Austin Bay Blog

I will be moderating a panel at the Blog World Expo in Las Vegas at 12:15 pm Saturday, September 20th. (Las Vegas Convention Center. Go here for the conference schedule.)

The panel is titled “The Blogosphere in Transition.”

Panelists include Pam Spaulding (pamspaulding.com), Bridget Magnus (BridgetMangnus.com), Roger L. Simon (Pajamasmedia.com and rogerlsimon.com) and Rob Neppell (NZ Bear of truthlaidbear.com)…and there may be more.

My column this week on “the media’s trillion dollar question” provides a little background. A version of this column may appear in the Las Vegas Review-Journal on Sunday.

For example:

The terms “new” and “old” media tend to distort rational discussion about the change in the way people access information.

Since this is a newspaper column, the odds are good you are reading it on paper, or on a newspaper’s Website — or perhaps on one of the Internet’s “news and opinion” sites.

Here’s why I think new and old distort or artificially divide debate into opposing media camps. There is good, informative journalism produced with integrity, and there is something far less — the dreck of spin, gossip and propaganda. There is quality entertainment, be it high, low or middlin’ brow, and then there is utter schlock.

New and old media both provide the good, the dreck, the quality and the schlock.

The key is new technology offering new opportunities for creativity and communication. The column mentions “convergence media” (like my ArenaUSA channel and pajamsmedia’s new on-line tv programming) and I’m sure the panel will address it.

If you’re at the conference, I hope you’ll attend the panel presentation.

This via AP:

Poland and the United States reached an agreement Thursday to base American missile interceptors in Poland, the prime minister said, going ahead with a plan that has angered Russia and threatened to escalate tensions with the region’s communist-era master.

Speaking in an interview televised on news channel TVN24, Prime Minister Donald Tusk said the United States had agreed to help augment Poland’s defenses with Patriot missiles in exchange for placing 10 missile defense interceptors in the eastern European country.

“We have crossed the Rubicon,” he said, referring to U.S. consent to meet Poland’s demands.

Tusk said the agreement was initialed by negotiators late Thursday in Warsaw and includes a “mutual commitment” between the two nations — beyond that of NATO — to come to each other’s assistance in case of danger.

Nice AP lede, great comment by PM Tusk. The Russian invasion of Georgia made “crossing the Rubicon” very politically palatable. Made is easy for the US to provide Patriots.

The VOA report says:

Talks on the missile shield foundered last month, when Poland demanded more security guarantees for the project.

AFP adds:

Washington aims to base 10 interceptor missiles in Poland plus a radar facility in the neighbouring Czech Republic by 2011-2013 to complete a system already in place in the United States, Greenland and Britain.

Moscow may well have concluded (two years ago?) that the Euro-ABM would be deployed, but it has certainly howled and threatened. The ground-based interceptor ABM is not anti-Russian, it’s a limited shield (ten interceptors) designed to counter an Iranian ballistic missile volley (”a shot from an ayatollah direction”). The “Patriot augmentation” is for Polish airspace defense and including Patriots had been a Polish demand. The Poles would not accept a Patriot lease deal. The Patriot has been upgraded over the years. The PAC-3 is a genuine anti-missile missile. Now, that system can –to a limited extent– counter shorter-range Russian missiles. The Russians have the capability of “swamping it” by firing dozens of ballistic and cruise missiles. Here is Lockheed’s ad for the multi-capable PAC-3.

MarketWatch reports that SS-21s have been used in Georgia. Its source is an ABM advocacy group. Here’s a quote:

“This outward military aggression with the use of ballistic missiles from Russia on a former USSR country sends a very serious message to all former members of the Soviet Block, especially Poland, who today made an agreement with the United States to host 10 U.S. ground-based missiles that will protect the United States of America and most of Europe from ballistic missiles. This agreement will also provide Poland with U.S. Patriot Missile Defense Batteries that have the capability to defeat and defend against short range ballistic missiles.

Follow my blog posts and this week’s newspaper column and it’s clear that I’m looking at the diplomatic mid-term and long-term for resolution of the Russo-Georgia War.

However, this morning I had “one of those conversations” about US and Western European military options—in the gym. Hey, these chats are occurring in defense ministries, in State Departments, in trenches outside of Tbilisi — the difference is, the conversation in the gym doesn’t matter while the ones in the ministries and trenches do.

So what military forces could the US send? The gym talk was a serioius conversation, after a fashion. I’d also had this exchange with a commenter on a prior post regarding the Russian decision to halt:

Commenter 2: “I believe Russia decided to quit before the counter stroke could be applied. At least it looks that way if you consider the terms of the armistice.”

My reply is fairly involved but it included this: “Would the counter-stroke you forsee involve Georgian allies? Now that follows a different time line, doesn’t it…?”

Reinforcement is a “counter-stroke” – one with risks.

Moving Georgia’s Iraq force home in US air transports was a reminder of US strategic reach. That was a military option and it has been employed. WHo knows? It may have given Moscow some pause. We’ve already seen at least one quasi-military option employed. Using USAF cargo planes to bring humanitarian supplies is standard policy – but a C-17 is a US military plane. That is a message, a limited, careful, but calculated message, and constitutes a low-risk option that, well, the order has been given and the transports are flying. The presence of US military training forces in Georgia is a message — one Russia chose to ignore. Beefing up the training and support mission is a military option.

In the gym I produced a scenario that puts two big-time geo-strategic gamblers in an armed face-off. I dubbed it “Texas Hold’em versus Russian Roulette.” In succinct terms: the force deployed comprises a reinforced US airborne brigade plus allied contingents if you can get them (Polish, Ukrainian, Iraqi, even Chinese?– this is, after all, fantasy). Base air support in a Black Sea littoral nation, and two carrier battle groups in the Black Sea itself when (if) Turkey allows their passage through the Straits. Nail overflight permission – told you, tricky diplomacy required at all levels.

But — say this in the gym, say it on the radio, say it on the blog– to make a genuine military statement on the edge of the Russian land mass requires heavy forces – at least a division that can be supported by follow-on heavy divisions. All else is a speed bump. Heavy divisions take time to deploy and move either by land through Europe or by sea.

The downside of any US-led military option is summed in this pseudo-equation: Texas Hold’em plus Russian Roulette = The New Eastern Front. Advantage Russian Roulette. You’re on the Bear’s turf.

Thus ended an exercise in political science fiction.

As a retired military friend of mine says, in a Georgia-type scenario the US can execute a minimal show of force mission (airborne brigade plus) or launch nuclear strikes. Ouch.

