Interview with Richard Nephew

Richard Nephew is Director of the Economic Statecraft, Sanctions, and Energy Markets program at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy, and the former Deputy Coordinator for Sanctions Policy at the US State Department.

What are the conditions for the removal of sanctions against Iran as stipulated by the framework agreement? And what are the conditions introduced by Iran and the US when it comes to lifting the sanctions?

It is not yet clear precisely what Iran will have to do and when it will have to do it by in order for sanctions to be suspended and eventually terminated. But, based upon the U.S. Factsheet, the P5+1 - Iran Joint Statement, and comments made by U.S. officials subsequent to the Lausanne round, it is likely that Iran will have to take steps to increase the amount of time it would take to achieve a break-out for nuclear weapons material to at least a year and to begin implementing the transparency steps that are part of the deal. This will probably require removing a large number of centrifuges, reducing its stockpile of enriched uranium, disabling the Arak reactor more permanently, and cooperating with the IAEA on both the new monitoring steps to be implemented as well as on the investigation of the Possible Military Dimensions (PMD) issue.

Which kind of US sanctions do you think will be removed? Will the sanctions for human rights abuses or support for terrorism also be removed?

Human rights-related and terrorism-related sanctions will not be removed. Iran will still be facing U.S. sanctions at the end of this process, including both of these categories as well as, in all likelihood, the U.S. embargo. So, U.S.-Iran trade, for the most part, is probably not going to change as a result of the deal, as it is presently being negotiated. What will be involved is relief of those sanctions that prevent foreign companies from doing business with Iran, aside from certain specific cases (e.g., with those foreign companies sanctioned for human rights reasons, for supporting terrorism, or for being involved in the supply of weapons and nuclear technology to Iran that is not otherwise authorized in the deal).

What is the meaning of the parties’ differing preferences when referring to the lifting of sanctions; whether “revoking” sanctions, as used in the Iranian fact sheet, or “suspending” sanctions, as used in the US fact sheet?

I suspect that the preferred terms is mostly semantics. As a legal matter, sanctions cannot be “revoked” or “lifted” -- for the most part -- without an act of Congress. And that simply will not happen, nor should it happen, in the initial years of a deal. So, what will happen, in all likelihood, is the use of legal authorities already encapsulated in the sanctions to cease the effects of the sanctions while a deal is being implemented. Then, at some point in the future, the sanctions can be legally terminated.

If a final agreement is reached by June 30, do you think all the UNSC sanctions will be lifted?

I think that UNSC sanctions will be terminated in their current form, but the U.S. factsheet and the Joint Statement make clear that some restrictions will be part of the final deal and will also be part of the UNSC legal process. So, I anticipate that a new resolution, welcoming the deal, will terminate the existing resolutions and then bring some of the restrictions back into legal effect.

If a final agreement is reached by June 30, do you think the P5+1 countries, especially the US, would propose a measure that aims to deter a possible violation of the final agreement by Iran?

Sure. I think that there will need to be some way of responding to Iranian violations. The Iranian government engaged in clandestine nuclear work for over 20 years. They have lost the benefit of automatic trust and confidence. They need to earn that benefit by complying with this new deal.

What will be the principal grounds on which the P5+1 countries and Iran negotiate until June 30?

I suspect the biggest issues will be the timing of sanctions relief and what would be required from Iran to trigger it; the scope of Iranian R&D; activities under the deal; and, how much transparency the Iranians are prepared to accept, particularly at military-related sites.

By Cemre Nur Öztürk