Jack Straw giving evidence to the Chilcot Iraq war inquiry last month. Photograph: EPA
1.33pm: Jack Straw, the justice secretary, has already given evidence to the Iraq inquiry about the foreign policy aspects of the decision to go to war.
But, as foreign secretary in 2003, he also took a close interest in the legality of the conflict and today he is appearing to discuss the legal issues.
The Liberal Democrats have accused him of trying to "hide the truth" about the legal advice he received, and Ed Davey, the Lib Dem foreign affairs spokesman, has highlighted three questions he believes that Straw has to answer.
Straw will get his chance to respond when the hearing starts at 2pm.
2.00pm: The hearing has not started yet, but on its website the inquiry has published a new memo from Jack Straw.
2.02pm: They're starting. Lady Prashar asks about Straw's relationship with his legal advisers. She says Michael Wood, Straw's main legal adviser, was concerned that Straw had made public comments contradicting the legal adviser Straw had been given.
Straw says the ultimate decision about the legality of the war was for Lord Goldsmith, the attorney general, "and him alone".
He says that in early 2002 he told Tony Blair that Britain had to go down the UN route. But, in his public comments, he wanted to keep the government's negotiating position open.
2.07pm: I'm just reading the Straw note. At one point he responds to the pointed assertion from Elizabeth Wilmshurst, the deputy legal adviser in the Foreign Office, about Straw not being an international lawyer.
I am not, famously, an international lawyer, but I had lived and breathed the negotiation of 1441, and therefore had an intense appreciation of its negotiating history.
2.11pm: The Straw memo is only 22 paragraphs long. Most of it is an explanation as to why Straw felt entitled to reject the advice he received from Michael Wood, the senior Foreign Office legal adviser, about the war being illegal. Wood wrote to Straw on January 24 2003 setting out his views. Straw responded on January 29 2003, telling Wood he noted his advice, but did not accept it.
2.16pm: Prashar is asking Straw about his letter to Wood. She says that when Straw told Wood he was rejecting Wood's advice (in January 2003), Goldsmith's view was the same as Wood's: that war would be illegal without a second resolution.
Straw says that at that point Goldsmith had not given a final view.
My view was ... that there was an overwhelming argument that 1441 required a second stage, but not a second resolution.
2.19pm: Straw says Wood was entitled to send his note. Straw did not ignore the advice. He gave it "careful attention".
Straw says he had no input into what Wood told the attorney general.
(Wood sent a note to Goldsmith in December 2002 setting out the arguments for and against UN security council resolution authorising war without a second resolution.)
Straw says this document, the December document, shows that when Wood told him in Janaury that there was "no doubt" about the position (ie, no doubt that war without a second resolution would be illegal), Wood was wrong. The fact that Wood had been able to explain the case for the second resolution not being necessary showed there was doubt about this.
2.25pm: Sir Roderic Lyne steps in. He suggests that Wood, in his January memo, was pointing out that Straw said something in private to Dick Cheney that contradicted the government's official position at the time.
Straw had told Cheney that if Britain tried and failed to get a second resolution, that "would be okay ... (a la Kosovo)".
Lyne says this contradicted the government's position because at that point Goldsmith was saying a second resolution was required.
Straw says it was a long conversation with Cheney. He used the Kosovo example as a "parallel, albeit a loose one".
Lyne repeats the point about Goldsmith believing in January that a second resolution was necessary.
Straw says he does not accept this. In January Goldsmith had not made a final decision. The view he held was a "preliminary view". There was not a single government position.
2.32pm: After Straw responded to Wood, Goldsmith wrote to Straw rebuking him for the tone of his letter to Wood.
Straw says there is no requirment that ministers have to accept provisional legal advice.
I have never, ever acted unlawfully. I have always been extremely careful about the law.
But that does not exclude the possibility of having an "honest debate" with the lawyers, he says.
2.35pm: In his letter to Wood on January 29, Straw talked about his experience as home secretary, and the way he sometimes rejected legal advice and had his view upheld by the courts.