But willing or not, the scenario proceeds. Even though it’s fiction we’re out of the gym. A military planner is called on the carpet in the White House and receives a grim howdy from an American president committed to defending an emerging democracy located in Russia’s European near-abroad. The president has played global Texas Hold’em for years. He says: “So. You keep nixing military options. I’m not satisfied. Give me a mil option that meets my strategic requirements but adapts to diplomatic initiatives and works within time and logistical constraints.”

The fictional reply: Insert a Peacekeeping Brigade (PKB). Call it a Peacekeeping Organization (PKO) if you want to give it an extra diplomatic smudge.

(Texas Hold’em raises an eyebrow.)

A peacekeeping brigade comprises at least two engineer battalions with attached military police, medical, Civil Affairs, signal units and lots of media connectivity. Cameras matter. Add State Department personnel. Add Special Forces with their linguistic talents and a light infantry battalion for local security. Embed non-governmental organizations with the guts to participate and promise support to NGOs who choose to operate on their own but would accept clean water and blanets. Why, Mr. President, you can help the human shields. Aren’t they heading for Georgia to stop a super-power invasion? Tell the human shields our peacekeeping outfit will give them MREs and bandaids while they chain themselves to Georgian churches to protect them from Russian bombs.

(Texas Hold’em grins at this possibility.)

Insert the PKB in a Russo-Georgia type situation and the emerging democracy gets on-the-ground support. The PKB is not an offensive military force, but an airborne brigade at the end of a long logistical tether isn’t either. The PKB serves as a military-diplomatic “transition signal” – Texas Hold’em and the emerging democracy get some of the value of a combat speed bump, while reducing though not eliminating the risks of inserting combat forces.

(Texas Hold’em…the man nods. Says thanks.)

REALITY CHECK: Unfortunately, we don’t have a dedicated peacekeeping brigade I’ve supported a dedicated peacekeeping organization since the early 1990s. This blog post from 2006 captures some of that history. The US Army War College paper I mention (advocating a “PKB”) drew a note from its grader, a US Navy commander. To paraphrase from memory: “Your generals won’t let you do it.” That was 1997.

UPDATE: I don’t usually do this but I will this afternoon.
George from Sunnyvale writes via Creators.com (my creators syndicate box):

“I read your comment about our military options in Georgia on austinbay.net with great interest. Your post made me think of a question.
Would it be possible for us to give the Georgian’s cruise missiles without the Russians deeming it an act of war on our part? And could cruise missiles close the Roki tunnel? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roki_Tunnel
Thank you for your reply. Feel free to respond via email or on your blog.”

Tunnels and roads and railroads aren’t the problem — it’s the Kremlin’s behavior. A US-supplied cruise missile closing a tunnel might make for great pix, may make some people feel good (for the moment), but unless the missile attack is part of a concerted effort of coordinated and supported actions, it gives Moscow another “cause” with few consequences. The Kremlin could plow straight through a US peacekeeping brigade and toss the troops into prisons, but it faces immense political risks and conseqeunces if it does. For the record, I don’t think Moscow has won — I think it is in position to get a victory of a type. Instapundit had a poll asking who won? I voted for “neither.” We don’t know yet. Moscow doesn’t know yet. Tbilisi doesn’t know yet. We can speculate. Welcome to freedom of speech. Worth defending, isn’t it?

Via StrategyPage. This week’s column.

Also see this StrategyPage update on the GSSOP (Georgia Sustainment and Stability Operations Program).

UPDATE: Hat tip Instapundit. A comprehensive post from CharlesCrawford.biz which concludes with this thought:

Does the objective correlation of forces favour those leaders who in a pre-modern way have a clear sense of what they want - and are ready to take risks to achieve it? Will think they have the upper hand against leaders who rely on little more than post-modern flannel and uneasy hopes?

I’ll pinch this from my column (from the StrategyPage link at the top of this post):

The Russo-Georgia War classifies as a limited strike sending the message that Russia intends to frustrate –at least in the short term — the post-Cold War expansion of Western Europe. Poland and Romania are in NATO, in part because they both fear an expansionist Russia, but Russian nationalists see the “West rolling East” into their sphere of influence.

Securing Russia’s borders and protecting the interests of ethnic Russians are traditional Russian concerns. Ethnic Russian communities in Georgia and Moldova’s separatist statelet, Transdniestr, are Kremlin causes celebre.

Now these concerns and the wounded ethno-nationalist pride that undergirds them may seem benighted and backward to international elites who proclaim global citizenship and advocate a diplomacy based on motivational oratory, but they energize a substantial number of people in a still quite powerful nation-state. International leaders must deal with the attitude and its militant expression. The nation of Georgia definitely must.

These “concerns” and the wounded pride undergirding them: Crawford’s “pre-modern.” Pre-modern but quite current.

As I write this post news reports claim Russian troops have halted their main attack just short of Tbilisi, Georgia’s capital. Perhaps Russian memories of the battle for the city of Grozny, Chechnya, play a role. In late 1994 the Russians attempted to drive Chechen rebels from Grozny, and failed miserably. The city fight became a brutal war on the Chechen people instead of a fight with rebels. Georgia lacks Russia’s vast arsenal of tanks and aircraft. However, Georgian infantrymen are experienced, well-armed, and motivated, and the “closed-terrain” of cities gives quality infantry an advantage.

But perhaps not. As I wrote in a previous post, to influence European political, economic or military action, Russia has three convincing tools: (1) nuclear weapons; (2) a veto in the UN Security Council; and (3) abundant natural gas shipped to Europe via pipelines. Russia also controls a chunk of Georgia proper, as well as South Ossetia and (probably) Abkhazia– so it isn’t the ghost of Grozny that stops the tanks, rather, the military has taken what the Kremlin thinks it needs. The territorial gains are diplomatic chips. Ukraine’s strong support for Georgia is a huge plus for Georgia.

The coming days will provide more details about the complicated military situation. In a hot war military halts and initial ceasefires are iffy. The phrase “the situation remains in flux” describes the uncertainty and also covers the scramble by commanders to secure a road junction or a slightly higher ridge. The situations in South Ossetia and Georgia’s other separatist region, Abkhazia, are also highly uncertain and as reports of fighting and maneuvering continue to appear. I just heard that the ceasefire deal will or maybe or could include a pullback by Russia to “pre-war” lines. Hmmm. We’ll see.

Now a complex and dire diplomatic and political aftermath is upon us. Transdniestr is simmering –that’s the separatist region of Moldova I mentioned in the “Kosovo Precedent” post (see above).

Reuters lede:

CHISINAU, Aug 12 (Reuters) - Leaders of Moldova’s separatist Transdniestria region said on Tuesday they would break off all contacts with the ex-Soviet state’s central government until it denounced Georgian “aggression” in South Ossetia.

Transdniestria’s Russian-speaking leaders split from Moldova in 1990 in Soviet times on the grounds that the republic’s Romanian-speaking majority would join neighbouring Romania.

