|
The Progress of the Peshmerga Forces and
their role in post-2003 Iraq
24.6.2010
By Saeed Kakeyi |
|
|
|
June
24, 2010
Abstract
This paper briefly discusses the origins of the
peshmerga forces from the start of the Republic of
Kurdistan (also known as the Republic of Mahabad) to
their contribution to the U.S.’s removal of the
Iraqi government in 2003. This paper also examines
why peshmerga forces involved in bringing peace to
those who choose violence as a mean to achieve their
interests? What are the implications of using
Kurdish Peshmarga forces in enforcing peace between
the warring Iraqi Arab factions? How far have they
been successful in minimizing the sectarian
violence? And finally, what is their legal status
that makes them cooperate with the United States led
Coalition Forces in building peace in Iraq?
Introduction
Although previous Iraqi regimes tried to marginalize
the Iraqi Kurdish population, their recent success
and influence is due largely to the loyalty and
patriotism of the peshmerga. |
Saeed Kakeyi |
Literally defined as
“one who faces death,” the peshmergas are the
soldiers of Iraqi Kurdistan.
The history of the peshmerga is essential to
understand the history of Kurdish nationalism in
Iraq. If not for the fighting spirit of the
peshmerga, Kurdish hopes for recognition may have
not been achievable. The first of these is the
Kurdish struggle against the governments who would
control the lands they inhabit; the second being the
difficulty in developing a unified Kurdish community
amongst what was once hundreds of tribes (McDowall:
2004, 1). Peshmerga forces would become intertwined
in both of these conflicts. After receiving training
in various early revolts and organization under the
famous Kurdish leader Mulla Mustafa Barzani, it is
the peshmerga that will often confront armies of the
regional governments trying to achieve suzerainty
over the Kurds. Also, because they recognize how
precious freedom and peace are, it is the peshmerga
who can help vanguards of international
peacekeeping, peace-building and peace-enforcement
to be culturally aware of their environments.
Origins of the Peshmerga
Forces
The roots of the modern-day peshmerga may be found
in the early twentieth century tribal and feudalist
Kurdish revolts. The end of World War I, however,
brought forth a new era in the potential for an
organized Kurdish military.
Because of the Sykes-Picot Agreement of May 1916 (McDowall,
115), Kurdistan was no longer the unofficial buffer
between the Ottoman and Persian Empires, but a
region divided between several new nations (Iraq,
Syria, Turkey, and Persia). With such physical
division, it became more difficult to create a
Kurdish army to fight for a Kurdish nation-state.
Neither the British nor the young Kemalist Turkish
government wished to see an independent Kurdistan,
especially one able to defend itself (McDowall,
126). For the British, the idea of a recognized
nation in southern Kurdistan deemed impractical due
to the inability of the Kurds to govern themselves.
The British also concerned with the prospect of oil
in the Kirkuk, Kifri, and Mosul regions. The
potential for a Kurdish military in northern
Kurdistan was different from that in the south
because of the rise of Mustafa Kemal who formed the
“imaginary” Turkish nationalism based on
assimilative state-nationalism.
The defeat of the Kurdish uprisings inspired the
Turkish government to deal with the “Kurdish
problem” by enacting laws limiting both Kurdish
identity and the governing ability of Sheikhs (O’Balance:
1996, 15). As the Turkish nationalist position
became firmer, attacks on the democratic rights of
the Kurds increased (Ghassemlou: 1965, 50).
Rise of Barzani prominence
Conflict between the Barzani tribe and the Iraqi
forces began in late 1931 and continued throughout
1932. The militant Mulla Mustafa Barzani, the
younger brother of the tribal leader—Sheikh Ahmad
Barzani, augmented to prominence against the
fledgling Iraqi military in southern Kurdistan.
Learning from the faults of previous Kurdish
revolts, Mustafa Barzani became increasingly aware
of the need for an organized military force to
coincide with Kurdish nationalism. Barzani tribe’s
military strength, with its contempt for the new
Iraqi nation-state and the desire for autonomy (McDowall,
290), merged with the growing nationalist-oriented
Kurdish intelligentsia, Barzani sphere of influence
in Iraqi Kurdistan became greater.
With the onset of World War II, Iraq was leaning
toward supporting Germany. As a result, the British
forces reoccupied Iraq in 1941. During this time,
the Barzani tribal leadership, Ahmad and Mustafa
Barzani, internally exiled in Suleimani away from
their tribe and remained at odds with the Iraqi
government. Thus, Barzani fled Suleimani and crossed
into Iran to reunite his resettled tribesmen and
lead them back to Barzan village in southern
Kurdistan.
On his return, Mustafa Barzani recruited a force of
2,000 fighters to challenge the Iraqi local
authorities. Throughout 1943, Barzani and his
fighters seized police stations and resupplied
themselves with Iraqi arms and ammunition. Barzani
used these early skirmishes as tests to strengthen
his command and control which led him to petition
the Iraqi government for autonomy as well as the
release of Kurdish prisoners, including Sheikh Ahmad
Barzani (McDowall, 292).
Although the autonomy request denied, the Iraqi
government did negotiate with Barzani throughout the
early 1940s (McDowall, 293). These negotiations not
only led to the release of his older brother, but
also brought the word “Jash” into common Kurdish
usage. Barzani used the term, meaning “donkey” in
Kurdish, as a way to criticize Kurds who
collaborated with the Iraqi government.
Knowing tribal discord and disorganization of the
Kurdish populace could hinder his forces, Barzani
formed the Rizgari Kurd (the Kurdish Freedom Party)
in early 1945 in a bid to unify the Kurds and
establish autonomy within Iraq (McDowall, 294).
By the end of September 1945, Barzani’s prominence
threatened the greedy interests of other powerful
Kurdish “Jash” leaders who joined the Iraqi forces,
attacking the Barzani forces, uprooting them from
their terrain and preventing them from further
attacking Iraqi troops in the region. These
“treasonous” forced Barzani to retreat from the
region and cross into Iranian Kurdistan. Once there,
the Barzani family and their supporters settled in
various towns in the Mahabad area, joining the
Kurdish liberation movement and setting the stage
for establishing the Kurdistan Republic and the
official creation of the Peshmerga Forces in early
1946.
Like McDowall, the author of this paper dismisses
the notion of Mustafa Barzani as an ardent
nationalist prior to the creation of the Kurdistan
Republic. In fact, given the collectivist nature of
the Kurdish society, the dominant power rested in
the hands of the tribal-feudalist decision-makers.
