INDTRODUCTION

World-wide, one in every one hundred and fourteen people is displaced today.2 In almost every world capital population movements are viewed with alarm. In Paris, Bonn, Bern, Vienna and Brussels the large refugee/illegal migrant influx from Eastern Europe and the Third World is cause for great concern. In Washington, DC, there is disquiet over Haitian, Chinese and Cuban boat people. In Japan, the key concerns revolve around the illegal influx from China and Southeast Asia.

These concerns are not only confined to developed countries: in Islamabad, the Pakistani government is desperately seeking ways to induce Afghan refugees to return home. India, meanwhile, is burdened by the growing numbers of undocumented Bangladeshis in Assam and Delhi; while Dhaka is concerned that India may expel them. The Thai government is concerned with the illegal influx of hundreds of thousands of Burmese. The Egyptian government fears that UN sanctions against Libya will lead to the expulsion of thousands of Egyptian migrant workers from Libya. Meanwhile, on the rest of the continent of Africa, numerous countries have been overwhelmed with the influx of refugees from Rwanda, Angola, Liberia, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan.3

The purpose of this article is to understand the global migration crisis in the specific context of illegal immigration into South Africa. The aim is to explore the various causes which lead to population displacement, its effects on host states and to arrive at specific conclusions relevant to policy-making. There will be a strong emphasis on the comparative dimensions of the problem. A comparative study will undoubtedly not only enrich the understanding of migration, but will also enable South African scholars and stakeholders to learn from the experiences of other states facing similar problems.

THE MAGNITUDE OF THE PROBLEM

Estimates of the number of illegal immigrants in the country range from two to eight million.4 The large discrepancies in estimates of illegal immigrants residing within South Africa expose the central problem faced by any study of illegal immigration: the illegal and clandestine nature of this form of population movement provides an inadequate basis for quantification.

The South African Police Services (SAPS) and the Department of Home Affairs are primarily responsible for the above figures. However, the question arises as to how these two agencies arrive at these estimates. George Orr, Director of Admissions in the Department of Home Affairs says his department’s estimates are based on taking the number of people who have entered the country legally but temporarily, but of whose departure there is no record, and extrapolating this in terms of a complicated formula. Reitzes5 notes that the calculation and the formula it produces, seems largely speculative.

Another method which is used to arrive at these ‘guesstimates’ is by means of extrapolating them from repatriation figures. Once again, the formula used and its effectiveness are unclear. There seems to be an additional reason to doubt this approach, namely the fact that repatriation figures do not indicate cases where a single individual has been deported several times. In one particular case, an illegal immigrant was arrested and deported 28 times in the course of six months!6

Whether illegal immigrants number two or eight million, it can be convincingly argued that they have a largely negative impact on the South African state and on the lives of ordinary South Africans (see section on effects below). The pressing issue that needs to be clarified is the identification of reasons for this large population influx into South Africa.

THE CAUSES OF MIGRATION INTO SOUTH AFRICA: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Eight factors may account for the spatial movement of people. These are:

socio-cultural factors;

communications and technology;

geographical proximity;

precedent;

demographic factors/population growth;

environmental factors,

local and increasingly global economic factors; and

political factors.

Socio-cultural factors

Socio-cultural factors may not only act as a ‘push’ catalyst in the area of origin, but also as a ‘pull’ determinant in the place of destination.

The early Indians who came to the colony of Natal as indentured labourers in the 1860s to work on the sugar cane plantations are a case in point. In the majority of instances they were Harijans, or the lowest caste in India’s rigid caste system. They were discriminated against politically, economically, and of course socially. Recognising that they could not improve their lot in any significant way in their homeland, they chose to relocate to Natal and attempted to build a brighter future. Here socio-cultural factors, or the perception of these factors served as a puissant push factor. More contemporary examples can also be cited. Bosnia, Rwanda and Burundi, for instance, illustrate how people are forced out of their homeland as a result of their specific cultural and ethnic identities. Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda and Burundi, Bosnian Muslims, Serbs and Croats in the former Yugoslavia, are all testimony to this sad fact.

Socio-cultural factors may also serve as an influential ‘pull’ factor, a fact that is largely due to the legacy of history.

The history of the human species has been a history of migration. Southern Africa is no exception to this trend. Ever since the first appearance of homo sapiens in the region 125 000 years ago, their subsequent evolution has been marked by constant population movements.7

The arrival of Dutch colonists in 1652 served only to reinforce this trend. The early nineteenth century witnessed the rise of a militarist Zulu kingdom under Shaka. This was accompanied by a period of tremendous upheaval known by the Sotho word Lifaqane which conveys the notion of forced removal. Thus, the rise of Shaka’s kingdom saw the fleeing of other tribes away from the militarist regional hegemon: Xhosa, Rolong, Pedi, Kora, Ndebele, Tlokwa, Hlubi, Mpondo, Swazi, Ngoni, Griqua, Sotho, and Tswana were all part of these great population movements. These centrifugal pressures were further strengthened by the ‘Great Trek’: when thousands of Boere families decided from the 1830s to leave their British colonial masters in the Cape Colony and to trek into the interior to establish their own Afrikaner homelands.8

The significance of this legacy of ethnic diaspora for present day Southern Africa cannot be overstated. Consider the number of Swazis inside South Africa as opposed to in Swaziland; the number of Tswanas inside South Africa as opposed to in Botswana; the number of Basothos inside South Africa as opposed to in Lesotho. There are various indications to suggest that ties of clan, lineage or tribe take precedence over the ties of citizenship generated by the state in Africa9, and that these serve as facilitating factors to encourage illegal immigration.