That never happened — but the two sides fought a brief war in 1992 and a resolution has yet to be found.

See this review of Tom Nichols’ book, Eve of Destruction, and his “global jungle outcome” where “great powers will increasingly grant to each other the exceptional right to use violence as they will”– because of the inadequacy of international institutions. I wonder if one long-term effects of the Russo-Georgia War will be to re-energize the Community of Democracies concept.

Given the reports of cyber attacks on Georgian digital systems, (and here, too,) the international lawyers need to look at what constitutes an act of war — a subject I address here.

Attack a nation’s highways and railroads, and you’ve attacked transportation infrastructure. You’ve also committed an obvious, recognized act of war.

An electronic attack doesn’t leave craters or bleeding human casualties, at least not in the same overt sense of an assault with artillery and bombs. However, the economic costs can be much larger than a classic barrage or bombing campaign.

Of course Georgian airfields and highways were hit by bombs, but the cyber attacks disrupt communications and economic activity, very much like cutting a railroad and knocking down the telegraph wires did in the US Civil War.

The inimitable Michael Barone reviews the “convergence media” presentation of my interview with General David Petraeus. I appreciate the generous words.

NOTE: I will eventually turn this post into a column. I have been intending to review Nichols’ book since March. I got to read Winkler’s book in galley and got a copy in the mail ten days ago.

Two books published this year admirably reflect history renewed and history pending, Jonathan Reed Winkler’s Nexus: Strategic Communications and American Security in World War I (Harvard, 2008) and Thomas M. Nichols’ Eve of Destruction: The Coming Age of Preventive War (Univ of Pennsylvania Press, 2008).
Winkler’s book provides a lesson in the evolutionary nature of technological change. Winkler explores the first global internet – the international telegraph cable system that began shrinking Planet Earth at the end of the 19th century.

Winkler illustrates that the “new” is rarely a radical break with the past. Undersea cables broke the great silence of strategic distance, establishing the first near-instantaneous global communications network. The hackers on this internet literally hacked cables.

As the 20th century dawned, Great Britain emerged as the global information power. “The world’s cable industry was almost entirely in British hands,” Winkler writes. Britain had the cable-laying ships and controlled production of gutta-percha, the choice “latex wrap” for insulating long-distance cable. Britain had a lead in wireless radio—the next-wave global link. Moreover, Britain had encouraged “countries to land their cables in Britain and overseas colonies…ensuring…their communications came under British control in wartime.”

When World War One broke out the British “hacked” German cables and immediately tapped both cable and wireless radio traffic (on its “Marconi wireless” stations). This produced an intelligence coup, and gave Britain imposing economic and political advantages. US international traders remained at the mercy of the British cable and wireless companies. Hence the jacket blurb by Richard Fernandez (The Belmont Club): “In a landmark book, Winkler shows how most of the issues of the information economy– and its handmaiden, infromation security– were thrust up on the US by World War I, when the naiton found that British domination of the cable infrastructure, combined with London’s strategic grasp of its possibilities, reduced the US to a humiliating dependence.”

Everything went through the British “filter.” British cable dominance echoes current US Internet dominance– at least distantly.

Thomas Nichols teaches at US Naval War College. The Coming Age of Preventive War is not a Beltway Clerk’s wonk tome about how fine the world would be if people with multi-syllabic vocabularies and the right kind of friends were running it. This is a warfighter’s book.

Nichols argues the “previous pillars” of order – tradition, international law, “concrete deterrence” —can “no longer promise the protection they once did.” The Westphalian idea of “absolute” state sovereignty is over (think Kosovo) and all institutions “founded upon it” (eg, the UN) are “in transition.” The emergence of Al Qaeda-type terrorists defeats the “logic” of Cold War-type deterrence and weapons of mass destruction in terrorist arsenals make the risk of a misjudgment too great. Yes, these ideas have been aired for the better part of two decades, but Nichols relentless focus on the “burden of action” and “the consequences of inaction” brings a grim, command decision frame the discussion, a “grimness” the author acknowledges.

Nichols sees three choices: (1) “continue to pretend the status quo is viable…” (denial choice) or (2) “great powers will increasingly grant to each other the exceptional right to use violence as they will” (“global jungle” choice). The second choice produces a system where small nations face “a system based on coercion rather than comity.” Nichols tentative third choice is reforming international institutions, beginning with the UN. He favors a McCain-type Community of Democracies, but considers other reforms. For example, membership in the General Assembly “derives” from simple existence, but Security Council membership “would be a privilege earned by a state’s behavior, both internal and external.”

Will it work? I’m not so sure, but Nichols makes the case the age of preventive war has already begun. “We don’t have to like that fact,” he writes, “but we do have to deal with it.”

Consider the looming diplomatic argument. If protecting Kosovar Albanians elicits a NATO invasion, as it did in 1999, and in the case of South Ossetia Russian peacekeepers operating under international aegis were already on the ground and involved in the Georgia-South Ossetia conflict (which they were), what is the gripe?

After Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence, separatism resulting from international action to protect an ethnic minority has an imprimatur.
That is one interpretation of Russia’s argument that Kosovo should never have been allowed to unilaterally separate from Serbia, which it did earlier this year.
Russia’s invasion of Georgia’s separatist South Ossetia region is certainly renewed warfare in the near abroad. It is also a violent reminder of how unsettled Eastern Europe remains in the post-Cold War era.

For Moscow’s foreign policy purposes, the troubles in Georgia fit “the Kosovo frame” – a minority group beset by an “ethnic nationalist authority” attempting to regain control.

I’m pointing this out not because I believe Georgia is Slobodan Milosevic’s Serbia. It most certainly is not. . Georgia a democratic state “working its way West” politically and economically. These are major qualitative differences between contemporary Georgia and Serbia in 1999.

However, Russian diplomats warned for the last eight years claimed “the Kosovo precedent” would affect around 200 regions or territories in nations around the world. That’s a nice round figure and it may in fact be low.

Moscow’s insisted that Kosovo would establish a “separatist precedent” for spinning statelets from sovereign nations. Interestingly enough, both Romania and Greece oppose a “unilateral” Kosovo independence. Spain, with its Basque separatists, wasn’t enthusiastic.

Securing Russia’s borders and protecting the interests of ethnic Russians are traditional Russian concerns. Georgia’s ethnic Russian community and the ethnic Russian community in Moldova’s separatist stately, Transdniestr, are causes celebre for the Kremlin’s increasingly muscular regime which is now hell bent on reasserting Russian power.

I believe Moldova remains the trigger for a new Ice Era in relations with Russia. I can’t call it a Cold War but Moldova and its troubles with Transdnisetr, immediately involve NATO. Romania is an active member of NATO and shares a border with Moldova Moldova is now an independent nation but was once a Romanian region. In between it was a Soviet socialist republic. Its current government “looks West” to the European Union and NATO—in part because it fears renewed Russian empire building.