Otherwise, why Ahmad Barzani did not choose a civil
nationalist Kurd instead of his brother to lead and
command the Kurdish forces against Iraq? Also, if
the Barzani revolts not started to increase the
tribe’s regional power (McDowall, 293), then why
other non-Badini tribes did not joined the Iraqi
forces in bringing havoc as they did to the Badinan
region of Iraqi Kurdistan?
The Republic of Kurdistan
The Republic of Kurdistan was the true birth for the
Kurdish nationalist movement. This short-lived
national identity marked the official creation of
the Peshmerga by the Ministry of Kurdistan Forces
and cemented the role of Barzani as the Minister and
the Commanding General of the Kurdistan Peshmerga
Forces.
In the opening years of World War II, the Soviet
Union seized northwestern Iran to ensure the flow of
important supplies reaching the Soviet Union from
its American and British allies. Seeing a window of
opportunity, the newly formed Komalay Jiyanaway
Kurdistan (The Revival Society of Kurdistan - Komala),
a middle-class democratic nationalist party, began
to negotiate with the Soviets the idea of creating a
Soviet-sponsored Kurdish republic, independent of
Iran (McDowall, 240). However, the Soviets asked the
visiting Kurdish leadership to abandon Komala for a
Soviet style centralized political party.
In exchange for money, military training, and arms,
including tanks, cannons, machine guns, and rifles,
thereby ensuring autonomy from Iran (Eagleton: 1963,
44), the Kurdish leadership dissolved the Komala by
creating the “Democratic Party of Kurdistan - Iran”
(KDP-I). The Soviet Azarbaijan President Bagherov
also warned the Kurdish leaders not to trust
Barzani, whom Bagherov called “a British spy” (Eagleton,
45-46). Since the dismissal of Barzani was not an
easy task to be accomplished, Qazi Mohammad, upon
his return from Soviet Azarbaijan in the fall of
1945, asked Barzani and his men to join the KDP-I to
which the latter had agreed (Eagleton, 56).
With Barzani’s cooperation guaranteed, Qazi Muhammad
formed a Kurdish government, and raised the official
Kurdish national flag. Within days, Qazi Muhammad
was elected as the first Kurdish president and on 22
January 1946 the Republic of Kurdistan was born.
Besides appointing a Prime Minister with a cabinet
of 13 ministers and assigning higher levels of
command, Qazi Muhammad also helped to literally
define the Kurdish word for soldier—peshmerga—a term
meaning “one who faces death” or one willing to die
for a cause.
Barzani’s professionalism combined with his national
concerns, especially regarding the Iranian
intentions and fearing a withdrawal of Soviet aid,
forced him to deploy much of the peshmerga forces to
the republic’s southern frontiers. With local
support, the Kurdish forces expanded to include some
12,500 peshmergas occasionally engaging the Iranian
hostile army.
However, as the Soviets withdrew from Iran and the
latter’s ability grew in winning regional and
western international support, the Kurdistan
Republic became vulnerable. Adding to the dilemma
was the withdrawal of internal support. Except for
the Barzani peshmergas, most of the other tribally
oriented peshmergas disbanded Mahabad. Consequently,
President Qazi Muhammad signed his surrender to the
Iranian authority in exchange for the safe
withdrawal of Barzani’s peshmergas from Mahabad. As
Barzani and his forces withdrew out of the capital
of the republic on 15 December 1946, the Iranian
military entered Mahabad, eliminating the one-year
life of the Kurdistan Republic (Eagleton, 114).
The Barzani peshmergas were well armed in
anticipation of an inevitable fight. Despite Iranian
attempts to disarm the remnants of the Kurdish
republic, the Barzani peshmergas were able to
smuggle out 3,000 rifles, 120 machineguns, numerous
hand grenades, and two 75 mm artillery cannons (Eagleton,
115).
Finally, in March 1947, the Iranian forces; armed
with massive fire power, supplemented by American
military experts, and joined by Kurdish tribal jash
militias, attacked Barzani forces. After a heavy
loses on both sides, Barzani along with some of his
best peshmergas, were mysteriously able to fight
their way into Iraq.
Prior to crossing the border, Barzani divided his
forces into five sections defeating Iraqi police and
jash forces. Almost immediately, the Iraqi
government, after arresting Sheikh Ahmad Barzani and
other family members, sought the surrender of
Barzani (O’Balance, 34). Knowing arresting Barzani
would not be a simple task, the Iraqi military began
mobilizing forces towards the Barzan region. Once
the attack became imminent Barzani realized he had
to flee yet again. Because both Turkish and Iranian
Kurdistan could no longer be regarded as safe haven,
Barzani decided to take his peshmergas to the
relative security of the Soviet Union (Eagleton,
126).
The peshmerga journey to the Soviet Union began in
late May 1947. Often, as the Barzani-led forces
crossed into Iranian territory, they had to prepare
for potential Iranian military assaults. Using their
well-refined skills in cover and concealment, the
peshmerga were often able to elude the Iranian
military presence. On 9 June 1947, for example, the
peshmerga attacked the flank of an Iraqi army column
(Eagleton, 127-128). During the two-front attack,
led by both Barzani and As’ad Khoshawi,www.ekurd.netthe
peshmerga killed hundreds of Iranian soldiers,
destroyed several tanks, rendered an artillery
battery ineffective, and downed an Iranian aircraft.
After evading or engaging the Iranian army
throughout their trip, the Barzanis, along with over
500 peshmergas and their families, crossed the
Araxes River into the Soviet Union on 18 June 1947.
The period from 1945 to mid-1947 was integral to the
development of the peshmerga as a recognized
fighting force. No longer was the military
organization confined to fighters of the Barzani
tribe. The Kurdistan administration effectively
merged officers and soldiers from Iranian and Iraqi
Kurdistan, creating a unified Kurdish force that
crossed tribal lines.
The Peshmerga Forces in
modern Iraq |
Top
Optimism ruled as many Iraqi Kurds found a voice in
the Democratic Party of Kurdistan (KDP). After
Barzani’s return from the Soviet Union in 1958, the
peshmergas and other Barzani followers were allowed
back into Iraq. Cooperation between peshmerga forces
and the new republic of Iraq, headed by General
Abdul-Karim Qasim who toppled the Iraqi monarchy,
only served to strengthen the ties between the Kurds
and the Iraqi Arabs. However, as Qasim became
fearful of Barzani’s growing political and military
influence, tension continued to grow between Qasim’s
government and the Kurdish political, tribal, and
military leaders throughout 1960.