For instance, part of the reason for large concentrations of Mozambicans in the former South African homeland of Gazankulu is that, being Shangaan, they share a certain cultural similarity with the indigenous population.

Concomitant to this is the belief among these undocumented immigrants that they can expect assistance from their kin living on the South African side of the border. This is an example of socio-cultural factors serving as an influential pull factor.

Communications and technology

The communications and technology revolution, epitomised by the micro-chip, has acted as a tremendous spur for population movements. The advances in information technology, as witnessed by live CNN broadcasts via satellite, has resulted in people having more information at their disposal and being better able to make informed decisions regarding the feasibility to migrate. Some scholars, such as Loescher10, believe that television programmes, in particular, bring home to those people living in Third World states and the former Eastern bloc, their own poverty and lack of democracy. This, they argue, further strengthens the impulse to migrate and must be seen as one of the contributing factors to east-west, south-north and, increasingly, south-south migration.

In Southern Africa one can postulate that the communications revolution has not played as significant a role as it had in east-west migration. This is not to say that communication has not played a significant role in understanding population movements in Southern Africa; rather that communication has followed the more traditional pathways of word of mouth. This has been reinforced by the migrant contract labour system, which underscores the interconnectedness of the region. For example, in both Lesotho and Mozambique,people in rural villages sing about how wealthy South Africa is.

Geographic proximity

Gomel11 argues that foreign populations originate primarily from the same geographical area. One of the reasons for this is that migrants retain a certain loyalty to their country of origin. Consequently, they may wish to visit their loved ones or, if they are refugees they may wish to return to the land of their birth once circumstances stabilise. This is borne out in a survey of Mozambican refugees residing in South Africa: 83,7 per cent expressed the desire to return to their homes should circumstances stabilise in their country.12 There may be more mundane reasons: individuals would generally know more about neighbouring countries than those further away.

In his study, Gomel found that geographical proximity was one of the major reasons why France experienced waves of migration from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. These findings are echoed by Heisbourg13 who concludes that "... the Maghreb, with its fragile economies will increasingly become for Europe the functional equivalent Mexico is for the United States."

In Southern Africa these findings were confirmed in the early 1990s by the spread of Mozambique’s 1,7 million displaced people outside its borders: 1,1 million in Malawi, 230 000 in Zimbabwe, 240 000 in Zambia, 25 000 in Swaziland, 72 000 in Tanzania, and 250 000 in South Africa.14

However, it also stands to reason that professional or skilled labour, who are internationally mobile, will be less confined to geographical space than unskilled or semi-skilled labour. This is borne out in a study by the Economic Commission for Africa that estimated that in 1987 an astonishing thirty per cent of the skilled manpower in Africa was living in Europe.15 This also seems to be confirmed by the fact that the overwhelming majority of Mozambican migrants in South Africa are unskilled.16

Precedent

Some experts suggest that precedent plays an important role in migration. A pioneer group who smoothly migrate, acts as a magnet for further migration. Korner17 puts it as follows: "Once migration has been routine, as it has been in most of the countries concerned [i.e. traditionally receiving countries], relevant information is more or less common knowledge. The fact that migration paths and procedures have been ‘run-in’ also makes the risk less-daunting. Migration may then become a mass phenomenon..."

Gomel’s18 work further elaborates this viewpoint by pointing towards a tendency in migration flows to be directed towards an area in which there already is an initial nucleus of immigrants from a given country. This makes the relocation of subsequent arrivals less costly: for example, most foreigners in Germany are from Turkey (34 per cent) and the former Yugoslavia (13 per cent). In South Africa, this also seems to be the case. George, a Mozambican residing illegally in South Africa, admitted that his cousin’s successful negotiation of the obstacles to emigration - including an electric fence and South African National Defence Force (SANDF) patrols - gave him the necessary incentive to emigrate as well. He also knew that upon arrival his cousin and friends would provide him with food and shelter while he sought employment.19

Demographic factors/Population growth

Population growth in itself does not necessarily constitute a factor which urges people to cross international borders. However, when coupled with economic decline, population growth certainly induces migrants to cross borders in search of a better life. This results simply from fewer employment opportunities, greater stress on the social and welfare services of the state and ultimately, social and political discontent.20

This certainly seems to be the case in the Maghreb. Each year more than a million youths join the Maghrebi workforce as the population increases at an annual rate of three per cent. Faced with declining economic performance and fewer employment opportunities, they choose to emigrate to the more prosperous economies of Western Europe.21 Population pressure is also seen as a major factor spurring further emigration from Mexico to the United States.22

This also seems true for Southern Africa whose population is growing at a rate of between 2,5 and 3,5 per cent per annum, despite the fact that living standards throughout the region have declined. For example, Angola’s GDP had fallen to seventy per cent of its 1973 level, while Mozambique’s GDP declined by fifteen per cent between 1982 and 1987.23 To complicate the picture further, Baynham24 notes that the population of Southern Africa has a youthful profile, resulting in a built-in demographic momentum. This means that while employment opportunities are decreasing or else remaining relatively constant, the potential labour force is expanding at an alarming rate. Thus the unemployment level will increase, and with it the motivation to migrate.

Environmental factors

Increasingly, policy-makers are aware that deepening ecological damage can also foster major population movements. These environmental migrants result from two categories of catastrophe:

those without an anthropogenic cause, arising from volcanic eruption, earthquakes, whirlwinds, hurricanes, drought, landslides, avalanches, floods, and forest fires; and



those with an anthropogenic cause, including the destruction of arable and grazing land, sustained heavy flooding, and increased hurricanes, whirlwinds, hailstorms, landslides, avalanches and forest fires as the direct or indirect result of human activities.25

However, Woehlcke26 concludes that most environmental migrants are a result of "direct anthropogenic destruction" especially those linked with the degradation of soil. The causal link between environmental decline and mass migration has been demonstrated in various studies. For example, Heisbourg27 argues that "... environmental prospects in Eastern Europe will play a key role in provoking population movements to the prosperous West."