Georgia shares a NATO land border — with Turkey. (NOTE: In original post I had no land border. Writing late at night.) It is an ally of the US. But in Georgia’s case it if “difficult to get there from here,” even in the US wanted to respond militarily. (Check the map.)

The Russians also claim Georgian allowed Chechen rebels to use base camps in Georgian mountains. Since the early 1990s Russia has also backed ethnic Russians in Georgia’s separatist Abkhazia region. In late July 2008 Russia pulled about 400 of 2,500 peacekeeping troops from Abkhazia—but given the war in South Ossetia expect the Russian’s to reinforce Abkhazia. At the minimum Russian military control of Abkhazia is a post-conflict bargaining chip
And Russia has beven bigger chips. This is tough for Georgia, but Russia that expects Europe to accede to Russian political and economic demands. To influence any European political or military situation, however, Russia really doesn’t need to send ground troops; it has three convincing diplomatic tools: (1) nuclear weapons; (2) a veto in the UN Security Council; and (3) abundant natural gas shipped to Europe via pipelines.

Moscow’s emerging ultranationalist government may see the invasion of South Ossetia as a route to recovering international respect, a renewed “Mother Russia” defending its allies against NATO’s political designs and, in fact, acting as “a Moscow NATO” when it comes to addressing wars on its own borders.

UPDATE: See this.

Quick note: TheArenaUSA’s convergence media program featuring the entire interview with GEN Petraeus went on-line a short time ago. The response to the various Arena “beta” programs has been gratifying and thank you– the Korea backgrounder and the Over The Horizon: The Evolving Food Crisis seem to have been particularly well received. Thank you. The Petraeus interview is presented as an Arena Report. There will be more. PajamasMedia has a Deep Background program with the audio, too.

This particular question (terror and crime in Iraq) and its extensive answer are an example of the Internet’s real contribution to serious discussion – space for the expert to elaborate, for concepts to evolve, for significant facts to receive due emphasis, for the experts and the audience to explore. And General Petraeus explores many dimensions of terror and crime, as well as the civilizing force of the Rule of Law. He acknowledges theory –that’s the scholar– as he speaks from crucible — the soldier at war.

Even on commercial radio talk programs an advertisement looms– an eventual, artificial guillotine. Live public radio comes close to providing elaborative space– sometimes. Of course today we find audio and video archived on the Internet for re-play and re-evaluation – the words are no longer lost. The Internet serves as a vast hyper-linked library where individuals can find what they want when they want it, then consider it at leisure. Quick Internet transcription services are already meeting the demand for “print copies” of radio and audio casts. The era of convergence media is now. The Internet savvy know this. A friend of mine shot me an email this morning noting a senior military commander in a major war is giving unfettered access to emerging media. Yes, that’s true. He was very generous with his time. I appreciate that. New convergence media technology provides the time and space for maximizing his generosity.

That’s enough blog chatter. As for this question and its informative answer: Terrorists and insurgents commit crimes but use those crimes to further their political (or eschatological) agendas. Terrorists connect with criminals in various human sewers, which is why intelligence and police agencies monitor the sewer – watch the criminals and occasionally you’ll catch a few terrorists, especially if you can get the criminals to become intel sources. Hammer the criminal organizations and sometimes you will crimp terrorist finances. Doesn’t mean you will defeat them; it means you have “pressurized their environment” in another operational dimension and over time that will damage them. Counter-terror operations are warfare that overlap with counter-crime operations. Defeating terrorists requires developing and implementing highly integrated political-military-economic plans and actions and pursuing them over a longer period of time. GEN Petraeus touches on a number of examples in our discussion. He really “drills down” when I ask him about crime and the rule of law. From my question: “There’s often a fine law between smuggling and rebellion.” We see this in Colombia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Malaysia, the Philippines, throughout the Horn of Africa, across Africa’s Grand Sahel (Sudan, Chad, etc), even in Iran.

FROM INTERVIEW 4 AUGUST 2008 2000 HRS BAGHDAD, 1200 HOURS CDT

AUSTIN BAY: Well, let me move to another line of operation. You operate both operationally and strategically. You mentioned the diplomatic line of operation, and Ambassador Crocker. I’d like to come back and ask you a question about that in a moment. But rule of law is absolutely vital. And you mentioned gangs. That associates immediately with crime. And many terror organizations, rebel groups engage in criminal activities to fund operations. There’s often a fine line between smuggling and rebellion, and we’ve seen that in Iraq. We see that, to a degree, in Afghanistan.
How are the Iraqis approaching that component, rule-of-law component, not just through criminal rule of law but also dealing with corruption? I realize it’s a big question but it’s one that you must address every day.

GENERAL DAVID PETRAEUS: Well, it’s a huge question. There a number of components to the rule of law. Obviously the police is one component. In that regard, there’s been good development in the area of the police, and especially the national police, an organization that many people, probably rightly so, some fourteen months ago, might ought to just be disestablished because they had become part of the sectarian problem instead of part of the solution.
As you’ll recall, the sectarian violence here was horrific, and it is very important to remember how bad it was. In the winter of 2006 and into the spring of 2007, there were periods when there were fifty five dead bodies a night on average, that was the average in December 2006, turning up just on the streets of Baghdad, just from sectarian violence, not including other forms of violence.
When you have such horrific violence day in/day out, fifty five dead bodies every twenty four hours, the security forces themselves start to take sides. They have to because their families are threatened, they are threatened, their leaders are assassinated, families are kidnapped, ministries are hijacked.
The Ministry of Health became a sectarian killing machine in many respects. The prime minister — one of the early tasks he asked me to help with was, of all things, to detain the deputy minister of health in his government and then the Ministry of Health facility protection security forces chief.
But, over time, and as the sectarian violence has receded, much has been possible in terms of reforming these different forces.
Now, in the case of the national police, it took replacement of every division commander and brigade commander and seventy five percent of the battalion commanders. But that has been done. There’s been retraining months long for each unit, and so forth.
So that is moving along reasonably well. There is some progress in the judicial arena as well. The construction of rule-of-law complexes, rule-of-law green zones, if you will, secure areas in which they can conduct the investigations and the trials, has helped.
But there is a lot of work that needs to be done in that regard. There’s still considerable intimidation of the judicial authorities. There have been assassinations and attempted assassinations of some of them. The militia and special groups have sought to strike fear in them if they take up those cases. And this comes back to the mafia-like activities and therefore the mafia-like actions of some of those elements that threaten security in Iraq.
We have, in fact, put considerable emphasis on how Al-Qaeda, in Iraq, generates resources. And they do it, again, like a mafia does, that we would be familiar with. It’s through extortion of successful businesses; extortion of money for protection rackets, or what have you; insisting that a cell phone business, for example, give them a cut of their profits or they’ll blow the cell phones down — cell phone towers down; taking a cut out of the cement business, the real estate business, the financial businesses, and so forth.
And you see the same on the militia side; although, again, much reduced now and they don’t control the port of Umm Qasr anymore. They don’t control various other elements that they did control until about six to eight months ago.
So progress there. And then beyond that, certainly corruption is a concern and a problem and one that the Iraqis have very much recognized and about which they’re very concerned. They’ve launched an anti-corruption program.
But this is going to be a serious issue. There is considerable money. There is a very young and still very much developing government largely led by individuals who — very good people and good leaders of opposition parties for many years but have not necessarily exercised strategic leadership in the past and very much growing into their jobs but with bureaucracies that are still very much developing as well.
So a lot of work to be done in the entire rule-of-law arena. Huge challenges to it. And it’s not a country that has had a tradition of strong-willed law, given the way that everything was, in a sense, perverted, if you will, by Saddam Hussein, twisted to his desires and basically responsive to the whims of the moment from Saddam and his regime.

