutch Freedom party managed to translate public fatigue over EU enlargement and rising fears over immigration into a second-place finish in the European elections. The UK's British National party (BNP) won its first ever seat in the European parliament, which it promises to abolish, along with Nato. Far-right and anti-EU parties scored similar victories in Austria, France, Denmark and Italy.
This wouldn't be much to worry about if the EU was in good health as an institution. But in its current daze of post-constitutional referendum navel-gazing, and faced with growing divisions over the economic crisis, the 27-nation bloc has little in the way of expendable political energy. And even if it did, the EU's toolkit for staunching the spread of extremist political movements is limited. When Jörg Haider's far-right Freedom party joined Austria's ruling coalition in 1999, Brussels briefly boycotted the government – but to little effect. In the end, it was the party's lackluster performance in office – not effective countermeasures from the EU – that ensured its defeat.
Theoretically, Brussels has some corrective instruments at its disposal, including the option to suspend EU structural funds or other assistance to countries that elect extremist parties. In the case of Bulgaria, however, this may not work. The EU has already stopped the flow of $800m in aid following allegations of official corruption and mismanagement. A threatened shut-off in structural funds is far less likely to have an impact if countries see it is possible to run afoul of Brussels and survive.
The EU's measured response to central Europe's economic crisis could have political and even geopolitical costs if extremist groups expand on their foothold in national parliaments and coalitions. At a minimum, toxic parties will surely test the EU's permissive governing structures. These institutions were designed to co-ordinate policy among pro-democratic, centrist-minded national governments – not to contain the ambitions of a handful of noisy populists who oppose the EU and Nato, distrust global markets and harbour intolerant views of minorities.
For the US, a surge in non-mainstream parties could, with time, cause problems. For example, US policymakers should not assume that Europe no longer requires serious attention, or for that matter, will indefinitely retain its trans-Atlantic complexion. When Robert Fico's populist government took control of Slovakia in 2006, for example, the country veered away from the reformist, pro-western policies that had guided its integration into the EU. Though ultimately backing away from some of his more extreme campaign pledges, Fico has derided American security initiatives in Europe and committed Slovakia to near-total dependence on Russian gas for the next 20 years.
Ultimately, continued gains for extremist parties in east/central Europe could help to further Russia's policy of divide and rule in the EU. In responding to this challenge, the EU and US will need to demonstrate resolve and creativity at a time when both are in very short supply.
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