Similar positions explain the flow of roughly one million Haitians who have fled the poverty caused by, among others, soil erosion and deforestation.28

In Southern Africa, natural disasters with an anthropogenic component also provide a stimulus for human movement. For example, agricultural farming policies were not always applicable to Southern African conditions, nor were the prevailing types of peasant farming productive. According to Alfredo, another Mozambican informant, the peasants in his village did not engage in crop rotation, resulting in a lower crop yield and the degradation of the soil. The civil war in Mozambique, the devastation of the countryside wrought by the Mozambique National Resistance Movement (RENAMO) and the decimation of the local population which forced them to flee, meant an inadequate labour force to work potentially productive fields.29

Southern Africa’s population movements have also been sparked by natural disasters without an anthropogenic component. Take the drought of 1992 which analysts regard as the worst to affect the region in eighty years.30 Angola serves as an illustration: erratic rainfall in the central and southern provinces, coupled with a civil war, meant that 1,9 million people in that country faced starvation in 1991. Not surprisingly, Angolans moved from the worst affected provinces towards the country’s borders and from there to neighbouring states.31 The continued drought in 1992 served to fuel these population movements further.

Until 1990, the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (now known as the Southern African Development Community (SADC)) was producing enough food to feed its population of more than 85 million people. But in 1991-1992, the region experienced a food deficit of 2,8 million tonnes. Those living in areas hardest hit by the drought, facing the prospect of starvation, moved to other areas within their own country and, ultimately crossed borders to countries where the drought was not as severe.32

Economic factors

Larrabee33 notes that the majority of migrants in the 1990s are motivated by economic considerations. This is the primary cause of the westward movement of people from former Eastern bloc countries, as well as the main cause of the movement of Haitians, Mexicans and El Salvadorans into the United States, and the movement of North Africans into Western Europe.34 This desire for an improvement in life’s chances also seems to be a prime motive for migration in Africa. For instance, between 1986 and 1990, countries in Central Africa lost between two and five per cent of their populations to Eastern and Southern Africa. This shift coincided with differential GDP growth rates: higher in Eastern and Southern Africa, with an average of 3,2 percent, and lower in Central Africa, averaging 0,5 per cent.35

Within Southern Africa, economic variables also play a role in the migration of people from countries such as Mozambique, Lesotho, Angola, and Zimbabwe, to countries such as South Africa, Botswana and Namibia. South Africa, particularly, serves as a magnet to those seeking employment, a higher living standard and brighter economic prospects. The size of the South African economy makes the allure of the country almost overwhelming to many in the region. This relates partially to another legacy of South African history.

The discovery of diamonds in the Orange Free State in the 1860s and the subsequent discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand in 1886 gave rise to massive population movements in nineteenth century Southern Africa. The demands of the mining industry resulted in the creation of the migrant contract labour system which criss-crossed the whole of Southern Africa. Neighbouring states became labour reservoirs to feed the hungry demands of South African mining magnates for cheap, unskilled black labour. Increasingly, the economies of South Africa’s neighbours became dependent on the migrant contract labour system for foreign exchange. For instance, a survey in 1991 illustrated that almost forty per cent of rural households in Lesotho were dependent on the remittances of migrants working on the mines of the Witwatersrand.36

However, the latter half of the twentieth century has seen some significant changes in the South African economy. These changes have included an emphasis on the recruitment of skilled labour and the expulsion and reduced employment of unskilled labour. In 1991, nearly 200 Zimbabwean doctors settled in South Africa.37 Conversely, the number of foreign workers employed on South Africa’s mines fell from 606 000 persons in 1951, to 587 000 in 1960, to 490 000 in 1970.38 The downward spiral continued through much of the 1980s and 1990s. For instance, the number of foreign workers in South African mines stood at 211 247 in 1986 and by 1995 this figure stood at 165 825. In addition, a further 100 000 were employed in South Africa’s agricultural sector.39 Moreover, this downward trend shows every indication of continuing, especially if Pretoria’s position on employing more of its own citizens is considered. It has serious potential consequences for states like Lesotho which depend extensively on the remittances of their migrant labour force.

The above begs an important question: Has the closing or narrowing down of legal channels of immigration for unskilled labour resulted in an increase in the illegal migration of unskilled labour? In other words, is there a functional relationship between contract labour migration and illegal immigration? Evidence suggests that such a link may indeed exist.

Uneven economic development, skewed growth patterns, or economic disparities do not in themselves induce population movements. However, economic disparities, combined with a knowledge of such disparities, generate migrant flows. Communication and information, as discussed above, continuously transmit an image of more prosperous and safer conditions, particularly in the West, to those in the most impoverished and oppressed regions of the world. The linkage between advances in communication and mass migrations were vividly illustrated in the case of Europe where television programmes, beamed from the former West Germany to East Germany, from Finland to Estonia, from Italy to Albania and from France to Algeria, resulted in large numbers of people becoming aware of the disparities between standards of living and quality of life in the West as opposed to their own countries. This resulted in the movement of people from Algeria to France, from Albania to Italy, from Estonia to Finland and westwards across Germany.40

In Southern Africa consciousness of economic disparities has been reinforced by the migrant contract labour system, a century old structure of transnational migration which criss-crosses the sub-continent.