This post from August 5 provides background on the interview.

For more on crime go here (my Arena Channel) and track through the interview to this question and answer.

Pajamas has the podcast posted as well. (Again, thank you, Ed Driscoll.)

Is terror crime or war? This is a different question than the one I posed to General Petraeus. Obviously, it’s both. And it depends. Terror is a tactic and criminals use it to “enforce” their will. Rebels use the tactic. Since it’s both and it depend, terror defies narrow legal templates. For another dimension –a different dimension, the US Supreme Court dimension — see the Boumediene v Bush video.

I know this post comes a bit late. It’s old news by now: Turkey’s Constitutional Court did not ban the Justice and Development Party (AKP), it fined the AKP. The “judicial coup” did not occur. The AKP was accused of undermining Turkey’s secularist institutions.

While working on an update for StrategyPage I read through a number of reports on the Court’s decision. This BBC story is a good overall summary. This Council on Foreign Relations opinion piece has some more details. This “reflective analysis” by IPS is a good read.

Is this a “slap at the Army” as some Turks have called it? My take: Not a slap, but certainly not a kowtow. The Council on Foreign Relations essay quotes its in-house expert, Steven A. Cook, as saying “Clearly the secularists will be disappointed that the party was not banned, but they are likely to take some comfort in the fact that the AKP was warned.”

Many Turks see this decision as another demonstration that Turkey is ready to join the European Union—a signal that Turkey is a reliable democracy. Most members of the EU hailed the decision and the EU’s “enlargement committee” praised it. A slew of secular Turks (not all Kemalists) aren’t so sure since they see the AKP as a “stealth” Islamist party. Once again to the BBC, this BBC report from July 30 providing a pithy sketch of the secularists fears.

An indicative quote:

“They are trying to brainwash people,” one young woman shouts at me. “They are fakes. They are wearing a mask to hide what they really are.”

And Turkey’s government, according to this woman, is really a group of Islamic fundamentalists bent on imposing their religious practices on the whole population.

The woman is probably ticked about the AKP’s insistence on passing hijab legislation (permitting headscarves in public universities). That was the “tipping point” political move that pushed the prosecutor’s case against the AKP forward in the Constitutional Court. (The CFR story touches on this.)

Still, the AKP is a popular party, has broad support, and is the duly elected government. BUt the IPS article (linked above) notes:

The message is that a party that gets 47 percent of the vote cannot do whatever it wants, and broader consensus is needed for major decisions, with the active involvement of opposition as well as civil society.

The AKP is, of course, the party receiving 47 percent of the votes.

In the big picture this is another battle in the “battle for Turkey’s soul.” That’s a useful phrase I first encountered in the 1980s and Jim Dunnigan and I have used on StrategyPage and — for that matter– it will appear again in the next edition of A Quick and Dirty Guide to War (to appear in October, courtesy Paladin Press). The AKP could be the example many Middle Easterns Muslims been looking for — a genuinely moderate and reformed Muslim party. Secular Turks fear it is “an ayatollah in a business suit.”

I do not think there is any question that at this moment in time General David Petraeus is one of America’s most widely respected leaders –in or out of uniform.

I had the privilege of speaking with the soldier-scholar at length this past Monday, August 4. Both my ArenaUSA channel and PajamasMedia will be running programs with the complete interviews. TheArenaUSA will be a convergence media program (audio-video-print) that will feature hyperlinked notes as well as a short video introduction — and of course other related programming, like the Strategic Overwatch video. (Registration is recommended but no longer required — so you can go straight to the video.) UPDATE: PajamasMedia has the interview as a “Deep Background” podcast.

If there is a theme threading the interview it is “achieving strategic goals in Iraq.” Petraeus gives both strategic and operational-level descriptions of the process he’s following to achieve near-term and longer-term goals. He also provides a sketch of several of those goals.

Pay attention to the questions about “strategic change.” Here is part of Petraeus’ answer to one of them (pinched from this week’s Creators Syndicate column) and my quick take on his reply:

“We’ve been at moments of strategic change,” Petraeus replied. “These are not light switch moments…what you have is more of a rheostat, many, many rheostat moments where in small areas local areas districts and eventually provinces there is an ongoing transition and has been an ongoing transition for the Iraqi forces to step more into the lead and the coalition forces to step back and provide enablers.”

Petraeus sketched a conditions-based approach to assessing a war of increments where victory only emerges over time. A “light switch” is Hollywood. Because it is complex, dynamic, and multi-dimensional, “rheostat warfare” escapes television’s appetite for soundbite analysis. Counter-terror, counter-insurgency, and for that matter, anti-crime campaigns are rheostat operations that take time to conduct and judge.

At one point I ask: “Do you have an idea of what victory would be in Iraq or the Global War on Terror?”

Once more pinching from the column:

Petraeus said the campaign plan had “near term objectives for summer 2008” and the security objectives have been met. If the Iraqi government passes “the provincial elections law then it can be declared that they have met them (plan objectives) in the political line of operation…” Diplomatic and economic objectives are also being achieved.

“We have objectives for 2009 and an end state as well,” he said. He did not elaborate on goals for 2009 but said the end state in short hand “is country that is at peace with itself and its neighbors. A government representative of and responsive to its people. A productive member of the region and the global economy.”

“But again,” he warned, “we have considerable drill downs that describe the objectives relative to in the security line of operations, relative the enemy… relative to the Iraqi forces, the different types that are here.”

He’s saying a smart and resilient enemy “always has a vote.” In Iraq’s case what Iran does or does not do matters.