By the end of 1961, Barzani was able to control most
of Iraqi Kurdistan (McDowall, 310). The Qasim
regime, disappointed with Barzani’s growing power,
was looking for any reason to justify air strikes
throughout Iraqi Kurdistan, including the Barzan
village (O’Balance, 47). These strikes, however,
only solidified Kurdish resolve, unifying the tribes
and bringing Barzani officially into the conflict.
Barzani consolidated his forces and began providing
a system of organization to supplement his already
established peshmerga forces. Under Barzani’s lead,
non-Barzani tribal forces were used to conduct
guerrilla attacks on Iraqi military positions (McDowall,
310). This tactic led to the defection of thousands
of Iraqi soldiers, including officers. These Kurdish
deserted soldiers increased the professionalism and
organization of the peshmerga forces.
By fall 1962, Barzani had nearly 20,000 troops at
his command. In order to engage the Iraqi forces,
the expanded peshmerga forces armed themselves with
numerous arms captured from Iraqi forces. With
numerous former Iraqi soldiers among the ranks, the
peshmergas were able to decipher many Iraqi
transmissions and provide key intelligence for
Kurdish operations. Operational decisions using this
intelligence were made by peshmerga commanders,
including Barzani, stationed in highly-mobile,
makeshift command centers.
Among the intellectual leaders of the KDP military
were party secretary Ibrahim Ahmad and Jalal
Talabani—the current Iraqi President. Although small
units of the new “Kurdish Liberation Army” (KLA)
were assigned to the intellectual leaders, the
majority of the fighting forces came from regional
tribes and not from urbanized Kurds (McDowall, 311).
Despite mention of the peshmerga fifteen years
earlier, O’Ballance and McDowall state that the
KDP’s Politburo-created KLA force was the first to
be labeled “peshmerga” (O’Balance, 54 and McDowall,
311). Similar to the armed forces of the Kurdistan
Republic, this peshmerga force was also willing to
face death for the idea of a recognized Kurdistan.
In the ranks of Talabani and Ahmad the leadership of
the KLA became known as “Sarmerga” - “leading to
death commander” (O’Ballance, 54).
By 1963, the numerous battles and skirmishes between
both the Barzani and KDP’s Politburo-led peshmergas
and the Iraqi military had become a stalemate. The
peshmerga forces kept control of Iraqi Kurdistan and
the Qasim regime refused to grant Kurdish autonomy.
Qasim was eventually overthrown by pan-Arab
Baathists led by Abd al Salaam Arif (McDowall,
312-313). Under Arif, the pattern of Iraqi assaults
and peshmerga guerrilla counter-assaults lasted
throughout the decade.
Because of the peshmerga forces, negotiation became
the only Iraqi means to victory. During several
rounds of cease-fire negotiations, the Iraqi
government frequently called for the disbandment of
the peshmergas prior to the granting of autonomy.
Barzani believed dismissing the military force was
“putting the cart before the horse”, knowing the
peshmerga presence was essential to the Kurdish
cause and could not be disbanded before the Kurdish
people achieved their goals and objectives.
Accordingly, peshmerga was no longer the title of
Kurdish soldier confined to the followers of
Barzani. The decision by the KDP’s Politburo to
label their fighters as peshmergas not only
increased the size of the force, but also instilled
a growing level of pride in membership.
Unfortunately, the ideological rift between Barzani
and KDP’s Politburo would also grow, forcing the
peshmergas to choose what type of Kurdistan they
were willing to die for.
The split between the
Peshmerga Forces
Aware of Barzani’s prominence among Kurds, the KDP’s
Politburo appointed Barzani as the “honorary
president” while he was still in exile. After his
return to Iraq in 1958, Barzani’s attempts to
overreach the authority of his position irritated
Ahmad and eventually Talabani (Izady: 1992, 212).
Mounting rifts between the leaders occurred during
the numerous Kurdish-Iraq ceasefire negotiations as
Barzani emphasized his own goals over those of the
KDP. A similar disagreement occurred prior to a 1964
ceasefire as Barzani negotiated directly with
President Arif, ignoring the KDP’s Politburo body
completely (Gunter: 1996, 228). As a result of
Barzani’s agreements with the Arif regime, Ahmad
grew to resent Barzani, claiming all Barzani orders
should be ignored by the peshmerga forces because
Barzani exceeded his competence as the president of
the KDP. Despite Ahmad’s claims, peshmerga loyalty
remained with Barzani.
Barzani used his loyal military to force Ahmad,
Talabani, and 4,000 of their peshmergas into Iran in
July 1964. However, Talabani and his peshmergas,
although still at odds with Barzani leadership,
returned to Iraq after the resumption of the
conflict in 1965, hoping to contribute to the
overall cause of Kurdish autonomy. Unable to
reconcile their differences and still attempting to
fight the war however, both Talabani and Barzani
vied for the favor of the revolving Iraqi
government. Barzani, once he consolidated his KDP
power, became the lead for negotiations with the
Arif government. Even with Baathist support, the
Ahmad-Talabani faction was unable to defeat Barzani
and his peshmergas (O’Ballance, 88-89).
In late 1969, the reformed Baath party began to
negotiate with Barzani in an attempt to finally end
the decade-long conflict. As Saddam Hussein, Baath
Party Deputy Chairman of the Regional Command
Council, met with Barzani in Kurdistan, Ahmad and
Talabani were left with little choice but to return
under Barzani’s leadership (Gunter, 229). The Iraqi
government, knowing they could not convince Barzani
to disband his military, agreed to create “The
Border Guard Forces” composed primarily of peshmerga
veterans. Although Barzani hoped for 10,000
peshmergas to remain active, the Baath party allowed
only 6,000.
Although armed conflict was minimal from 1970 to
1974, tension between the Iraqi government and the
Kurds continued unabated. Additional Kurdish
political demands and an attempt on Barzani’s life
served to drastically increase hostility (McDowall,
332).
By 1973, Kurdish discouragement was solidified as
the Iraqi regime entered into a strategic alliance
with the former Soviet Union. Knowing conflict was
forthcoming; Barzani consolidated the peshmerga
forces and continued to recruit more for a larger
force and better equipped than ever before (McDowall,
332-333).
Barzani, on the advice of Iranian, American and
Israeli advisers, drastically reorganized his force.