Prashar says Wood and Wilmshurst argued that it was even more important to be careful in international law because there is no court that can resolve these issues.
Straw says he accepts that that there was a need to be careful. But that did not mean government had to come down on one side, he says.
2.39pm: Straw is now talking about the note he sent to Goldsmith in early February 2003 criticising Goldsmith's draft note about the legality of the war. (This was the preliminary advice Goldsmith wrote in January. It said a second resolution was required.)
Straw says he considers Goldsmith a friend. He admires him. But at that point he did not see very much of him. That was why he put his views in writing, Straw suggests.
Sir Lawrence Freedman asks why Goldsmith did not speak to the French to ask them for their interpretation of 1441.
Straw says if Goldsmith had wanted to speak to the French, the Foreign Office would have arranged it. Goldsmith is a very good French speaker, Straw says.
(Goldsmith told the inquiry that he did not ask the French what they thought 1441 meant because that would undermine the government's negotiating stance in relation to the Iraqis.)
2.46pm: Straw says he always maintained a good personal relationship with his French opposite number, Dominique de Villepin.
2.49pm: Straw says the French were profoundly concerned that there should be no "automaticity". They wanted to ensure that 1441 did not provide approval for military action "of itself". This was reflected in the "architecture of 1441". 1441 said that if Iraq was in breach of its obligations, the security council would have to consider the matter.
Sir Lawrence Freedman asks about the fact that 1441 talked about "serious consequences", not "all necessary means", the usual UN euphemism for war.
Straw says "serious consequences" did cover war.
He picks up a point made by Freedman (I think) at an earlier hearing, about "serious consequences" being the phrase used in the resolutions currently in force against Iran. Straw says those Iranian resolutions are different. They refer back to other resolutions making it clear that "serious consequences" means sanctions, not war. 1441 was different, Straw says. In 1441, "serious consequences" did cover military action.
2.56pm: Straw says that if 1441 was a resolution that required a second resolution, "the negotiations would have been over in a week".
That would have been dead easy. It would have been over. There has to a reason why these negotiations began in late October and went on intensively, night and day, for six weeks.
Straw says the negotiations went on for that long because the Americans were determined to preserve their red line: that 1441 would not require a second resolution to authorise war.
3.00pm: Straw says 1441 made it clear (as the French wanted) that there would be no "automaticity". It said there would be a two-stage process. The British accepted that.
3.04pm: Sir Lawrence Freedman asks if Straw accepts the concept of an "unreasonable veto" at the UN security council.
(Some argued that if there was an "unreasonable veto", then war would be legal without a new resolution.)
Straw says this issue was considered at the time. But Straw says a veto is a veto. He says he thinks it would not be sensible to argue that some vetoes wer acceptable, but some were not.
Freedman says that Blair used the "unreasonable veto" argument in public.
Straw says he does not recall that. But he did write to him about this point.
3.08pm: Sir John Chilcot asks if the cabinet debated the legality of the war.
Straw says legality was part of the debate.
Chilcot asks if the cabinet had legal advice before Goldsmith issued his advice.
Straw says he does not recall all members of the cabinet receiving papers on this.
Chilcot asks if the Foreign Office legal advice was circulated.
Straw says it did not get "promulgated". Blair and Straw and others involved in the negotiations knew what the legal advisers were saying. But the papers were not circulated to other ministers.
3.12pm: Chilcot asks about the involvement of the attorney general in 1441. He suggests that Goldsmith was part-in, part-out.
Was it clear that 1441 was "self-standing", Chilcot asks. (In other words, was it clear that it did not require a second resolution?)
Straw says: "It was to people negotiating it."
Chilcot says pursuing a second resolution undermined the argument that a second resolution was not legally required.
Straw accepts that there was "a risk" of this. But he says there reasons for pursuing it. If there has been a second resolution, the Saddam regime would have collapsed "like a pack of cards", Straw says.
(He seems very confident about that. He does not elaborate.)
3.17pm: Chilcot asks if it would have been better to fold the "developing legal view" into the policy.