If you want to “look forward” with General Petraeus’ interview as a reference and critical guideline, TheArenaUSA’s Strategic Overwatch program (an update to the Consequences pilot tv episode) provides a useful tool for thinking about what the path to achieving these goals in Iraq will look like over the next 12 to 36 months– that’s what a scenario ought to do, provide an instructive and creative insight into a dynamic, changing situation.

Note this exchange regarding the “incremental” nature of the warfighting process –lifted from Ed Driscoll’s transcript– but how “the incremental” builds over time to reach goals:

AUSTIN BAY: Gen. David Petraeus, let’s pick up on your rheostat analogy. You’re giving us a conditions-based approach to assessing victory in a very intricate, complex and long struggle. Now this is an incremental victory–one step up; a half-step back. Enemy action results in a coalition response; coalition actions result in an enemy response. That’s war among human beings. It strikes me that some of those conditions include a sovereign Iraq that is largely responsible for its own internal security, but is also a United States ally. These are some of the conditions mentioned in the Update Strategic Overwatch video at the ArenaUSA.com. That said; if you would, please comment on a sovereign Iraq emerging as a US ally.

Did you get a chance to look at that video?

GENERAL DAVID PETRAEUS: Just briefly, I’m afraid, Austin. But let me just come back to what you just said because the way you stated that is exactly right. It is incremental, and it does have fits and starts. It is this exercise of pushing the stone up a hill, a Sisyphean endeavor at times where you do make two steps up and one step back. Sometimes you get one step up and two steps back.
But, overall, over the course of the past year or so, really since the start of the surge of offenses in particular, that was the large comprehensive offensive launched in June 2007 when we had all of the surge brigades on the ground, since that time, there has been a fairly steady degree of improvement week in/week out, month in/month out. Certainly, again, there have been flare-ups at times. The militia counterattacks, when Prime Minister al-Maliki ordered Iraqi forces and the Basra, were really quite a substantial — more than a flare-up.
But, over time, those were dealt with, more than dealt with, in fact, and very severe losses inflicted on the militia.

That’s a perspective on the current “over all.” Where else might these “increments” lead? For example, the Strategic Overwatch scenario (in one of the slides) provides a glimpse of what future (and maybe not so future) Iranian troublemaking might look like:

…more Shia Arab strife occurs in Lebanon (stoked by Iran) with the goal of distracting Iraqi Shias and/or “radicalizing” Iraqi foreign policy…

Petraeus spent a great deal of time discussing the Iraqi Army — its increasing professionalism, its increase in size, and its modernization. Again, the Strategic Overwatch has a “look forward”:

Iraqi Army continues to re-arm and modernize; Iraq and the U.S. agree to a “long range cooperation agreement” the Iraqi people see as advantageous to Iraq…

The Iraqis will have to continue their military modernization and professionalization process, but they will also expect the US to be a reliable ally.

I came back to the Iraq “emerging as a US ally” is a victory condition. In paraphrase, he said: “That is certainly one of the objectives,” Petraeus said. The US would want an Iraq “taking resolute action against” Al Qaeda in Iraq, Shia militias, and “special groups” supported by Iran.

I encourage you to listen to the entire interview. Check out both on-line presentations –TheArenaUSA convergence media program will also include selected transcripts of General Petraeus’ comments (and ultimately include some footnotes). Pajamas will post an entire transcript later this week. (Thanks to Ed Driscoll.)

Defining victory in war is tough. Achieving victory is, of course, an even harder proposition.

UPDATE: StrategyPage has the column posted.

UPDATE 2: A real update here, as of 12:33 PM CDT. TheArenaUSA program will be up later this afternoon PDT.

Read this book:Challenges of the Muslim World, Present, Future, and Past” (Elsevier, 2008). by William Cooper and Piyu Yue.

The book is not a political polemic — it is penetrating and very useful scholarship.

I reviewed it last week in my Creator’s Syndicate column (via StrategyPage).

And pay attention to the graphs and figures.

The authors have the communicator’s knack many statisticians lack — the ability to produce charts and figures that turn complex data bits and algorithmic contortions into dynamic pictures that explain. One such chart explains why gasoline prices in the United States have climbed roughly 70 percent since Cooper created the “World Energy Consumption by Economies, 1970-2025″ in 2006.

The chart is “oil agnostic” — it considers energy demands in quadrillion BTUs. In 1970, the world required 300 quadrillion BTUs; make it 645 quadrillion for 2025. The percentage consumed by “mature economies” (like the United States) declines from 65 percent to 42 percent. “Emerging economies” (China) rise from 16 percent to 46 percent. If the numbers boggle, slap your wallet and examine them again.

If you’ve been checking out the Austin Bay Arena Channel, you know that we are adding new content and material every week. This week we are premiering our feature, “Over the Horizon” and my first “OTH” addresses food politics, the rising cost of food, and the “global food crisis.”

There are several developing problems relating to food supplies around the world. Just this past week the United Nations estimated that it will take 6 billion dollars to feed the starving and famine stricken in Africa.

This Toronto Star article is a bit windy, but this particular graf provides a useful sketch:

The crisis is the result of a complex set of interrelated factors, including rising oil prices which have driven up fertilizer and transport costs, speculation in commodity markets, dwindling government-held reserves of food stocks to buffer shocks, and the shift of food crops into biofuel production…

This isn’t very different from what I wrote in a column two months ago, one entitled “The Maze Behind Maize”:

The pun is more accurate than the accusation: A maze of interrelated factors affect the price of maize and most other foodstuffs. The growing economies of India and China require energy, and demand from these two Asian giants as well as sustained demand from other advanced economies has spurred a long-term rise in oil prices. Higher oil prices bump food prices; it takes energy to raise and transport food.

Arena’s “Over The Horizon” takes the column into the realm of convergence media. “OTH: The Evolving Food Crisis” addresses the “cascading effects” and how the food crisis threatens vulnerable people who already live on the edge of malnutrition if not outright starvation. Watch it and let me know what you think of the production. You can preview the teaser here:

Login to my Arena Channel and view the full convergence media program.

Martha Raddatz of ABC News reports that US commanders in Iraq believe US troops should remain to insure security.

Key quote:

We spent a day with Maj. Gen. Jeffery Hammond in Sadr City. He is the commander of the 4th Infantry Division, which is responsible for Baghdad. Hammond will likely be one of the commanders who briefs Barack Obama when he visits Iraq.

“We still have a ways to go. Number one, we’re working on security and it’s very encouraging, that’s true, but what we’re really trying to achieve here is sustainable security on Iraqi terms. So, I think my first response to that would be let’s look at the conditions.