Earlier guerrilla tactics were abandoned and the
peshmerga were re-assigned into completely
conventional units. Believing international military
support would continue throughout the conflict,
Barzani ordered these units to face the Iraqi enemy
head-on resulted in catastrophe.
Although the peshmerga may have downed over 100
Iraqi planes and destroyed over 150 tanks, they
lacked the firepower of the Iraqis. From their more
accustomed concealed positions, the peshmerga were
able to engage the advancing Iraqi forces from
hidden sniper positions. These tactics allowed the
allowed the Kurdish military to claim a kill ratio
of 20 to 30 Iraqi soldiers killed for each peshmerga
death (McDowall, 333).
However, the final blow to the peshmerga forces came
via the Algiers Accord, signed between Iran and Iraq
in March 1975. With the termination of Iranian
support, the allies of Iran also stopped supporting
the Kurdish cause. In what many peshmerga veterans
refer to as “American Betrayal,” the U.S. government
ceased providing military and financial aid to the
peshmerga. Despite their pleas, the Kurdish
leadership discovered the American objective was
only to weaken Iraq and prevent an attack on Iran -
not to assist in achieving Kurdish rights.
Seeking to gain the upper hand, Iraqi forces
attacked peshmerga positions the day after the
Algiers Accord was signed. Hundreds of Kurds were
killed as Iraqi forces seized previous peshmerga
strongholds. The indiscriminate Iraqi assault caused
over 200,000 Kurds to flee to Iran, including 30,000
peshmerga. Many remaining peshmerga gave up their
weapons and surrendered to the Iraqi forces while
others possibly hid their weapons, hoping to
continue the fight (McDowall, 341).
Overall, the Kurdish-Iraqi War of 1974-75 nearly
destroyed the peshmerga’s fighting ability and with
it the entire Kurdish cause. Once proud peshmerga
veterans could only watch as thousands of Kurds were
relocated, villages were destroyed, and millions
were forcefully integrated into Iraqi society. After
over 40 years of fighting, most for the cause of
Kurdish nationalism, Barzani’s last military
operation was perhaps his greatest failure (McDowall,
342).
The exodus of the KDP leadership and failing health
of Mustafa Barzani created a “power vacuum” in Iraqi
Kurdistan. Loyal KDP members saw leadership pass to
Barzani’s sons Idris and Masud (McDowall, 343).
Although dissention began in the 1960s, without
Barzani’s unifying presence those unhappy with the
direction of the KDP began to create their own
organizations. Among these splinter groups was the
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) which was formed
in Damascus in June 1975 and led by Jalal Talabani.
As a new emerging political power, the PUK formed a
small peshmerga force dedicated to continuing as
well as revitalizing the revolution by conducting
numerous anti-government raids beginning in the
summer of 1975 and continuing throughout 1976. As
the PUK grew in popularity and its peshmerga force
was expanding rapidly, Talabani returned to
Kurdistan from his exile in Damascus. In 1977, in
consultations with other PUK leaders, Talabani
divided his peshmerga into eight harams (battalions)
each in a different district of Iraqi Kurdistan.
Talabani’s PUK popularity enraged the ailing
defeated Mustafa Barzani and caused further dissent
with the KDP, who had no alternative but a belief in
the figure of Barzani and his aforementioned two
sons. Hence, the earliest major clash between KDP
and PUK peshmergas occurred in the Hakkari province
of Turkey—near the triangle borders of Iran, Iraq
and Turkey. This clash, later indentified as the
Hakkari massacre, happened in April 1978 and
resulted in the mass execution of 750 PUK peshmergas,
including their commander Ali Askari who was sent by
Talabani to pick up Syrian arms supply in Turkish
Kurdistan. Askari and his 800-man force was no match
for the 7,500-man KDP force led by Sami Abd al
Rahman (McDowall, 344-345). Thus, hatred, revenge
and lust for power between the two factions
escalated like never before and set the stage for
complicated Kurdish internal conflict.
After Barzani’s death in 1979, the KDP quickly
allied its peshmerga with the Ayatollahs of Iran.
True to their alliance, the KDP peshmergas instantly
began assaulting the anti-Iranian Kurdish Democratic
Party (KDPI) (McDowall, 346). For Idris and Masoud
Barzani, the lust for power was more important than
a Kurdish alliance with the KDPI. Meanwhile, the PUK
leadership, believing conflict among Kurds was
detrimental to the overall cause, opposed the KDP
both politically and militarily. Hence, the two
parties’ peshmergas began attacking each other and
lobbied for Kurdish popular support.
While again splitting Iraqi Kurdistan into north and
south operational regions as they had during the
1960s war, both parties continued to benefit from
the interstate war between Iran and Iraq which
started in 1980 and lasted for eight years.
In 1982 Iran was able to drive much of the Iraqi
forces out of its territories and launch a series of
attacks into Iraq, opening fronts in both southern
Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan. These attacks severely
hampered the ability of the PUK and forced the group
to move their headquarters from the Iran-Iraq border
and closer to Iraqi forces. Seeking a relief from
their heavy losses (McDowall, 348), the PUK
leadership negotiated a ceasefire with Saddam regime
on 3 January 1984.
By January 1985, Saddam’s regime, receiving ample
U.S. aid and agreeing to repeated Turkish military
incursions into southern Kurdistan—attempting to
quell its own Kurdish threat—no longer needed PUK
peshmerga assistance. Nevertheless, the PUK
leadership was able to garner a better position
vis-à-vis the KDP by forcing the latter to agree to
a joint PUK-KDP Kurdistan National Front (KNF) in
February 1987.
The formation of the KNF increased the expectations
of the peshmergas. Unified under a joint command in
May 1987, peshmergas of both sides were able to take
advantage of Iranian military support and expand
their operations, seizing military centers and towns
throughout Iraqi Kurdistan (McDowall, 352).
The combined PUK-KDP-Iranian attacks enraged the
Hussein regime. Commanded by illiterate Iraqi
General Ali Hassan Al-Majid (also known as Chemical
Ali), Iraqi forces killed or deported thousands of
Kurds in order to cut off peshmerga supply lines.
Moreover, by employing a “scorched earth policy” (McDowall,
353), the Iraqi military began using chemical
weapons on peshmerga positions throughout Iraqi
Kurdistan, including the town of Halabja (O’Ballance,
169). The chemical attacks continued as Iraqi armor
and aircraft rapidly deployed to Iraqi Kurdistan,
forcing thousands of Kurds to flee Iraq, including
many peshmerga and their families. Overall, nearly
4,500 villages were destroyed, 1.5 million Kurds
were displaced, and about 182,000 people were
disappeared (McDowall, 360).