Straw says it would have been better "if it had proved possible" for Goldsmith to have provided a "definitive" legal view at at an earlier stage.
He says the orginal instructions only went to the attorney general in December.
With the benefits of hindsight, it would have been better if a final view could have been arrived at at an earlier stage.
Straw says that would have made it clear that there was a difference between military action being an option, and it being a desirable political objective.
(Straw makes this point in the final paragraph of the written statement published today.)
3.21pm: Chilcot asks about the cabinet meeting on March 17. Could cabinet ministers have a proper discussion without knowing that the legal advice was finely balanced?
Straw says ministers did know that there were intense arguments about the legality of the war.
The issue for the cabinet was was it lawful or otherwise.
Straw says that what was required was "essentially a yes/no decision from the attorney general".
The cabinet was composed of some "very strong-minded people".
They wanted to know what the answer was from Goldsmith. They did not need to know what process Goldsmith had gone through.
Straw says Short told the inquiry that she was "kind of jeered at" when she asked for a debate about the legal issues at the March 17 cabinet meeting. Straw says he does not remembering that happening.
3.26pm: Straw says there is nothing unusual about legal decisions being finely balanced.
What the cabinet needed to know was what the final decision was, he says.
Prashar asks why Straw did not want a full discussion on the legality of the war at that cabinet meeting. One memo says Straw was worried about leaks.
Straw says leaks were one concern.
Chilcot asks if cabinet ministers had enough information to make the decision properly.
Straw says they did. He and Robin Cook had persuaded Blair that the Commons should have to vote to authorise any war.
We did that with great clarity about what the consequences would be.
Straw says he knew this would affect decision-making in government. Suez would never have taken place if Eden had had to win a vote in the Commons.
There were four debates on Iraq in the run-up to the war. Three of them were on a substantive motion. That meant ministers were being "bombarded" with advice.
Everybody understood what the issues were and [the personal responsibility they had].
Straw says he wants to talk about the cabinet decision-making process later. He says he thinks it should have been "more formal".
But the cabinet was formally involved, he insists.
On that note, they stop for a break. I'll sum up in a moment.
3.34pm: Here are the key points so far:
• Straw denies "ignoring" the advice from his Foreign Office legal adviser. (See his written statement.)
• He claimed that Saddam's regime would have collapsed "like a pack of cards" if there had been a second UN resolution. (See 3.12pm)
• He said Lord Goldsmith should have provided his legal advice earlier. But Straw did not say whether he thought this was Goldsmith's fault, or Tony Blair's. (See 3.17pm)
• Straw said he did not accept the argument that Britain could ignore an "unreasonable veto" at the UN security council. He appeared to be slightly embarrassed when told that Blair had floated this idea in public. (3.04pm)
• He said cabinet decision-making should be "more formal". (See 3.26pm)
• He said that Clare Short was wrong to say she was "jeered at" when she said the cabinet should discuss the legal advice on March 17. (See 3.21pm)
• He said that if 1441 not really required a second resolution to authorise war, it would have been agreed in one week, not six weeks. (See 2.56pm)
3.48pm: They are back. Sir Lawrence Freedman asks if Colin Powell, the US secretary of state, ever said that the US would to go to war even if Iraq complied with the UN resolutions.
Straw says he does not remember that. But he had hundreds of conversations with Powell, sometimes several a day. He says he will check his records because he thinks Freedman is trying to tell him something.
3.54pm: Straw says the decision of Hans Blix to withold a document from the UN security council in early March raised questions about his "lack of openness".
3.58pm: Freedman asks why Britain went for a second resolution when it was not considered essential.
Straw says when you make a threat of force, there will always be a "timescale".
Freedman asks how Saddam could prove his compliance, when his non-compliance was deemed to be the existence of weapons what we now know did not exist.
Straw says:
The view that he had weapons of mass destruction was the view of the whole of the security council.
He says that if Saddam had allowed scientists to be interviewed outside Iraq, and if there had been an "emerging story" saying he did not have WMD, that would have been the end of the matter.
4.04pm: Straw says Blix thought Iraq had WMD. "He said so on the record in his book," says Straw.