“Instead of any time-based approach to any decision for withdrawal, it’s got to be conditions-based, with the starting point being an intelligence analysis of what might be here today, and what might lie ahead in the future. I still think we still have work that remains to be done before I can really answer that question,” Hammond said when asked how he would feel about an order to start drawing down two combat brigades a month.

When it comes to defense, security, and military issues, Raddatz is by far ABC News’ most knowledgeable reporter.

But even a candidate able to create an Oz of words cannot finesse the logistical reality.

From the Raddatz’ “logistics” section:Success on the battlefield is not the only complication with Obama’s plan.

Physically removing the combat brigades within that kind of time frame would be difficult, as well.

The military has been redeploying troops for years, and Maj. Gen. Charles Anderson, who would help with the withdrawal, told us as we toured Camp Arifjan in Kuwait, “We have the capacity to do a minimum of two-and-a-half brigade combat teams a month — can we expand that capacity? Sure. Can we accelerate? It depends. It depends on the amount of equipment that we bring back. And it’s going to depend on how fast we bring them out.”

And Raddatz provides an example:

Two combat brigades means up to 1,200 humvees in addition to thousands of other pieces of equipment, like trucks, fuelers, tankers and helicopters.

And 90 percent of the equipment would have to be moved by ground through the Iraqi war zone, to the port in Kuwait, where it must all be cleaned and inspected and prepared for shipment. This is a place with frequent dust storms, limited port facilities and limited numbers of wash racks.

Trucks. Ships. Planes. Moving people and things. Why, geography– and we’re not talking a mind glitch like 57 states. This is about a basic understanding of material reality, not political poetry. Obama may move hearts with a well-turned phrase, and get Chris Matthews knees to tingle, but how good is he at scheduling convoys? The image the hard left has of a US withdrawal is a helicopter fetching fleeing staff from the top of the Saigon, Vietnam embassy. That’s the liturgical icon of the “withdraw now” crowd. Of course I think Obama will “refine” his Iraqi policy so that it becomes something very much like–well, like Bush’s.

We’ve an emerging success in Iraq –the Strategic Overwatch scenario in this post provides an analytic a projection. This success has been building for four years and unfortunately it will take a decade for politicized passions to cool before the sober reassessment occurs. Then we’ll be bombarded with theses and books and a few mea culpas about the trail of successes evident amid the failures, the dead, the bombs, the terror. In war the enemy gets a vote. The good guys also get a vote. Over time the votes mount up, the destruction mounts, but so does the construction. In Iraq the construction by the Iraqi people and the coalition is mounting. In Iraq the enemy –Al Qaeda, the Saddamists, Shia gangsters– had the tactically “easy” route: destruction and chaos designed to obtain psychologically damaging headlines and spread fear and doubt. The Iraqi people and the coalition had to construct as well as fight. That’s tough tactically and operationally but strategically wise.

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Bloomberg reports on the Zimbabwean dictators upcoming moves on Parliament.

This claim by the Zimbabwe Solidarity Forum (ZSF) (via Monsters and Critics) is interesting.

The ZSF’s claim:

The Zimbabwean military, and not President Robert Mugabe, is now running the troubled country, the South Africa-based Zimbabwe Solidarity Forum (ZSF) said Thursday.

ZSF spokesman Sipho Theys told a news conference in Johannesburg that a military junta had taken over the Zimbabwe and militias were controlling parts of the country.

‘Rural bases of soldiers are living off rural communities and humanitarian aid,’ the South Africa Press Association (Sapa) quoted Theys as saying.

Mugabe was reelected unopposed in a June 27 one-candidate presidential run-off election which African observers said was ‘not free, fair or credible.’

Mugabe has control over the militias and at least a “working relationship” with the military. Remember, he has tried to shield his supporters (including key military units) from the savaging effects of Zimbabwe’s failed economy. It’s an old game. Saddam showered the Iraqi Republican Guard with economic goodies.

The US won’t rule out the possibility.

Reuters:

The United States on Wednesday condemned the attack on its consulate in Istanbul and a State Department spokesman said he could neither confirm nor rule out al Qaeda involvement.

The Houston Chronicle reported:

Suspected al-Qaida militants armed with pistols and shotguns attacked a police guard post outside the U.S. consulate in Istanbul today, sparking a gunbattle that left three attackers and three officers dead.

Here’s the new consulate. I’m guessing the one Ivisited in 1992 has closed–it was not far from the Pera Palas Hotel as I recall (where Agatha Christie wrote “Murder on the Orient Express”).

Turkey, however, has many radical factions that use terror, from the PKK (Kurdish Workers Party) to hard left radicals still mired in the Cold War to Islamo-fascists. Still, this attack was brazen – a gunbattle with security guards. With three attackers slain it means we should learn more in the coming days. The Houston Chronicle report said that at least two of the attackers had been identified as Turks. Why would Al Qaeda hit Istanbul? Because they can. Despite Turkey’s sophisticated counter-terror precautions, Istanbul is a huge, vibrant, open city. It is also Europe. Al Qaeda-linked terror bombings took place in Istanbul in 2003 and killed 58 people.

I will be on Hugh Hewitt’s national radio program today discussing “Scenario 8,” which is the “Strategic Overwatch” scenario in ArenaUSA’s “Update” video. (Click “Guest Login” and have immediate access to the majority of the programs inside.) If the Hugh Hewitt show is not carried on the radio in your area, you can listen online at http://krla870.townhall.com/. (At the moment I am scheduled to be on at 6:20 PM Central Time, 4:20 PM Pacific Time).

Yes, Strategic Overwatch is a limited victory for the coalition forces– though arguably a huge victory for Iraqis. Radical? I don’t think so. Progress in Iraq has either been ignored or disparaged –we’ve suffered from the narrative of doubt. Now, even Obama may be “refining.” For the record, the UPDATE video was shot in Los Angeles in mid-May — so it pre-dates the sudden “narrative of optimism.” Note that the scenario includes several “enemy” contingencies– including one involving Iran.

The Iraqis are clearly gaining confidence — the Iraqi “demand” that the US withdraw troops is a statement of political confidence It is also a a well-hedged statement, since Iraqi National Security Adviser Mowaffak al-Rubaie that U.S. withdrawal was “conditioned on the ability of Iraqi forces to provide security…”

Here are three of the elements drawn from the “Scenario 8″ slide in ArenaUSA’s on-line presentation:

Assumptions: U.S. is in Iraq for the long haul; Iraqi political progress continues.

Time to Develop: Could emerge by mid-to-late 2009, fully fledged by 2011.