The incentive to migrate is further sharpened by the effects of economic structural adjustment programmes (ESAPs). In an attempt to confront economic crises, most countries in Southern Africa have resorted to ESAPs brokered by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. These have adversely affected the local population wherever they have been implemented. For instance, in Zambia the price of maize meal, the country’s staple food, has increased by 500 per cent since subsidies were cut. Under the auspices of ESAPs, restructuring of the private sector began in earnest. The aim of such restructuring was to curb production costs through the retrenchment of thousands of workers. In October 1991, the Zambian Government under President Frederick Chiluba began restructuring the private and public sectors. In the public sector, 20 000 civil servants lost their jobs. In the private sector it has been estimated that restructuring swelled the ranks of the unemployed by a further 70 000.41 Thus, according to some experts, the actual short term effect of ESAPs have been the increased impoverishment of the populace in countries where it has been implemented. This would further feed migration, with people moving to countries where they could earn a living, legally or illegally.

Political factors

Turmoil resulting from political rivalry, ethnic strife, socio-economic inequities or regional imbalances, tend to promote south-south migration.42 Its roots take various forms: persecution of certain groups, denial of political rights, mass expulsions, coups or civil war.43

The organic link between political instability and mass movement has been illustrated from time immemorial. More recently, the two to three million Iraqi Kurds who escaped persecution and repression by sheltering in neighbouring Iran and Turkey, are testimony to this phenomenon. Another recent case is the former Yugoslavia where disintegration, civil war and the redrawing of boundaries are creating internal haemorrhaging and are resulting in the release of large numbers of refugees to both Hungary and Germany.44

In Southern Africa, civil strife in both Angola and Mozambique have displaced thousands of people. This also underlines the central role which political factors play in the movement of the region’s people. In 1990, for example, it was estimated that between 600 000 and 1 000 000 people had died in Mozambique and that three million had been dislodged.45 In 1992, a United Nations’ report revealed that, besides those killed in the civil war, an additional 1,4 million Angolans (out of a population of ten million) are suffering material loss, in the form of destruction of crops and homesteads, and the loss of employment opportunities, and personal loss, in the form of deaths of family and friends, as a direct result of the civil war. The report also revealed that 4,7 million Mozambicans out of a total population of 15,7 million suffer the effects of civil war, all becoming potential emigrants.46

A graphic illustration of the link between political turmoil and mass displacement occurred in May 1991 when RENAMO attacked the Mozambican border town of Ressano Garcia driving some 3 000 residents into neighbouring South Africa.47

THE EFFECTS OF HOSTING AN ILLEGAL IMMIGRANT POPULATION

Before the effects of such a large presence of illegal aliens on the South African state can be analysed, it is imperative to get some kind of perspective on the target population itself. Little statistical work has been done to create a profile of the alien population in South Africa. As noted before, one of the primary reasons is the clandestine nature of this form of migration. In 1993, however, the Southern African Catholic Bishops Conference’s (SACBC) Masungulo Project did a survey of 6 348 Mozambican households in South Africa. While one should be cautious about extrapolating these figures and making generalisations for the whole illegal population in South Africa, it nevertheless has some applicability to the broader illegal immigrant population residing within the country. There are three reasons for this. Firstly, Mozambicans comprise the bulk of the illegal population in South Africa. Secondly, research findings by individual researchers and the Department of Home Affairs have arrived at similar conclusions regarding illegal aliens from countries other than Mozambique.48 Finally,the push factors operating in the various countries of theregion are roughly similar, leading to a similar type of emigrant. Thus it might be illuminating to look at some of the characteristics of the illegal Mozambican population.

The Masungulo survey revealed:

that Mozambican migrants in South Africa are a young and growing population;



the dependency ratio (that is, the number of people under the age of 15 and over the age of 64 relative to all others in the population) is very high;



a greater percentage of them are women of a child-bearing age;



most do not have more than three years of formal education; and



most do not have other work skills than those of subsistence agriculture.49

From the above it can be deduced that the costs of hosting an illegal population with such a demographic profile are prohibitively high. In a recent article, Colonel Brian van Niekerk, National Co-ordinator of Border Control and Policing of the SAPS, stated that in 1994 it cost the country R1 985 million to house an alien population.50

Hence it can be posited that the large concentration of illegal immigrants in the country, places an inordinate burden on the state, decreasing its capacity to deliver impoverished South Africans from their misery. In other words, the presence of illegal aliens has an adverse effect on the capacity of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) to improve the lot of ordinary South Africans.

This is made clear by the strain illegal immigrants place on the health services of this country. For example, clinics in KaNgwane and Gazankulu which have been established to serve the needs of South African citizens are overstretched due to the demands placed on them by thousands of illegal Mozambicans residing in the area. Since aliens are mostly destitute or come from strife-ravaged areas, they usually need much more attention than local people. This care comes at the expense of South Africa’s own citizens.51

It is also a disturbing fact that illegal immigrants bring with them diseases with epidemic potential, that can be attributed to poverty. The vast majority of these illegal immigrants arrive in poor health and are severely malnourished. Their malnourished bodies have little resistance to illness and disease. Thus aliens are excessively susceptible to diseases such as yellow fever, cholera, tuberculosis and AIDS. For instance, cases of malaria in the Northern Transvaal and other cases of chloroquine resistance have been associated with the movement of migrants from Mozambique. The relationship between illegal immigration and epidemics is borne out in the Nsanje district of Malawi, fifteen kilometres from the Mozambican border. There, cross-border migration resulted in both sides of the border having roughly the same percentage of AIDS, malaria, cholera and tuberculosis cases.52 In the case of AIDS, Schutte53 makes a causal link between illegal immigrants and the spread of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) in the country.