Despite the Iraqi government’s unprecedented attack
on Iraqi Kurdistan, the fighting spirit of the
peshmerga lived on. Still united under the KNF, both
Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani understood the
importance of continuing the Kurdish struggle (McDowall,
360). Therefore, both leaders reorganized their
remaining few thousand peshmerga into small strike
teams. The goal of these teams was to reduce Iraqi
military effectiveness and “prevent Baghdad from
hiding the fact of continued resistance” (McDowall,
368). With their new strategy, their peshmergas
conducted several successful ambushes and attacks on
vital Iraqi infrastructures until the onset of the
Operation Desert Storm (ODS) in 1991.
The Peshmerga Forces during
the ODS and the 1991 Kurdish Uprising
Because of the traditional international Cold War
mentality and due to the influences of the Middle
Eastern “Old Guard” politicians, the U.S. government
declined Kurdish support. Despite their neutrality,
peshmerga leadership was not stagnant following the
Kuwait invasion. In accordance with the decisions of
the KNF, the peshmerga expanded their covert forces
in both size and scope, conducted a propaganda
campaign to rekindle Kurdish nationalism,
incorporated Kurdish Iraqi army deserters, and
developed a cooperative network with the jash
elements.
This new peshmerga-jash network allowed the
peshmerga to acquire previously unattainable
support, including intelligence, and forgave the
jash for past their allegiances. Each of these
actions benefited the peshmerga and increased their
effectiveness in the weeks following the first
U.S.-Iraq War.
The spirit of revolution took hold in Iraqi
Kurdistan. KNF peshmerga forces, who had engaged
northern Iraqi military positions several times
since February 27, 1991 (McDowall, 393), came to the
assistance of the jash and Kurdish populace,
conducting initial occupations of towns and manning
tactical positions overlooking popular-controlled
areas. By 14 March, Kurdish officials controlled
nearly 75% of Iraqi Kurdistan.
Led by the peshmergas and largely assisted by the
jash, the Kurdish uprising reached Kirkuk on 17
March (McDowall, 371). However, peshmerga assault on
Kirkuk - the “the Heart and Jerusalem of Kurdistan”-
was not a lasting success. Kurdish optimism in the
region was short-lived. The Iraqi government, two
days later, was permitted by the victorious U.S. and
its coalition forces to quickly reinstate control
over it Kurdistan portion, especially the
oil-rich-city of Kirkuk.
Armed with sophisticated weaponry and with no
international support, the peshmergas were quickly
overpowered and began to disappear. The fear of
Iraqi retribution caused over 1.5 million Kurds to
flee towards both Iran and Turkey (McDowall, 373).
Despite the peshmerga opposition’s ability to slow
down Iraqi ground forces, the Iraq air assault went
unabated, attacking Kurdish refugees and causing
mass confusion on the roads to the border.
Because of the “CNN Affect” and under the auspice of
United Nations Resolution 688, some western nations
and many international organizations came to the aid
of the fleeing Kurds, providing them with basic
necessities such as food and medical care. Among the
lead countries assisting the Kurdish plight was the
U.S., one of few who also believed that the above
resolution also allowed for military protection. In
total, nearly 12,000 U.S. military service members
stayed in Iraq in support of Operation Provide
Comfort (Lortz: 2005, 61).
Peshmergas of the KDP and the PUK played an integral
role in the operations of the U.S. Special Forces
and the other international groups. Despite years of
betrayal and questionable alliances made the
peshmergas initially suspicious, once a bond of
trust was established, the peshmergas began
supporting the U.S. led relief effort.
With U.S. military agreement, peshmerga units
provided security for their allies and eliminated
Iraqi secret agents in the area. After assisting the
relief effort and winning the respect they deserved
from the U.S. Army, the peshmergas were called upon
to ensure the safe travel of civilians as the
Kurdish populace attempted to return to their homes
(Lortz, 62).
The peshmerga Forces after
the Cold War |
Top
After the return of a majority of Kurds to their
cities and villages and the withdrawal of
international forces in July 1991, the peshmerga
again confronted Iraqi forces (McDowall, 373). As
Talabani and Barzani worked in the political arena,
the peshmergas stationed in Erbil and Suleimani
clashed with Iraqi military units and succeeded in
liberating most cities of southern Kurdistan
throughout the fall of 1991.
Knowing his weakened military could not handle an
all-out conflict with the peshmergas and with the
international eye still on the Kurdish situation;
Saddam ordered the withdrawal of his civil servants
and imposed a blockade of Iraqi Kurdistan in late
October 1991. During this time the only income to
Iraqi Kurdistan was provided by tolls manned by
peshmergas from Iraq to Turkey (O’Ballance,
196-197). On the other hand, as negotiations with
Saddam’s regime proved unsuccessful,www.ekurd.netthe
KNF established its own “Kurdistan National
Assembly” (KNA), a freely-elected Iraqi Kurdistan
government. Among the benefits of a Kurdish
government was the ability to create a unified
peshmerga force of 100,000 men and eliminating the
assortment of armed Kurds who had taken to the
streets upon their return (McDowall, 380).
The newly-elected KNA could not hide the tension
between the KDP and the PUK and their respective
peshmerga forces. Thanks to the regional
interferences, by the mid-1990s, peshmergas of the
KDP and the PUK had once more divided Iraqi
Kurdistan (McDowall, 386). The PUK, while having
less manpower with only 12,000 active peshmerga and
6,000 reserves, had greater firepower, including
T-54 and T-55 tanks, artillery pieces, multiple
rocket launchers, 106mm recoilless rifles, light
anti-aircraft machine guns, SA-7s, and 60mm, 82mm,
and 120mm mortars, captured from the defeated Iraqi
military forces in 1991 (Lortz, 63).
KDP and PUK leaderships continued to push their
peshmergas into proxy skirmishes throughout 1995,
killing hundreds and infuriating the Kurdish
populace (Gunter, 235). Ceasefires were signed and
broken as both sides sought regional allies to
strengthen their forces.
The ability of the KDP’s marriage with the Iraqi
devil was evident as Iraqi artillery “softened” PUK
targets before Iraqi tanks and helicopters began
their assault on PUK strong holds. The heaviest
Iraqi attack occurred in Erbil in August 1996 when
3,000 lightly-armed PUK peshmergas faced 40,000
Iraqi armored soldiers backed by the KDP fighters.