Related Events: Iraqi Army continues to re-arm and modernize; Iraq and the U.S. agree to a “long range cooperation agreement” the Iraqi people see as advantageous to Iraq; the “squeeze” on the PKK continues; Iraq begins to attract steady and sustained private investment; members of the Arab League begin forging stronger political and economic ties with Iraq. (copyright Austin Bay and TheArenaUSA.com)

Over the past ten weeks I’ve received several comments from the Arena’s feedback box. ArenaUSA decided to use the “Austin Bay Channel” as the beta-test. At least three other Arena Academy channels will be coming on-line during the next month: Annie Jacobsen, Frank Gaffney, and Dr Robert Mundell (Nobel Prize in Economics 1999).

As for full Arena registration (beyond guest login)– registering gives viewers full access to all content, early viewing of featured programs, polls, invitations, updates and the opportunity to help shape Arena programming.

And I’ll add this thought– if Hugh and I have time I’ll discuss the new Arena series “Over the Horizon” (OTH).

UPDATE: The AP quotes LTG James Dubik’s congressional testimony:

The general who led efforts to train Iraq’s army and police units said today that progress is mixed and long-term U.S. help is needed.

Army Lt. Gen. James Dubik said Iraq’s security forces have grown from 444,000 to 566,000 since he assumed command of the Multi-National Security Transition Command in June 2007 and they are better able to execute operations on their own.

And:

When pressed by panel chairman Rep. Ike Skelton, D-Mo., the general said he does expect Iraqi ground forces to be operating proficiently by the middle of next year, possibly as early as April.

Dubik’s testimony is appropriately circumspect. However, his “possibly” April 2009 date (”middle of next year”) is in line with my Strategic Overwatch scenario.

Iraq the Model has been in the front lines of free speech in the Middle East.

See this post for an update on Itaq the Model’s role in supporting Arabic-language bloggers.

The heat generated by this 5-4 Supreme Court decision has not subsided. Fox News reports there is no “imminent decision” by President Bush to close the Guantanamo Bay prison. ABC News points out both Obama and McCain favor closing the prison.

In the first edition of BEYOND THE AGENDA I interview law professors Lino Graglia (con) and Scott Sullivan (pro) about Boumediene v. Bush — the case’s background, the Supreme Court decision, and its implications.

Professor Sullivan addresses the issue of the potential for the release of classified intelligence material. Graglia tackles the extension of US civil rights to Osama bin Laden. Watch the slides — these experts have hyperlinked footnotes. This is genuine “convergence media” — here and now.

Watch the whole thing.

Beyond The Agenda will be a regular on-line video series. If you’ve program ideas, please pass them along to The Arena’s program managers.

The Hard Thing of Democracy

A Vietnam vet friend of mine argues that maintaining a democracy requires three things: a passion for freedom, tolerance for diversity and intolerance for threats.

An email from a reader, responding to a Creators Syndicate column on Iraq’s struggling democracy, suggested I write about the United States’ own tortuous path — sketching a nation that began with limited voting rights and confronted powerful factions, ethnic animosities, urban riot, rural rebellion and destructive civil war. The reader thought America’s saga might help the public “understand that this democracy thing is hard.”

Hard indeed. Mull my friend’s threefold guidance, and you’ll find tricky paradox after paradox entwined within several enigmas. Balancing tolerance and intolerance is an obvious tension, which requires reason, experience, maturity and discipline, but the aspiration for freedom, the drive to obtain it and retain it, also involves emotional passion and desire.

America itself is a structural paradox. The United States is a republic — for good reason. America’s founders saw dangers in what James Madison (Federalist Paper 10) called “pure democracy … a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person.” Madison argued this arrangement had “no cure for the mischiefs of faction,” and weaker parties and “an obnoxious individual” were vulnerable to “pure” majority rule.

Yet a muscular democratic spirit empowers the Constitution’s opening phrase, “We the people of the United States.” America is a balancing act, where democratic practices and values steer the republic.

Democracy and freedom, that passionate objective, are closely linked, but democracy in practice is an exercise in restrained freedom. Liberty without responsibility quickly and all too easily degrades to libertinism, which is why maintaining democracy demands shared responsibility.

But shared responsibility — what a risky demand. Human beings may behave nobly and sacrificially; they also behave abysmally and selfishly. During the Cold War, Jean Francois Revel wrote in “How Democracies Perish” that “democracy may, after all, turn out to have been a historical accident. … Democracy is by its very nature turned inward. Its vocation is the patient and realistic improvement of life in a community.”

Revel echoed John Adams’ observation of 1814: “Democracy never lasts long. It soon wastes, exhausts and murders itself. There was never a democracy yet that did not commit suicide.”

Revel saw democratic practice as paradox fraught with social reward and danger. “Societies of which permanent criticism is an integral feature are the only livable ones,” he wrote, “but they are also the most fragile.”

“Permanent criticism” exemplifies tolerance for diversity, though to my ear Revel’s “criticism” implies respect and regard for the system itself — a salient difference from 1960s student protestors who damned the entire American enterprise. But neither criticism nor protest is the highest form of patriotism, as many of these self-congratulatory ’60s radicals contend. The toughest job in a democracy is that of a private soldier assaulting an enemy machine gun nest — and that private’s action is intolerance for threat exemplified.

Revel believed democracies would continue to be threatened “as long as theirs is not the only system in the world,” and they “must compete with systems that do not burden themselves with the same obligations.”

What are those obligations? Philosopher Paul Woodruff (who is also the University of Texas’ Dean of Undergraduate Studies) in his book, “First Democracy: The Challenge of an Ancient Idea”, identified “seven ideas” that a democratic government “tries to express.” They certainly intersect with Revel’s obligations. Woodruff listed: freedom from tyranny; “harmony”; the rule of law; natural equality; citizen wisdom; “reasoning without knowledge”; and general education.

Harmony entails “wanting together.” Lack of harmony can lead to civil war. Democratic equality “rests on the idea that the poor should be equal to the rich … at least for sharing governance.” Woodruff argued that ancient Athenians taught that “reasoning without knowledge depends on working out what is most reasonable to believe. What is most reasonable to believe is the view which best survives adversary debate.” That suggests permanent criticism and controversy are as vital to democracy as being prepared to defend it.

“Democracy is hard,” Woodruff wrote, echoing the reader’s letter. “They did not get it entirely right in Athens 2,500 years ago, and we do not have it right now, anywhere.”

Perhaps democracy is, like happiness, a pursuit.

This post is taken from this week’s Creators Syndicate column and a speech I gave July 1. And speaking of permanent criticism and democratic fragility, ArenaUSA will be posting a pilot versionof “Beyond the Agenda”– the first program features law professors Lino Graglia and Scott Sullivan and the subject is Boumediene v. Bush. Sullivan was involved in Guatanamo Bay litigation. I’ll be posting on this later.

UPDATE: The Arena has posted the first edition of Beyond The Agenda, with Boumediene v. Bush as the subject. Click on my Arena page direct link (top of the blog page)) or here or go here for background.