A functional relationship also exists between illegal aliens and the crime rate. During 1993, for example, 4 969 illegal aliens were arrested in South Africa in connection with the commitment of serious crimes (rape, murder, theft, burglary, etc.). In 1994, however, 12 403 illegal aliens were arrested for committing a serious crime.54 Police note that fourteen per cent of crimes within the borders of South Africa involve illegal aliens. These crimes are generally gun running, drug trafficking, prostitution and money laundering.55 Crime, and the violence associated with it, has an effect on the economy in two ways. Firstly, rising crime and violence rates reduce investor confidence. Secondly, state resources which would have been utilised for the RDP have to be channelled into the security apparatus of the state. In this, it is important to note that the present budget of the Government of National Unity (GNU) has witnessed a significant increase to provide for the growing needs of the SAPS.

The increasing influx of illegal immigrants also contributes to unlawful squatting in South Africa. Most aliens arrive in South Africa destitute, jobless and homeless. The result is that the vast majority find their way to squatter areas. It is estimated that eighty per cent of illegal aliens reside in informal housing settlements and squatter camps.56

PLANACT (a service organisation that undertakes, among others, social studies) has found that twenty per cent of hostel dwellers and inhabitants of informal settlements in Gauteng are Zimbabwean and Mozambican. This not only indicates the extent of migration into South Africa, it also reveals a further burden on the RDP. The government is not only attempting to provide services and upgrade facilities in squatter areas, but is also trying to provide houses for all South Africans. However, as Schutte57 notes, it is extremely difficult to distinguish between the alien and the citizen in a squatter community. Thus, illegal immigrants are benefitting from the facilities and houses provided under the RDP, at the cost of the South African taxpayer.

Illegal immigrants also have a negative impact on the domestic labour market. A report by Toolo and Bethlehem have documented the presence of illegal aliens in the various sectors of the economy. In addition, it reveals that many workers feel that the presence of illegal foreign workers has a depressing effect on wages. This, union officials argue, results in local people having decreased access to employment. Unless otherwise stated, the information below derives from the abovementioned report.

Illegal immigrants are generally active in the following sectors of the economy:

agriculture

hotel and restaurant

construction

domestic

informal trading

In the food and agriculture sector, Food and Allied Workers Union (FAWU) organisers have noted the presence of large numbers of aliens working on farms in the Eastern Transvaal and on the sugar plantations of northern KwaZulu-Natal. FAWU organisers claim that farmers employ aliens because they are cheaper to employ - many work for shelter and a plate of food a day - and that they are, because of fear of exposure, resistant to union activities.

South African Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers Union (SACCAWU) officials have detected an increased presence of illegal immigrants in the hotel and restaurant sector. This impression has been confirmed by officials of the Tea-Room and Restaurant Industrial Council, who believe that the majority of these workers are Mozambican and Zimbabwean. As in the agricultural sector, SACCAWU organisers report that aliens are prepared to work for extremely low wages and that due to their vulnerability arising from their illegal status, are wary of embarking on industrial action. SACCAWU argues that this not only undermines their ability to fight for better wages and conditions, but also serves to depress wage levels of South African workers and results in a decrease in employment opportunities for South Africans. The example often cited here is Cafe Zurich in Hillbrow. The owner dismissed twenty South African waiters and replaced them by twenty Zairean waiters who worked without being paid a wage, simply surviving on tips.58

Both the Construction and Allied Workers Union (CAWU) and the Construction Industrial Council has confirmed the presence of large numbers of undocumented immigrants in the industry and noted that the majority of these are employed by sub-contractors. Since sub-contracting has grown in recent years and accounts for eighty per cent of employment in housing construction, it is thought that foreign workers are likely occupying a large portion of this labour market. CAWU organisers point out that sub-contractors are difficult to organise and that the presence of vulnerable illegals contribute to incidences where these employers pay wages as low as R80,00 per week.

A similar situation exists in the domestic sector. The South African Domestic Workers Union (SADWU) has reported an increase in the number of aliens in this sector, most of whom are from Malawi and Zimbabwe. SADWU organisers also report that, since they are prepared to work for very low wages and are resistant to unionisation, employers prefer illegal immigrants to South Africans. Their presence has not only been detected in the suburbs, but also in the townships and rural areas.

The presence of illegal aliens in the informal sector has furthermore elicited a great deal of concern from the African Chamber of Hawkers and Informal Business (ACHIB). They point out that aliens engaged in hawking are not only drawn from the Southern African region, but also from Taiwan, China, India and Pakistan. They argue that because they sell their goods at far cheaper prices, local hawkers are losing their only source of livelihood.59 The seriousness with which ACHIB views foreign traders can be seen in an incident which occurred in August 1994. ACHIB members marched through the Johannesburg city centre and assaulted all the foreign hawkers they could find. They also marched to the Hillbrow police station and demanded the immediate removal of all foreign hawkers. This incident underlines the point that illegal immigration can be a potent source of domestic instability.

This rising tide of xenophobia, however, is not simply confined to ACHIB members. A survey by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) in October 1994 found that 56 per cent of South Africans thought that the government should act more strictly against illegal immigrants. By February 1995 the poll increased to 72 per cent.60 This has serious implications for domestic and regional politics.