The Iraqi military seized Erbil and helped the KDP
peshmerga to push the PUK frontlines closer to the
Iranian border (Lortz, 63).
Though was too late, the Clinton administration
insisted on the peshmergas to halt down their
internal fights if the KDP-PUK leaderships wished to
be included among continuing U.S.-sponsored Iraqi
opposition groups. Unfortunately, for the Kurdish
cause, the nearly decade-long “Kurdish Civil War”
disheartened many Kurdish civilians, as they began
to lose confidence in the political leadership of
the warring factions (McDowall, 391-392).
With coercive diplomacy, the 1998 U.S. sponsored
“Washington Agreement” was reached ending the
internal fighting between the KDP and the PUK
peshmergas. The Agreement laid-down a timetable for:
1.“October 1st 1998: The KDP begins to extend
appropriate financial a quittance on monthly basis
to the public service ministries in the PUK areas.
2.October 15th 1998: Timeline for repatriation of
persons displaced by the former conflict. Agreement
on restoration of property or compensation by
responsible parties.
3.Beginning of November 1998: Joint consultations
with the Government of Turkey.
4.November 1st 1998: Coordination and Cooperation of
humanitarian ministries complete. Revenues
contributed by KDP to the ministries flowing from
KDP areas to PUK areas.
5.November 15th 1998: Progress report on
repatriation, unification of ministries and revenue
sharing.
6.January 1st 1997: First meeting of the interim
assembly. Interim Joint Government establishes a
plan to normalize Erbil, Dohuk and Suleimani.
7.April 1st 1997: Interim Joint Government
establishes a plan for the organization of
elections.
8.July 1st 1997: Regional elections” (Kurdistanica,
1998).
However, the international emergence of the al-Qaeda
terrorist network following the September 11, 2001
attacks on the U.S. did not allow peshmerga weapons
to be silent for very long. Although sporadic
fighting continued with the PKK, the PUK peshmergas
faced their largest threat from Ansar al-Islam, an
al-Qaeda-sponsored terrorist group attempted to
establish itself in Iraqi Kurdistan. Led by Mulla
Krekar, a Kurd of ex-communist and a strict Islamic
faith, Ansar al-Islam was composed of over 500
terrorists, many of whom fled Afghanistan after the
U.S. mission.
Although they were professional in their
mountain-based guerrilla tactics, the PUK peshmergas
had difficulty countering the terrorist methods of
Ansar al-Islam. With alleged support from Iran,
Saudi Arabia, and Iraq, Ansar al-Islam was able to
gain some PUK held rigid terrain. However, U.S.
preparations to oust Saddam Hussein and with initial
KDP support, the PUK peshmergas were able to manage
the conflict.
The Peshmerga Forces during
the Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003)
The deployment of CIA agents to Kurdistan followed
by the 10th U.S. Special Forces Group (SFG)
(Robinson: 2004, 296 cited in Lortz, 66) began a new
era in U.S.-Kurdish relations, an era that would
witness unprecedented cooperation between peshmerga
forces and the most powerful military in the world (Lortz,
66). Arriving in July 2002, the CIA agents claimed
to be on a counterterrorism mission against Ansar
Al-Islam; a mainly Kurdish terrorist group was
holding ground to the east of the Suleimani province
near the Iran-Iraq border prior to the 2003 Iraq
War. However, the CIA rarely worked with the
peshmergas to achieve its claimed mission. According
to Michael Lortz, “[T]he true mission of the CIA was
to acquire intelligence about the Iraqi government
and military” (Lortz, 66).
Due to their traditional practice, the CIA agents,
initially, were not friendly with the peshmergas.
Their method of recruiting and paying informants
undermined the peshmerga’s ability to purchase black
market weapons. However, when the U.S. intention of
removing Saddam’s regime was confirmed, the CIA
relied on peshmerga intelligence gathering; and
eventually cooperated with the KDP-PUK peshmergas to
destroy key Iraqi infrastructures and installations
ahead of the U.S. invasion in March 2003.
In sheer peer manner, the cooperation between the
peshmergas and the U.S SFG was far closer than the
peshmerga-CIA relationship. Upon the arrival of the
SFG in January 2003, the peshmerga became an
integral part of the Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF),
especially in uprooting the Ansar Al-Islam from
Kurdistan.
The destruction of Ansar al-Islam was beneficial to
both the U.S. and Iraqi Kurdistan. For the U.S. SFG,
the removal of Ansar Al-Islam, on the one hand was a
token of friendship given to the Kurds, and it
destroyed a vital part of the al-Qaeda network on
the other hand. As for the peshmergas, the
elimination of Ansar Al-Islam was critically needed
to nullify any future threat to peshmerga operations
during the forthcoming liberation of Iraq and
beyond. As Kurdish trust and confidence in American
intentions established, PUK and KDP peshmergas were
chosen by the U.S. as the best regional allies and
were placed under the direct command of the U.S.
Army (Lortz, 66). The PUK peshmergas were commanded
by U.S. Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Kenneth Tovo and
the KDP peshmergas were led by fellow LTC Robert
Waltemeyer (Robinson, 301 cited in Lortz, 66).
In 2003, to give extra meanings to the Newroz
celebrations—the Kurdish New Year calendar beginning
on 21 March—U.S. forces launched Tomahawk missiles
at selected Ansar al-Islam positions throughout the
Sargat Valley in the district of Sharazour. As the
ground assault began, LTC Tovo led his six mixed PUK
peshmerga-Special Forces units; and, within two
days, the peshmerga-Special Forces teams succeeded
in removing Ansar al-Islam from the Sargat Valley,
killing most and forcing those who remained to flee
over the Iranian border (Robinson, 302-306 cited in
Lortz, 67). The KDP peshmerga-10th SFG operations
involved attacking the Iraqi forces positioned along
the northern part of the “Green Line”—separating
Iraqi forces from the Kurdish forces (Lortz, 67).
As overwhelmed by the U.S. air strikes assaults and
peshmerga artillery fire, Iraqi forces that had
difficult fighting with nearly 100,000 peshmergas
north and west of Mosul city, began a strategic
retreat to positions closer to Kirkuk. While this
was happening, eager peshmerga units began occupying
the vacated Iraqi positions and lead the U.S. forces
into the oil-rich provinces of Mosul and Kirkuk
(Robinson, 325-26 cited in Lortz, 68).