Freedman suggests Blix was becoming "more sceptical" in February.
Straw says Blix did not say that to him.
4.06pm: Straw says the neocons in Washington made the negotiating environment "much more difficult".
4.07pm: Freedman asks if Straw would have been able to reach an agreement if he had been given two more months to strike a deal.
Straw says that if the war had been delayed, "Saddam would have been re-emboldened there and then".
He says he regrets the fact that relations with France deteriorated. They are an extremely important ally. The UK collaborates more with them than with any other country, apart from the US.
4.12pm: Sir Roderic Lyne asks about the attempt to get a second resolution.
Straw says the problem was with Chile and Mexico. They were looking over "each other's shoulders", he says.
Lyne asks about President Chirac saying that he would veto a second resolution. He asks Straw to confirm that, after Chirac made his statement, the French government told London that this did not mean he was ruling out a second resolution for good.
Straw says that he discussed this with his French opposite number, Dominique de Villepin.
Lyne asks if there was an agreement between Blair and George Bush on March 12 to blame the French for the failure to get a second resolution.
Straw says it was obvious that Chirac's intervention had not helped.
Lyne says Clare Short told the inquiry that "blaming the French" was an agreed line.
Straw says Short voted for military action.
4.23pm: Straw says Chirac "knew what he was doing" when he made his comments and that he intended to abort the chance of a second resolution being negotiated.
Straw says if a way had been found of inviting the neocons in Washington to take "a long holiday without a telephone" things would have been much easier.
Lyne says the point about the neocons underlines the fact that Straw found himself in a "crunch" at this point. Time ran out for diplomacy, Lyne says.
Lyne asks the "last minute" letter Straw is supposed to have written to Blair. He says the inquiry has not found this.
Straw says he wrote a letter to Blair on March 11. But he did not write a subsequent one.
Then they stop for another break.
4.28pm: Here's are the highlights from the last hour.
• Straw said he did not write a letter to Blair on the eve of the war urging him to think again. When he last gave evidence, Straw said that he had written to Blair in March suggesting that he consider not getting involved in the military action. But there have been reports suggesting that he wrote a letter of this kind just before the war started. Today he denied that. (See 4.23pm)
• He confirmed that, after President Chirac gave an interviewing saying he would veto a second resolution in any circumstances, the French contacted the British to suggest that Chirac was not ruling out a second resolution for good. (See 4.12pm)
• Sir Roderic Lyne said he had seen document saying that Tony Blair and George Bush agreed to blame the French for the failure to secure a second resolution. (See 4.12pm)
4.39pm: They're back. They're now talking about the post-war situation.
Prashar asks when Straw found out that the Pentagon had taken charge of the post-war planning.
Straw says Colin Powell had often said to him that the military would have to take charge after the war. But what broke down was the extent to which the state department were going to be involved.
The Pentagon reckoned they could do everthing, "with consequences that were adverse", Straw says.
4.43pm: Prashar asks why the UK did not have influence over post-conflict planning.
Straw says the UK sought to exert influence. But it lost out, because the state department lost out in an internal Washington battle.
Prashar asks what advice the government had about the need for post-war planning.
Straw says he received a lot of advice. He made a speech about post-war planning before the war had even finished.
4.47pm: Straw says the fundamental problem was not lack of planning in London.
The fundamental problem was the breakdown in coordination in Washington between the department of defence and the state department.
Straw says he did not believe this "breakdown" would have the consequences it did.
4.49pm: Straw says when he became foreign secretary in 2001 relations between the Department for International Development and his predecessor (Robin Cook) were "not good". They improved while he was in charge, he says.
4.50pm: Prashar asks why the government did not anticipate the sectarian conflict.
Straw says some of the planning was successful. There was no humanitarian crisis.
In the summer of 2003 Straw went to Baghdad. He was able to drive around in an armoured car.
We anticipated a great deal. To begin with, the environment we found was similar to that we anticipated.
It was later, after July 2003, that the problems arose, he says.
4.55pm: Prashar asks why the government did not set up a committee under ministerial leadership to deal with post-war Iraq.