In the first place, anti-foreigner sentiments can have an adverse impact on domestic political stability. There already exists a marked degree of tension between political parties on how to approach the issue of illegal immigrants. The survey mentioned above revealed that the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), National Party (NP) and the parties of the white right-wing are far more xenophobic than their African National Congress (ANC) counterparts. For instance, in September 1994 the Inkatha Youth Brigade threatened that if the government failed to take strong action against illegal aliens, it would do so itself.61 The question of undocumented immigrants could thus occupy a central platform on which political parties mobilise for the 1999 elections. Secondly, should any political party seek to exploit this xenophobia among the voting public and manage to gain political office on a tough anti-immigrant stance, it will have serious consequences on regional relations. Once more, South Africa will be living ‘against’ its neighbours as opposed to living ‘with’ them. Tensions between Pretoria, Harare and Maputo on account of South Africa’s enforced repatriation of Mozambican and Zimbabwean nationals are already perceptible.

MANAGING MASS MIGRATIONS: TOWARDS STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES

As illustrated above, illegal immigration places a tremendous burden on the South African Government and people. It therefore stands to reason that the influx of illegal aliens into the country needs to be curbed.

The South African Government clearly realises this. But, Pretoria’s responses has generally been reactive, ad hoc, short term policy measures. These have ranged from control measures (for example, enforced repatriation, greater presence of police and army personnel on the borders, etc.), to accommodation (for instance, the recent cabinet decision to legalise the presence of illegal immigrants who have resided in the country for longer than five years, who have been gainfully employed, with no criminal record, or who are married to a South African spouse).

These measures, however, have failed to stem the tide of illegal immigrants who are said to enter the Republic at a rate of one every ten minutes.62 In recognition of this failure, Mr. Penuel Maduna, Deputy Minister of Home Affairs, was recently quoted as saying: "History has shown us time and time again that hunger and fear are driving forces which are much stronger than even the most sophisticated aliens control measures. South Africa has become the country of survival for many."63

What is obviously needed is the adoption of a ‘strategic perspective’ to deal with the problem of clandestine migration. This implies a long term vision which, unlike the control and accommodation measures seen above, stresses intervention. In other words, attempts should be made to address the root causes which give rise to population movements. The following is a brief account of Europe’s relative success in applying such an approach and its possible application in Southern Africa.

The objective of the interventionist approach is to provide incentives for prospective emigrants to stay within the borders of their own country. Essentially, this aims to redress the political and economic causes which give rise to mass migrations.64

One line of the strategy argues broadly that political pluralism should be encouraged in the Third World.65 This is generally seen in terms of liberal democracy, a multiparty system, and free, fair and frequent elections. These, the argument runs, would stem political conflict and civil war, and reduce refugee flows. While not disputing the importance of pluralism, it is important to recognise that transitions from a single-party state to political pluralism are delicate. As the resumption of fighting after the elections in Angola in 1992 suggests, it could have the opposite results to those desired. This point holds special relevance to Southern Africa, where "... the difficulties which transitions pose are exacerbated by the overall weakness of the polities within which change is taking place."66

Recognising that poverty, or rather the lack of economic opportunities, is often at the root of population movements, the interventionist approach stresses the need for economic development within those states from which these movements arise. This is often done through special trade agreements, investment programmes and educational schemes.67 A programme of this kind has been proposed by Italy and Spain with regard to North Africa. The hope is that these policies will result in job-creation and economic stability and hence that they will reduce population movements from North Africa into Southern Europe.68 One criticism which can be levelled against this approach, however, is that South Africa is a Third World state whose own development needs are such that it cannot become a donor country in the foreseeable future.

Another weakness of this approach is that it tackles the global nature of the problem on a piecemeal basis. Globalists argue that only a restructuring of the international economy will reduce south-north and south-south flows, and until this happens, the haemorrhage will continue. This also has special relevance to South Africa which is not only facing an influx of illegal immigrants from the region, but also from as far afield as Nigeria, Algeria, Asia and Eastern Europe. Moreover, even if such a strategy is to prove successful in the long run, it does have contradictory results in the short to medium term. Hamilton and Holder69 put it this way: "The development process itself tends to stimulate migration in the short to medium term by raising expectations and enhancing people’s ability to migrate. Thus the development solution to the problem of unauthorized migration is measured in decades - or even generations ... Any cooperative effort to reduce migratory pressures must stay the course in the face of shorter term contradictory results."

A more sophisticated strategy is to encourage regional integration. Proponents of such a strategy see regional integration as the key to stem migration and point to the European Union (EU) as a successful example. For instance, Gomel70 points out that, in the 1970s, countries of Southern Europe (Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal) ceased to export their "surplus labour" to the more affluent countries in Northern Europe as a direct result of EU regional integration. This effectively decreased wage differentials and generally increased economic and social homogeneity within the EU.

On the surface, such a strategy seems feasible. However, on closer inspection, various cracks are revealed. For example, the decrease in population flows from Southern to Northern Europe was not only the result of economic factors - demographics also played a role. A drop in birth rates decreased the pressure on social and economic infrastructure increasing the overall living standards of the population.

Meissner71 contested whether wage differentials between Southern and Northern Europe were that far apart in the first place. She pointed out that Turkey’s application for membership of the EU was turned down for fear that the wage differential of 10:1, might lead to substantial emigration from Turkey to Western Europe with economic integration. She used this as an example of migration acting as a serious deterrent to broader economic integration. This is an important lesson for the states of Southern Africa, which are considering regional integration, especially where large wage disparities exist, for example, between South Africa, Botswana and Namibia on the one hand, and Angola, Lesotho and Mozambique, on the other. Could such wage disparities serve as a spoke in the wheel of regional integration in Southern Africa? The case of the EU suggests that it may. Furthermore, doubts regarding the future of the regional project are further reinforced by the weakness of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the fact that one common regional vision of integration is absent. This is further evidenced by the plethora of regional organisations in Southern Africa: in addition to SADC, there is also the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).