A day after the occupation of Baghdad on 9 April,
2003, the first KDP peshmerga force entered Mosul on
10 April, engaged the Iraqi army, secured their
objectives, and pulled out of the city on 12 April
in accordance with the wishes of the U.S.
leadership.
Though the PUK peshmergas entered and remained in
Kirkuk city against the wishes of the U.S., they had
a valid reason to do so. For the Kurdish leadership
in Iraq, Kirkuk is the core of the Kurdish conflict
with Baghdad governments and the neighboring
countries. PUK argued that its presence in the city
would deter any regional interference in the shaping
of the upcoming Iraqi government. Therefore,
securing the contested city by Kurds meant to have a
better position in negotiating a new political
system that Iraq needs to be governed by.
In any case, the joint Kurdistani-U.S. attacks from
21 March to 12 April 2003 defeated thirteen Iraqi
divisions, prevented Iraqi forces from reinforcing
their southern defenses, captured strategic
airfields throughout northern Iraq (Robinson, 340
cited in Lortz, 68), and reduced the ability of the
Ansar Al-Islam to terrorize the Kurdish population
in Iraq.
As Lortz asserts, “[t]he Kurdish peshmerga, assisted
by the U.S. military, were finally able to defeat
the Iraqi military and topple its oppressive
leadership. The fighting spirit of the peshmerga had
succeeded in forcing a new chapter in Kurdish
history - yet another era of attempted power sharing
between Arabs and Kurds (Lortz, 68).
The Peshmerga Forces in the
post-2003 Iraq
As the U.S. liberated Iraq from the tyrannical
regime of Saddam Hussein, the Bush administration,
scrutinized by some powerful members of the United
Nations, was forced to accept its role in Iraq as an
occupying country. Accordingly, the U.S.
administration established the Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA) in Iraq. With transitional
responsibility, the CPA decided to reconstruct and
reconstitute Iraq.
These fundamental changes created challenges and
opportunities for the CPA and the U.S. forces. The
challenges can be grouped into three settings: Iraqi
multi-communal challenges, the nondemocratic
totalitarian mindset and the postwar international
legitimacy. Of the most critical challenges the CPA
had to deal with was the deep-rooted Iraqi polity
(Dobbins and et al.: 2003, 168).
Unfortunately, the CPA preferred dealing with the
nondemocratic totalitarian challenges by dissolving
the Iraqi army and implementing the ill-advised de-Ba’athification
policy. The result was a rapidly growing resistance
which helped nurturing and expanding the Al-Qaeda
network in Iraq.
As tested during the liberation of Iraq,
Kurds—politically and militarily—were ready to meet
some of these challenges. Politically, Kurdish
leadership engaged with most Iraqi influential
figures opposing the U.S. presence. With U.S.
backings, Kurdish leaders encouraged Arab Sunni
leaders to participate in the new Iraqi political
process. However, for the peshmergas to participate
in peace-building and occasional peace-enforcement
missions, the KDP and PUK leaders insisted on
getting full recognition for their Kurdish forces.
Though Kurds did not get all they wanted, the CPA
allowed the Kurds to retain their existing peshmerga
forces in its drafted Transitional Administrative
Law (TAL). Adopted by the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC)
in March 2004, Article 54(A) of the TAL stipulates
that:
“The Kurdistan Regional Government shall continue to
perform its current functions throughout the
transitional period, except with regard to those
issues which fall within the exclusive competence of
the federal government as specified in this Law.
Financing for these functions shall come from the
federal government, consistent with current practice
and in accordance with Article 25(E) of this Law.
The Kurdistan Regional Government shall retain
regional control over police forces and internal
security, and it will have the right to impose taxes
and fees within the Kurdistan region” (CPA, 2004).
The legal interpretation for the above mentioned
sub-article provides a legitimate status for the
peshmerga forces. Accordingly, the Kurdish
leadership agreed to send their peshmergas to
partake in operations with the Coalition Forces.
Many peshmergas became border guards or were
assigned to protect vital oil pipelines and others
continued operations with the U.S. Special Forces.
According to Lortz, nearly 7,000 peshmergas,
nicknamed “Peshrambo”, were trained in commando
operations and assisted in the hunt for Ansar
al-Islam and other Al-Qaeda related militants (Lortz,
69).
As the TAL and its Annexes legitimized the existence
of the peshmerga forces, close to 35,000 peshmergas
enrolled in the Kurdish Border Guards (KBG)
formations. After receiving proper training at the
Qalachuwalan and Zakho military academies, scores of
young and intellectual peshmergas graduated as
military officers serving in the newly formed Iraqi
Army. The remaining peshmergas involved in assisting
the U.S. forces with interrogations,
flash-checkpoints and peace-enforcement missions.
Yet, when the Iraqi anti-Kurdish elements complained
of too much power has been given to the Kurdish
peshmergas and asked for their disbandment, leaders
of the KDP and the PUK responded with firm answers.
In official statements Masoud Barzani insisted the
KDP keep their peshmerga, calling them a “symbol of
the resistance” (Sharp: 2005, 5-6 cited in Lortz,
71). Jalal Talabani also contributed to the idea of
retaining a loyal peshmerga force by discussing
initiatives that would invest in accommodations for
peshmergas, including housing and a special
peshmerga store.
Furthermore, in a joint letter, dated June 1, 2004,
and communicated to the U.S. president George W.
Bush, Masoud Barzani of the KDP and Jalal Talabani
of the PUK raised concerns with some U.S. diplomats
who were echoing anti-Kurdish sentiments about the
peshmerga identity. Among other things, the letter
states that:
“A year ago, our peshmerga forces fought side by
side with the American forces for the liberation of
Iraq, taking more casualties than any other US ally.
Today, Kurdistan remains the only secure and stable
part of Iraq. We note that, in contrast to the Arab
areas of Iraq, no coalition soldier has been killed
in the area controlled by the Kurdistan Regional
Government…US officials have demeaned the peshmerga,
calling this disciplined military force that was
America’s battlefield comrade in arms, ‘militia’” (Navend,
2004).
Although the peshmerga’s military status has been
contested, Iraqi Arab political relations with the
Kurdish leadership took a large step forward when
the PUK leader Jalal Talabani was elected President
of Iraq in May 2005. With Masoud Barzani elected
President of Iraqi Kurdistan in June 2005, the
potential to achieve the goals of generations of
peshmergas became greatly enhanced.
