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De Gaulle’s policy in the Middle East
08/08/2004
Since 1945 French policy toward the Middle East has undergone essential changes which are the direct result of the dissolution of French colonialism.
The basic national interests which France pursued in the area from the original establishment of the colonies remain unchanged: economic interests in oil and trade; military interests in the strategic protection of the Mediterranean border and access to oil; and political interests in the maintenance of France as a major power in the world, in part by retaining a capability to influence the actions of the Middle Eastern nations.
Once political control was no longer possible, persuasion rather than domination provided the only means for implementing the French policy.
Before de Gaulle (1948-1958)
A major influence on every nation’s policy in the Middle East is the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Both France and Israel were united in a common hatred of Arab nationalism. To France, Egypt was the principal source of aid for the Algerian nationalists. To Israel, Nasser was the idol of the Arab masses that sought to restore the rights of the Palestinians. Moreover, there was a natural affinity between the socialists in France and the socialists in Israel, who were in command in the two countries.
France became the crucial source of Israel’s armaments which included the Mystere aircraft and Mirage as well .In fact, during the early phase of the Algerian war (1956-1962), France was extremely anxious to have someone who would fight against Nasser. And in 1956 Britain joined Israel and France in an invasion of Egypt. France and Israel were not merely allies; they were co-belligerents.
De Gaulle’s policy in world perspective (1958-1969)
De Gaulle’s policy toward the Middle East was derived from his plan for the future of France in the world. This plan arose from his general aversion to bipolarism which he believed was corresponding less and less to the real situation. Hence, French diplomacy aimed at the development of a third force with sufficient strength and independence to influence the behaviour of the big powers. Leadership of the force would afford France an independent posture enabling it to play an active and constructive global role. Moreover, this independent posture was designed to restore freedom to French decision-makers and to enhance French international prestige. In order to achieve this goal, de Gaulle emphasizes that the force requires a presence on all continents. To implement this aspect of the policy, de Gaulle capitalized on nationalist sentiments in both Latin America and Canada. In Africa he sustained the French position through the affirmation of cultural ties with former colonies; in the Middle East, he made all his possible to restore the French prestige.
De Gaulle’s policy before the June War
De Gaulle began remolding French policy in the area almost as soon as he took office. He astutely removed the Algerian hurdle, in accordance with a policy of decolonization, thus ending France’s personal quarrel with Nasser. The socialist Party of Guy Mollet, which allied itself with Ben Gurion’s party, was now out of office. And the French Radicals along with Israeli supporters of the Organization de l’Armée Secrète conspiracy against de Gaulle were now held suspect by the Fifth Republic. In the meantime French enterprises had suffered tremendous loss in the Middle East because of the Suez crisis of 1956 and the Algerian situation.
It was against this background that de Gaulle’s government began to reassess its policy in the Middle East. Diplomatic relations were re-established with the United Arab Republic following the Evian’s accord which ended the Algerian conflict in 1962.
As for Israel, France still remained the main supplier of modern armaments. Between 1961 and 1964, Israel secretly purchased from France seventy-two Mirage 3-C warplanes. Moreover, the French defense manufacturer, Marcel Dassault, supplied Israel with twenty-five surface-to-surface missiles. When Ben Gurion paid a state visit to France in 1961, de Gaulle told him that he considered Israel as a friendly and allied nation. Arabs and Israeli alike respected France’s new look at the Middle East.
De Gaulle and the June War
As long as de Gaulle was able to keep French policy in a middle position and remained non-aligned in the Middle East, he could pursue a course of action that would maximize his objectives without risking his security. This reasoning was behind his actions during the crisis of May and June of 1967. Israel’s Foreign Minister, Abba Eban, was seeking to determine the extent of backing his country could expect from Western powers. The response of France was motivated by a desire of non-involvement. Conscious of this situation, de Gaulle attempted to dissuade the two parties from starting hostilities. As a further illustration of its neutrality, France refrained from joining Britain and the United States in challenging the validity of the Aqaba blockade.
When all diplomatic efforts failed to prevent the outbreak of hostilities, France reaffirmed its neutrality by suspending arms delivery. But France condemned the opening of hostilities by Israel and refused to recognize any territorial changes based on military acquisition. It favoured a settlement based on the evacuation of territories seized by force and the end of all belligerency.
Israeli leaders were critical of the French policy, but Moshe Dayan, the defence minister, recognized, the French position was neutral. Nevertheless, Levi Eshkol, called de Gaulle a friend but suggested that he might be friendlier if he ended the embargo on the sale of fifty Mirage aircraft ordered by Israel prior to the war!
Surely, French policy was this time received more favourably by the Arabs than by Israel.
De Gaulle’s impact on the Arab world
In the Arab world, de Gaulle won wide praise. France, which, since the Suez crisis in 1956 had lost all its cultural influence in Syria and Egypt, restored this influence overnight. Thus, Syria, Egypt, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia expressed all approval of the French president’s policy. France’s independent political line significantly increased opportunities for trade, cultural agreements, aid, and oil agreements between France and the Arab countries.
By astute political observation and calculated diplomatic moves, de Gaulle formulated a foreign policy which aimed at reducing United States or Soviet hegemony, creating a third force with French leadership, and rebuilding French spirit and international stature. De Gaulle’s plan, for the most part continued by Pompidou, called for a restoration of a significant French political, cultural and economic presence in the Arab countries while maintaining solid ties with Israel.
Laura Tolub
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