The question which needs to be posed is whether the failure of the regional project necessarily also means the failure of the interventionist approach to the problem of mass migration. There is a strong argument that it does not. One can still make use of the interventionist approach, but instead of using a multilateral forum, a number of bilateral agreements could be established between South Africa and its neighbours. Africa has a long history of bilateral treaties between countries regarding population movements. Consider here, the agreement between Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea, and between Burkina Faso and the Côte d’ Ivoire, regulating population flows between their respective countries. Such bilateral agreements also exist between Burkina Faso and Gabon, Gabon and Cameroon, and Ghana and Libya. These treaties cover issues of both entry and departure. More comprehensive bilateral agreements that not only cover issues of entry, residence, and departure, but also occupational and social rights, participation in trade unions and social security rights, also exist between France and its former colonies of Senegal, Mali and Mauritania.72

Building on this long African tradition, South Africa also seems to be going the bilateral route. Consider here the agreements reached between the South African Minister of Home Affairs and his Zimbabwean and Mozambican counterparts. The objective of such bilateral agreements need not only be the control and regulation of population flows, but also pro-active intervention to address the root causes of population movements. Note in this regard, Pretoria raising concerns about the lack of democracy in Swaziland with King Mswati III. The success South Africa has had, can be seen in the recent decision by the Swazi monarch to undertake constitutional reforms. A further example is found in the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) recently providing their Mozambican counterparts with motor vehicles and communication equipment to police their side of the border more effectively.

The merits of such an approach lie in the fact that it bridges the concerns of both illegal aliens and the State. From the perspective of illegal immigrants who do not really want to leave the country of their birth, but find that the ‘push’ factors are so great that they leave them with no other option but to cross national frontiers, it addresses the root causes which motivate people to migrate. From the perspective of the host state, it relieves the burden on the socio-economic infrastructure which illegal immigrants inevitably cause.

CONCLUSION

South Africa is clearly being overwhelmed by large numbers of illegal immigrants crossing the country’s porous borders to seek better living standards in this new ‘Canaan’: employment opportunities for South African citizens are lost, the health system is overburdened by demands from illegal foreigners, soaring crime rates are given an added boost, and the political spectrum becomes increasingly polarised on the issue of illegal aliens. Thus, there is a pressing need to curb this illegal influx, but unilateral control and accommodation measures have already proved to be unsuccessful. What is needed is the adoption of strategic perspectives which combine elements of interventionist and control measures within a bilateral context. The underlying rationale for this is obvious: there can be no reduction in the illegal influx of people unless the socio-economic and political conditions in neighbouring states are stabilised. However, these are necessarily long term interventionist measures. The question which must be raised, is what could be done in the short term. Here, the attention must be turned to control measures, such as increased border patrols and enforced repatriation. Once more, in order to make these control measures more effective, and to minimise any diplomatic fall-out which could sour regional relations, this should be undertaken in a bilateral context.

This article is published as part of the Human Security Project, which is endorsed by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, with the financial assistance of the Hanns Seidel Foundation of Germany and the Foundation for Global Dialogue (FGD).



H Solomon, Population Movements into South Africa: Trends, Outlook, Policies, FGD Occasional Paper Series, 2, 1995, p. 3.



M Weiner The Global Migration Crisis: Challenge to States and to Human Rights, Harper Collins, New York, 1995, p. 1.



The Economist, 4 March 1995; M Reitzes, Alien Issues, Indicator South Africa, 12(1), 1994, p. 7; H Toolo & L Bethlehem, Labour Migration to South Africa, paper read at the Workshop on Labour Migration to South Africa, National Labour and Economic Development Institute (NALEDI), Johannesburg, 31 August 1994, p. 5.



M Reitzes, Divided on the Demon: Immigration policy since the election, Policy and Review Series, 8(9), September 1995, p. 4.



A Minnaar & M Hough, Illegal in South Africa: Scope, Extent and Impact, paper read at the conference on Managing Mass Migrations, International Organization for Migration and the United Nations Population Fund, Pretoria, 22 August 1995, p. 4.



T R H Davenport, South Africa: A Modern History, Macmillan, Hong Kong, 1991, p. 5.



Ibid., pp. 12-15.



See H Solomon, In Search of Canaan: A Critical Evaluation of the Causes and Effects of Migrations within Southern Africa and Strategies to Cope With Them, Southern African Perspectives, 24, 1993, pp. 21-22.



G Loescher, Refugee Movements and International Security, Adelphi Papers, 268, 1992.



G Gomel, Migrations Towards Western Europe: Trends, Outlook, Policies, The International Spectator, 27, 1992, p. 74.



Southern African Catholic Bishops Conference, Mozambican Refugees in South Africa, Masungulo Project, 1993, p. 36.



F Heisbourg, Population Movements in post Cold War Europe, Survival, 33, 1991, p. 35.



R Chidoware, Refugees and Exiles in South Africa, Southern African Research and Documentation Centre, 22 May 1991, p. 2; The Christian Science Monitor, 19 February 1991.



New York Times, 12 February 1993.



The Washington Post, 26 November 1990.



H Korner, Future Trends in International Migration, Intereconomics, January/February 1991, p. 42.



Gomel, op. cit., p. 74.



Solomon, op. cit., 1993, p. 9.



A Adepoju, Preliminary Analysis of Emigration - Dynamics in Sub-Saharan Africa, International Migration - Quarterly Review, 32(2), 1994; R T Appleyard, International Migration: Challenge for the Nineties, International Organisation for Migration, Geneva, 1992.