Yet, as the new Iraqi Constitution was ratified by a
referendum on 15 October 2005, peshmerga forces
gained unprecedented constitutional status. The
Fifth Section of Article 121 states as following:
“The Regional Government shall be responsible for
all the administrative requirements of the region,
particularly the establishment and organization of
the internal security forces for the region such as
police, security forces and guards of the region” (USIP,
2006).
According to Jabar Yawar, KRG Minister of Peshmerga
Affairs, “[t]his is (the constitutional right) by
far the most acceptable legal remedy for the KRG in
transforming the 100,000 peshmergas into Kurdish
National Guards (KNG) and effective police and
security forces” (Ali, 2007).
The KRG also negotiated with the Iraqi federal
government the formation of three Iraqi army
brigades each with over 3,000 former peshmergas to
be stationed only in Iraqi Kurdistan. However, as
the sectarian violence escalated in central Iraq
throughout 2006 and the first half of 2007, the
Coalition Forces requested these Kurdish guards and
army units to temporarily be deployed to the
provinces of Baghdad, Diyala, Salahaddin, and Mosul
to keep the peace and participate in civil military
affairs. In fact, according to a Kurdish-Globe
report, Dr. Mahmoud Al-Mash’hadani—a Sunni Arab,
Chairman of the Iraqi Council of Representative, “in
a closed session of the Iraqi Parliament last
month…had called upon the Kurdish leadership to send
Peshmerga forces to Baghdad to protect the
lawmakers” (Kirkuki, 2006).
Like the Americans, Kurdish troops are a slender
peacekeeping force standing between the warring
Sunni Arabs and Shiite Arabs and to fighting
insurgents. U.S. commanders consider them a critical
part of the peace enforcement in Baghdad and other
troubled spots of Iraq because of their fighting
prowess and perceived neutrality. In May 2007, more
than 2,100 peshmergas were deployed to Baghdad‘s
troubled Bayya area. Then on June 14, Radio Free
Iraq (RFI) reported that “more than 2,000 Kurdish
Peshmerga fighters will be sent to help achieve
security in the volatile Diyala province upon the
request of the Iraqi government and the
Multi-National Forces” (RFI, 2007). These Kurdish
soldiers have been instrumental in taking the U.S.
peace enforcement troops to neighbourhoods and
quarters in Iraqi urbanized centres that previously
were off limits to them. Thanks to peshmerga help,
present-day Iraq is 70% safer than it was in 2006.
Conclusion
This paper has attempted to account for the
development of the peshmerga and its role in the
Kurdish struggle in Iraq as well as its role in
peace enforcement in post-2003 Iraq. While
supporting Kurdish nationalism, the peshmerga’s
continuous defiance of Iraqi Arab authority, despite
being frequently outnumbered or overpowered, have
reinvigorated the Kurdish spirit. To mention the
peshmerga in passing, as many authors have done, or
to label the peshmerga as merely “militias”, is to
marginalize the contribution of the organized
Kurdish fighting force in Kurdish history. For a
people who have depended on their fighting ability
for centuries in order to maintain their national
identity, it is difficult to see the Kurdish in Iraq
without the peshmerga forces.
As seen in this paper, not only have previous
interastate agreements been nullified, but the Kurds
have also been “abandoned” by three of the world’s
premier superpowers: the British in the 1920s, the
Soviet Union in the 1940s, and the U.S. in both the
1970s and the 1990s. It is little surprise then that
after gaining power the Kurds would be hesitant to
disband their only real source of self-defense.
The ideal of the peshmerga as “guardians” of Kurdish
nationalism will continue far beyond the generation
of Mustafa and Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani. As
older peshmerga step away from the battlefield and
assume political roles, new peshmerga fill the ranks
to protect their national identity and to help bring
peace to those who live in violence.
References:
1.Ali, Nuri (25 June 2005). KRG agrees that
peshmerga will become 'regional guard'. Kurdistani
New (Kurdish daily), p. A2.
2.Eagleton, William Jr. (1963). The Kurdish Republic
of 1946. Oxford University Press.
3.Ghassemlou, Abdul Rahman (1965). Kurdistan and the
Kurds. Publishing House of the Czechoslovak Academy
of Sciences, Collet’s Ltd.
4.Gunter, Michael M. (Spring 1996). The KDP-PUK
Conflict in Northern Iraq. The Middle East Journal,
Vol. 50, No. 2, pgs 225-241.
5.Izady, Mehrdad R. (1992). The Kurds: A Concise
Handbook. Taylor and Francis, 1992.
6.Kirkuki, Hawar (28 December 2006). Kurds make
breakthrough on talks with Iraq. The Kurdish Globe,
p. A1.
7.Lortz, Michael G. (2005), (Thesis) Willing to Face
Death: A History of Kurdish Military Forces—the
peshmerga—from the Ottoman Empire to Present-Day
Iraq. The Florida State University, Collage of
Social Sciences.
8.McDowall, David. A Modern History of the Kurds.
I.B. Tauris, 2004.
9.O’Ballance, Edgar (1996). The Kurdish Struggle
1920-94. MacMillan Press, Ltd.
10.Radio Free Iraq (14 June 2007). 2,000 Kurdish
Peshmerga fighters to keep security in Diala.
Retrieved on 23 February, 2008 from: http://www.iraqupdates.com/p_articles.php/article/p_articles.php/article/18333
11.Robinson, Linda (2004). Masters of Chaos: The
Secret History of the Special Forces. Public
Affairs.
12.Sharp, Jeremy M. (25 March 2005). Iraq’s New
Security Forces: The Challenge of Sectarian and
Ethnic Influences. CRS Report for Congress, 25 March
2005.
13.Full text of the Washington Agreement between the
KDP and the PUK leaders, available at: http://www.kurdistanica.com/english/legal/papers/doc-0001.html
14.Full text of the CPA’s Transitional
Administration Law is available at:
http://www.cpa-iraq.org/government/TAL.html
15.The joint Barzani and Talabani letter to the U.S.
President George W. Bush, available at
http://www.navend.de/aktuell/pdf/2004-06-17/Brief%20Talabani%20und%20Barzani.doc
16.Unofficial English translation of the Iraqi
Constitution by the United Nations Assistance
Mission for Iraq, available at: http://www.usip.org/ruleoflaw/projects/unami_iraq_constitution.pdf
Copyright, respective
author or news agency
Top |
Kurd Net
does not take credit for and is not responsible for the content of news
information on this page
|