Straw says that was a matter for the prime minister.
Prashar asks about planning again. Straw says:
In a better world things could have been better.
(I suppose you can't really argue with that.)
4.57pm: Sir Martin Gilbert asks about the UK being an occupying power.
Straw says Britain was bound to take responsibility because it was an occupying power.
We were occupying powers. We had to put up with that.
Gilbert asks Straw why the UK had so little influence, particularly over de-Baathification and the disbandment of the army.
Straw says if Britain had been consulted, the decisions would have been different. He says these were the worst decisions of the post-war period.
The government only found out "too late" what was happening.
5.01pm: Straw says everyone accepted that there had to be a degree of de-Baathifications. But more "intelligence" should have applied. He seems to mean intelligence/information, not intelligence/brainpower. He says the Americans should have distinguished between those who were in the Baath party because they had to be, and those in the party because they supported Saddam.
5.03pm: Straw says the Treasury did provide the money to deal with the aftermath.
5.05pm: Sir Lawrence Freedman asks about kidnapping.
Straw says that when there were kidnappings, they became a "personal priority" for him.
He mentions the Ken Bigley case. He says there is a lot that he cannot say about this in public. He acknowleges that this is frustrating for the family. He went to meet Bigley's family, went to the memorial service and remained in touch with the relatives.
He also mentions Margaret Hassan.
Freedman asks what the government policy is.
Straw says the government does not pay ransom money. That would encourage more kidnapping.
But he says the government is prepared to talk to intermediaries, and the kidnappers themselves. "No one stands on any dignity."
At that point the video feed freezes. Has Chilcot pressed the panic button that allows him to halt transmission of the video feed if the evidence goes in to sensitive territory? Or is it just a technical snag? I don't know yet.
5.13pm: My tweeting colleagues who are at the QE2 centre are not reporting any censorship yet, so the feed going down (see 5.05pm) may just have been a technical glitch. The video is working again now.
5.15pm: Straw says:
I think it's simplistic to regard Iran as the bogeyman in respect of the problems in Iraq.
That seems to be a dig at Blair. In his evidence, Blair said Iran was to blame for the worst of the problems afflicting post-war Iraq.
Straw says the Iranian objective for Iraq was the same as the UK's. The Iranians wanted Iraq to be stable. They also wanted Iranians to be able to visit the Shia holy sites in the country.
But they also did not want the West to have a "comfortable time" in Iraq. They did not like having America and its allies on one side of them, in Iraq, and on another side, in Afghanistan.
Straw says he cannot understand why President Bush lumped Iran, Iraq and North Korea together in his "axis of evil" speech.
After 9/11 Iran was trying to reach out to the West. This was a brave thing for President Khatami to do. But Khatami had the rug pulled from under him by Bush's "axis of evil" speech.
Straw says he does not want to minimise the damage done by some elements of the Iranian regime. Some British soldiers were killed by bombs probably produced in Iran, he says.
5.21pm: Chilcot says Straw was the only minister who was as fully involved in all aspects of pre-war policy as Blair. Should more ministers have been involved?
Straw says Geoff Hoon was also very heavily involved. But he understands Chilcot's point.
Straw says he was "at the more formal end of the spectrum" about how government should be conducted. If it had been up to him, he would have set up "a more formal cabinet committee" at an early stage.
The cabinet was not being used to "arbitrate" on decisions.
But he has two caveats.
First, some decisions had to be made very quickly.
Second, this would not have affected the "substance" of the outcome. Ministers did not feel "out of the loop", not least because the government had to win a vote in the Commons.
5.25pm: Chilcot says other witnesses have talked about the decision to go to war being down to judgment taken by Blair. Did that mean that Blair did not receive enough challenging advice?
Straw does not accept this. He thinks Blair was challenged.
Others were there too saying to the prime minister, as it were, "Hang on a second".
Straw says David Manning and Jonathan Powell were both performing this role.
5.28pm: Chilcot says he has two final questions. He wants an answer to the "why" question, because this is important to relatives. Was Iraq the UK's choice of target because it was the US's choice of target, rather than on its own merits?