Heisbourg, op. cit., p. 35.



K A Hamilton & K Holder, International Migration and Foreign Policy: A Survey of the Literature, The Washington Quarterly, 26, 1991, p. 197.



R Davies, A Statistical Profile of the SADCC countries in the 1980s, Southern African Perspectives, 3, 1991, p. 4; H Solomon, Migration in Southern Africa: A Comparative Perspective, Indian Journal for African Studies, 5(2), 1995b.



S Baynham, South Africa and the World in the 1990s, South Africa International, 23(3), January 1993, p. 14.



M Woehlcke, Environmental Refugees, Aussenpolitik, 43(3), 1992, p. 289.



Ibid., p. 290.



Heisbourg, op. cit., p. 35.



Hamilton & Holder, op. cit., p. 197.



Interview with Joao and Roberto, Mozambican immigrants, 15 March 1993.



M Tafirenyika, SADCC’s Food Security - What Went Wrong?, Southern African Research and Documentation Centre, 18 February 1992, p. 1.



The Christian Science Monitor, 7 January 1991.



S Kuwali, The Food Situation in Southern Africa, Southern African Political and Economic Monthly, 6, 1992, p. 3; UN-PAAERD, Extracts from Economic Crises in Africa: Final review of the UN-PAAERD (United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development), Backgrounder, 5, 1991, p. 5.



F S Larrabee, Down and Out in Warsaw and Budapest - Eastern Europe and East-West Migration, International Security, 16, 1992, pp. 6-7.



Hamilton & Holder, op. cit., p. 197; Loescher, op, cit., pp. 7-10; Heisbourg, op. cit., pp. 34-35.



UN-PAAERD, op. cit., p. 3.



H Solomon, Beyond Refugee Crisis Management, paper read at the Salzburg Seminar on Involuntary Migration, Salzburg, Austria, 13 July 1995, p. 6.



E Leistner, Migration of High-level Manpower to South Africa, Africa Insight, 23(3), 1993, p. 218.



J O Oucho, International Migration and Sustainable Human Development in Eastern and Southern Africa, International Migration, 33(1), 1995, p. 35.



Solomon, op. cit., 1995, p. 6.



Loescher, op. cit., p. 10.



R Chidoware, The Effects of ESAPs on Workers, Southern African Research and Documentation Centre, 18 May 1993, pp. 1-2.



H Arnold, South-North Migration and North-South Conflict, Viertaljahresberichte, 127, March 1992; Heisbourg, op. cit., p. 39.



Loescher, op. cit., p. 28.



Ibid., pp. 3 & 28.



The Washington Post, 26 November 1990.



United Nations, Spotlight on Humanitarian Issues: Enlarging the UN’s Humanitarian Mandate, United Nations, New York, December 1992, p. 1.



The Christian Science Monitor, 2 May 1991.



G Orr, Migration to South Africa, paper read at the seminar on Migration: Sources, Patterns Implications, Witwatersrand Branch of the South African Institute of International Affairs, 6 May 1993; D Schutte, Migration: The Status Quo and Prospect for Southern Africa, ISSUP Bulletin, 1993; P Vale & H Solomon, Migration and Global Change: Understanding the Taunami Effect, paper read at the seminar on Migration: Sources, Patterns, Implications, Witwatersrand Branch of the South African Institute of International Affairs, 6 May 1993.



Southern African Catholic Bishops Conference, op. cit.



B van Niekerk, The Impact of Illegal Aliens on Safety and Security in South Africa, ISSUP Bulletin, 7, 1995, p. 5.



Schutte, op. cit., p. 7.



H Solomon, Changing Patterns of Migration in Southern Africa, in M Venter (ed.), Migrancy and AIDS, Medical Research Council, Cape Town, 1994, p. 22.



Schutte, op. cit., p. 8.



Fax to the author from A Minnaar, Human Sciences Research Council, 17 January 1996.



M Reitzes, Alien Issues, Indicator South Africa, 12(1), 1994, p. 8.



Schutte, op. cit., p. 9.



Ibid., p. 9.



This was recounted to the author on 31 August 1994, by a researcher employed by the National Labour and Economic Development Institute (NALEDI).



Reitzes, op. cit., p. 8.



C de Kock, C Schutte & D Ehlers, Perceptions of Current Socio-Political Issues in South Africa, Human Sciences Research Council, Pretoria, 1995, pp. 22-23.



Minnaar, op. cit., p. 30.



Reitzes, op. cit., p. 9.



M Reitzes, Divided on the ‘Demon’: Immigration Policy since the Election, Policy Review Series, 8(9), 1995, p. 15.



Larrabee, op. cit., pp. 31-32; S Collinson, Europe and International Migration, Pinter, London, 1994; A Suhrke, Towards a Comprehensive Refugee Policy: Conflict and Refugees in the Post-Cold War World, Christen Michelsen Institute, Bergen, 1992, pp. 1-3.



Heisbourg, op. cit., p. 39.



P Vale, Southern Africa’s Security: Some Old Issues, Many New Questions, paper read at the Seminar on Confidence and Security-Building Measures in Southern Africa, UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, Windhoek, Namibia, 24-26 February 1993, p. 5.



Hamilton & Holder, op. cit., p. 201.



S Bearman, Strategic Survey 1990-1991, Brasseys, London, 1991, p. 45.



Hamilton & Holder, op. cit., p. 201.



Gomel, op. cit., p. 70.



D Meissner, Managing Migrations, Foreign Policy, 86, 1992, p. 82.



S S Russel, K Jacobsen & W D Stanley, International Migration and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa, World Bank, Washington, DC., 1990, pp. 106-107.