Straw says it was both. The UK did want to tackle Iraq. It had been involved with Iraq since the Gulf war.
He also says the UK would not have got the "huge" nuclear disarmament it achieved in Libya if it had not been for Iraq.
5.31pm: Chilcot follows the "why" question with the "when" question". Why was action in March justified?
Straw says war was not inevitable, even in March.
It will be for "future historians" to decide whether the decision to go to war was correct, he says.
He says he grieves for those who lost loved ones, even though he still believes the decision to go to war was correct.
There were "few" in Iraq who would want to go back to what they had before March 2003, he says.
5.36pm: Chilcot is making a final statement. He says he will set out the current position as the inquiry sees it. That's because it has almost got to the end of its first found of evidence-gathering hearings.
The hearings have served two purposes. They have provided a narrative.
But most of the inquiry's work has involved looking at the paperwork. Looking at these papers is the core of the inquiry's work. Some documents are still coming in. But the inquiry's access to papers is unrestricted.
Over the next few months the inquiry will consider how the evidence joins together. After this work is over, the inquiry will decide who it needs to interview again.
In the meantime, the inquiry will also hold meetings with a range of individuals, British and non-British. They could include Iraqi veterans and Americans. The inquiry also hopes to visit Iraq later this year.
There will also be some private hearings, Chilcot says. The terms under which they are held will be published on the committee's website and as much of the evidence as is possible will be published.
Chilcot says the inquiry is still hoping to publish its report by the end of the year.
That's it. I'll sum up the highlights from the last hour in a moment.
5.51pm: Here are the highlights from the last hour.
• Straw appeared to criticise Tony Blair for blaming Iran for all the problems afflicting post-war Iraq. (See 5.15pm)
• He said Blair should have set up a more formal cabinet committee to consider Iraq. But he said that he did not think this would have affected the ultimate decisions that were taken. (See 5.21pm)
• He strongly criticised the decisions taken by the Americans on de-Baathification and the disbanding of the Iraqi army. He also said that the main problems with post-war Iraq were caused by "the breakdown in coordination in Washington between the department of defence and the state department". (See 4.47pm, 4.57pm and 5.01pm)
6.04pm: At 3.48pm I reported some cryptic remarks from Sir Lawrence Freedman suggesting that Bush was going to go to war even if Iraq complied with 1441. Straw said Freedman was trying to tell him something. The Press Association has now published the full exchange, and that makes it clear that Freedman has obviously seen some very interesting paperwork.
Freedman asked:
Can you start by confirming that you knew that military action was planned by the US for the middle of March come what may? You were copied in, presumably, to reports of conversations between the prime minister and the president?
Straw replied:
Yes, I don't think there was any key document that I should have seen that I didn't.
Freedman went on:
Was there any point where [Colin] Powell said to you that even if Iraq complied, president Bush had already made a decision that he intended to go to war?
Straw replied:
Certainly not to the best of my recollection.
Freedman went on:
I was going to suggest you might want to look through your conversations and check.
Mr Straw at last got the hint.
I will go through the records because I think you are trying to tell me something.
6.14pm: The full text of Chilcot's closing statement is now on the inquiry's website.
6.28pm: Yesterday the Lib Dems identifed three questions that they thought Straw had to answer today about the legality of the war. By my count he answered one (Why did Straw reject Michael Wood's legal advice? Because he thought it was wrong) and he did not have to respond to two others (about the decision not to show cabinet ministers full legal advice being a breach of the ministerial code and about his decision to refuse a Freedom of Information request relating to the publication of cabinet minutes) because he was not asked about them. But the inquiry team did get some good responses out of Straw. It was interesting hearing him have a sly dig at the "Iran is to blame" line peddled by Tony Blair when he gave evidence. And the Freedman/Straw exchange about the US going to war come what may (see 6.04pm) was fascinating.
That's it for today. And that's it for the next few weeks, because there won't be any more heaings until Gordon Brown gives evidence in a few weeks time.
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